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                                                  Abstract 
There is a common opinion among researchers and experts that efficient management of 
radio spectrum plays a vital role in ensuring universal access to telecommunications 
services. The objective of this study was to identify radio spectrum reforms and their 
associated effects on market liberalisation. It was postulated that appropriate radio 
spectrum reforms would be catalysts for market liberalisation. The evolution of command-
and-control approaches in relation to market-based approaches was assessed.  
The research involved literature critique, review of policies as that relates to history of 
radio spectrum management in South Africa and across the world, and radio spectrum 
regulations analysis in South Africa. Interviews of radio spectrum industry experts and 
documents study of the evolution of telecommunications regulatory environment with 
respect to radio spectrum management and market liberalisation were also used as main 
sources of research. 
The purpose of the literature critique, review of policies, regulations and documents was 
to identify hints of radio spectrum reforms and measure qualitatively the extent of market 
liberalisation. While interviews of radio spectrum industry experts were used to ascertain 
industry response to strides made as far as radio spectrum and market liberalisation in 
South Africa. 
It was observed that initially, in most parts of the world and in South Africa, market 
liberalisation progressed quickly despite appreciable correlation with radio spectrum 
reforms. Early radio spectrum reforms, such as the establishment of an independent 
regulator of the industry and radio spectrum, had contributed to some level of market 
liberalisation with creation of oligopolistic telecommunication market, and had increased 
to radio spectrum by Vodacom, MTN and Cell C having access to both 900 MHz and 
1800 MHz bands. However, perpetual practise of command-and-control, an efficient radio 
spectrum management encouraged hoarding. 
The literature review and interview provided seven main contributions of reforms in the 
form of strides. These strides formed the basis for the research framework: 1) 
establishment of an independent regulator of the industry and radio spectrum, 2) 
increased access to radio spectrum, 3) service and technology neutrality on radio 
spectrum, 4) essential facilities to enable sharing, 5) market-based approaches radio 
spectrum pricing: AIP, 6) service-based competition versus infrastructure-based 
competition, and 7) non-rival, non-exclusive usage of radio spectrum.   
The conclusion is that increasing access to radio spectrum and the independent regulator 
were not primary determinants of market liberalisation. An analytic framework has been 
used to show that market liberalisation reached a plateau phase, with a few incumbents 
becoming dominant and creating an oligopolistic market structure. It is at this point that 
further market liberalisation could be stimulated by additional radio spectrum reforms. The 
command-and-control approach remains the main bottleneck source for access and 
efficiency in radio spectrum management, which encourages rival and exclusive use of 
  
radio spectrum. It has been observed that market-based radio spectrum reforms have 
also entrenched rivalry and exclusivity in the use of radio spectrum. Radio spectrum 
reforms that encourage non-rivalry and non-exclusivity, such as open-access to radio 
spectrum, are highly recommended in this research. 
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1 CHAPTER ONE: RADIO SPECTRUM REFORMS AND MARKET 
LIBERALISATION  
1.1 INTRODUCTION  
This chapter introduces the research topic and background information with particular 
focus on telecommunications impacted by radio spectrum reform and the effect on market 
liberalisation. 
The research seeks to explore the required radio spectrum reforms necessary to enable 
South Africa to fulfil national objectives as defined in the National Development Plan 
(NDP) and South Africa Connect (the National Broadband Policy), which among others 
includes market liberalisation. This is necessary to achieve universal access for 
broadband services. It is acknowledged that South Africa Connect objectives will be 
achieved through a combination of wired and wireless technologies (DoC, 2013). 
However, the focus of this research limits the scope to wireless networks only. 
In terms of the NDP and South Africa Connect, there is a need to improve competition in 
the industry in order to reduce the cost of communication, while achieving universal 
access. To achieve this, further market liberalisation is required. According to the NDP 
and South Africa Connect policy documents, ineffective radio spectrum management 
causes a bottleneck or limitation to competition in the market. Even in the case of South 
Africa and other countries in the world, market liberalisation initially occurred without radio 
spectrum reforms making much strides. However, it appears that after a plateau phase 
of market liberalisation, radio spectrum reforms can be employed as a necessary catalyst 
for stimulating further liberalisation. This is the reason behind conducting this research as 
a means to explore the case for radio spectrum reform in South Africa. 
1.2 BACKGROUND  
The emerging mega trends in communication, such as cloud computing and big data, are 
arguing over networks with ubiquitous accessibility and dynamic management. Especially 
in wireless communication, the introduction of smartphones and tablets is behind the 
exponentially growing popularity of rich content (example: online gaming, mobile TV and 
social networks. The end user’s demand for rich content can be fulfilled by the availability 
of broadband networks (GSMA, 2015).    
Broadly, there is a requirement for high quality broadband networks for all by 2030, with 
the capability to support high data traffic speeds. This can be facilitated by radio spectrum 
reform and market liberalisation (DoC, 2013). It has therefore been identified that one of 
the main ingredients necessary towards creating an enabling environment to achieve 
ubiquitous accessibility to the broadband network is through efficient allocation and 
assignment of radio spectrum (spectrum management reforms) (DoC, 2013).   
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Furthermore, radio spectrum reform is required because of the increased number of 
technologies that now depend on it as compared to earlier years as seen in Figure 1. 
Telecommunications and broadband is believed to be a vital element in setting the 
country’s economic growth back on track. This assumption is supported by research done 
on broadband contribution to GDP growth, which confirms a 10% increment in broadband 
penetration has a potential to result in an additional 1.38% in GDP growth (Qiang & 
Rossotto, 2009). These results are only applicable for countries with a low to middle-
income majority. While for OECD countries, a 10% increase in broadband penetration is 
proportional to a range of between 0.9 and 1.5 percentage points increase per-capita 
GDP (Czernich, Falck, Kretschmer, & Woessman, 2009). As mentioned above, radio 
spectrum reforms are among the necessary catalysts to enhancing broadband 
penetration.  
Ordinarily, radio spectrum reform is viewed as an evolution away from the command-and-
control approach to radio spectrum management. Regulators in most countries have 
followed a command-and-control approach in radio spectrum management about ten 
decades ago, which is a prescriptive approach (Cave, Doyle, & Webb, 2007). In the South 
African context, this was a well-supported approach for government institutions (military, 
police, emergency agencies, etc.) and state owned companies (SOCs) such as Sentech, 
Transnet, Telkom and Eskom. The support was based on their assured monopoly status 
in the market. For example, prior to the 1990’s only SOCs were able to use radio spectrum 
for microwave point-to-point links. 
In the mid-1990s, South Africa embarked on a programme for managed market 
liberalisation of the telecommunications sector. In implementing this programme, the 
allocation and assignment of radio spectrum was still based on command-and-control as 
opposed to market-based approaches (Zimri, 2013). For example, prior to 2005, only 
Telkom was assigned radio spectrum to build infrastructure for interconnection and 
wireless backbone links. This meant that private companies were obliged to rely on 
Telkom and other incumbents for provisioning of wireless backbone links, forcing a 
vertically integrated market structure 
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Figure 1: Radio spectrum dependency trend 
 
Source: Researchers’ own    
Similarly, Telkom exclusively used radio spectrum and technology for the last mile as 
opposed to interconnections as it given to the mobile operators prescribed by radio 
spectrum licences. The Global System for Mobile (GSM) was a prescribed technology for 
the 900 MHz and 1800 MHz radio spectrum bands assigned to MTN and Vodacom and 
later Cell-C (RSA, 2001). Following the same command-and-control approach, the 
Independent Communication Authority of South Africa (ICASA) licensed the radio 
spectrum to operators in 2001 through a ministerial policy directive for the provision of 3G 
services (RSA, 2001). 
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Figure 2: Radio spectrum assignment proportion of South Africa 
 
Source: Ngwenya  
The command-and-control approach in radio spectrum management has resulted in 
inefficient allocation and assignment of radio spectrum in an oligopolistic market structure, 
where a few operators dominate the market. Only about 600 MHz of the 1167 MHz radio 
spectrum allocated by the International Telecommunication Union (ITU) for broadband is 
currently assigned to a few operators in South Africa (Ngwenya, 2011).   
MTN, Vodacom,Telkom and Cell C‘s network all account for 75% geographical coverage, 
well over 95% population coverage and mobile penetration of 136.2% (BMT, 2013). There 
are roughly 400 potential network and service licensees who have no access to radio 
spectrum (ICASA, 2014a). The current radio spectrum regulatory regime by ICASA does 
not present a fair platform for these licensees to compete for radio spectrum access. This 
explains the low level of competition, and consequently the high cost of communication, 
low penetration and low adoption of broadband in South Africa in the context of the 
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majority of South African population spending 4, 6% of their total household expenditure 
on ICT products (StatsSA, 2015). Figure 2 depicts the South African radio spectrum 
holdings that provided wireless broadband services from the year 2000 to 2010. 
As the demand for more radio spectrum or access to radio spectrum increases as 
depicted in Figure 1, it is clear that the traditional command-and-control approach in radio 
spectrum management will become inadequate and create artificial scarcity of radio 
spectrum. 
1.3 STATE OF REGULATORY ENVIRONMENT IN SOUTH AFRICA 
1.3.1 Market liberalisation  
According to the ITU, market liberalisation has to do with long-term competition to ensure 
sustainable markets. The main supporting arguments for market liberalisation and 
competition are low costs, low entry barriers and innovation  (ITU, 2005b). 
South Africa embarked on a managed liberalisation process since 1996, which started 
with a white paper on telecommunications (RSA, 1996a). The white paper was the first 
policy document to be adopted by South Africa on telecommunication related matters in 
the dawn of democracy in 1994. Other than the need to enable private operators in the 
market, the white paper made provision for radio spectrum management issues. It further 
made provision for the need for a regulator that would be responsible for radio spectrum 
regulation and licensing in the public interest (Horwitz, 2001).  
The result of the Policy white paper was the promulgation of the Telecommunications Act 
No. 103 of 1996. The objects of this Act included, among others, universal access and 
services to telecommunications, limited competition in the telecommunication industry, 
protection of telecommunication users and consumer interests, and efficient use of radio 
spectrum (RSA, 1996b). The Act further established the South African 
Telecommunication Regulatory Authority (SATRA) with the authority to “control, plan, 
administer, manage, and license the radio spectrum” (RSA, 1996b). 
Prior to the Act of 1996, as part of managed liberalisation, the market was opened for two 
mobile operators (MTN and Vodacom) in 1994. Later in 2001, Cell-C was introduced as 
the third mobile operator. The year 2006 saw the introduction of Neotel, making it the 
second national operator for fixed services. Neotel’s introduction aimed to act as a 
competitor for Telkom. This was part of the continuation of the managed liberalisation 
process following the 2001 ministerial policy directions. In terms of the 
Telecommunications Act of 1996, Telkom was granted an exclusive period for 
provisioning of backbone and interconnection infrastructure (Horwitz, 2001). 
It is important to note that even though the market was being liberalised, command-and-
control in management of radio spectrum continued to be entrenched. For example, the 
radio spectrum and technology used by the mobile operators had to be issued as part of 
the service licence. Radio spectrum for microwave backhaul and point-to-multipoint, 
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ranging from 6 GHz to 38 GHz, as well as radio spectrum for wireless local loop was 
exclusively given to Telkom.  Several other radio spectrum licences were issued by 
decree through first-come-first-served or other non-market-based methods (Kedama, 
2014). 
1.3.2 Moving from Convergence to the Broadband Era 
In trying to keep pace with convergence, the South African Government published a 
Convergence Bill in 2003. The Bill started with the provision of the government’s position 
towards convergence, which was later enshrined in the Electronic Communications 
Act. In addition, there was promulgation of the ICASA Act, which merged the former 
separate telecommunications and broadcasting regulators to create ICASA (RSA, 2000). 
These two pieces of legislation became the primary legislation for the management of 
radio spectrum in the convergence era in South Africa. This legislation facilitated flexibility 
in the licensing framework where the prescriptive way of assigning radio spectrum was 
removed and replaced with a flexible approach through the introduction of technology 
neutrality in the licensing regime. 
The legislation further centralised the radio spectrum management to the minister and the 
regulator. In terms of section 3(1) (a) of the Electronic Communications Act 2005 (ECA), 
the minister is responsible to make policy for radio spectrum (RSA, 2005). The legislation 
further grants the minister the power to approve the South African national radio spectrum 
band plan. In terms of section 34(1) of the ECA, the minister is empowered to represent 
the country at the International Telecommunications Union (ITU), a United Nation’s 
agency, where allocation of radio spectrum to different radio communications service is 
agreed (RSA, 2005). It is also the responsibility of the minister to represent the country in 
regional and international coordination of radio spectrum, which deals with interference 
issues (RSA, 2005). 
On the other hand, ICASA is given the responsibility to control, plan, administer and 
manage the radio spectrum, and to grant, amend, renew, transfer, and revoke radio 
spectrum licenses in terms of  section 4 (3) (c) (e) of the ICASA Act of 2002 and sections 
30 and 31 of ECA (RSA, 2005) and (RSA, 2000). In terms of section 34(2), the regulator 
is further mandated to develop the national radio spectrum band plan, which has to be 
approved by the minister (RSA, 2000). For five years 2009-2014, both the Department of 
Communications and ICASA made a number of proposals in the form of policy directions 
and regulations in an effort to release the high demand radio spectrum, a process that to 
date is yet to be concluded. This has put at risk the realisation of policy goals as stipulated 
in the National Development Plan of 100% broadband access by 2030, more so the 
broadband targets as pronounced in SA Connect, National Broadband Policy (NDP, 
2012, p. 190) and (DoC, 2013, p. 18). 
In addition, the delay has resulted in a policy and regulatory vacuum on radio spectrum 
management and has further caused confusion in the ICT sector. One of the reasons for 
the confusion and delay is the South African scenario where there is the misperception 
that regulator and policy maker have concurrent jurisdiction on radio spectrum 
management. In point of law, the legislation states that the Minister may make policies on 
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matters of national policy applicable to the ICT sector, and related legislation in relation 
to radio spectrum, this provision gives the minister the power to make recommendations 
through policy (RSA, 2005). The legislation further states that the regulator controls, 
plans, administers and manages the use and licensing of the radio spectrum. This 
provision of the legislation gives the regulator the power to decide and implement a 
framework a licensing framework to assign radio spectrum (RSA, 2005). This explains 
the observed conflict between political and business interests. 
The proposals in the published draft Invitations to Apply (ITAs) on application of radio 
spectrum licence for the purpose of providing broadband wireless access services in 3.5 
GHz and 2.6 GHz. Proposed draft policy directions on electronic communications 
services in high demand radio spectrum on one hand continues to entrench the traditional 
approach of command-and-control on radio spectrum assignment, on the other hand is 
introducing radio spectrum reforms, as discussed below. 
1.3.3 Recent developments in radio spectrum regulations and policy 
In May 2010, ICASA issued facilities leasing regulations. The purpose of the regulations, 
among other things, is to provide for the requirements for the leasing of communications 
facilities (ICASA, 2010a). This gave effect to open-access as a reform as provided for in 
section 43 of the ECA. Section 43 provides for obligation to lease communication 
facilities. This was an effort by the regulator to introduce reforms through facilities leasing, 
a regulatory tool that has elements of sharing. 
In 2009, because of global development and interest around WiMAX networks offering 
another means of offloading traffic, ICASA issued an ITA for licensing the remaining 
portion of the 2.6 GHz and 3.5 GHz bands. The ITA entrenched traditional centralised 
command-and-control, a prescriptive approach with some radio spectrum reforms. Firstly, 
the ITA specified the kind of network to be rolled-out for the radio spectrum to be 
assigned. Secondly, it provided that radio spectrum would be used for providing municipal 
broadband wireless access (ICASA, 2010b). Thirdly, the ITA, proposed auctions as the 
preferred method to award radio spectrum in South Africa. This was the first time a 
market-based approach was considered for radio spectrum licensing in South Africa, 
which was an attempt by the regulator to introduce radio spectrum reforms (ICASA, 
2010b). 
Draft regulations outlining the procedure and criteria for granting high demand spectrum 
accompanied the ITA. The ITA was later withdrawn by the regulator. The principles were 
later incorporated in the radio spectrum regulations of 2011 (ICASA, 2011b). 
The rationale behind the withdrawal was that there is a need for the re-evaluation of 
assignment methods, where band design needs to be reconsidered given the 
technological developments (ICASA, 2010d). Part of the debate at the time in the 
telecommunication sector was around whether auction is an accepted method to assign 
high demand radio spectrum. Sections of government, including the minister, were not in 
favour of auctions as the method to assign high demand radio spectrum for South Africa, 
which resulted in delays to assign radio spectrum. 
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On 27 August 2010, ICASA published regulations on radio spectrum license fees, which 
provides that Administrative Incentive Pricing (AIP) will be the method to be used for radio 
spectrum fees, a method already adopted by countries such as the UK in 1998 (ICASA, 
2010e) . AIP is a pseudo-market-based approach used by the regulator to charge annual 
fees to the radio spectrum licensees. It is more relevant in an environment where radio 
spectrum trading rules are not clearly articulated (Marcus, 2012).   
AIP radio spectrum licence fee regulation by ICASA is another stride towards market 
liberalisation. This reform is not inherently prescriptive AIP because it is driven from an 
administrative approach through its implementation. It does not exclusively remove some 
of the characteristics of command and control. Through AIP, ICASA will determine the 
price for the radio spectrum through a standardised prescribed formula as opposed to the 
market directly.The rationale behind ICASA’s adoption of AIP is to continue the 
modernisation of radio spectrum regulations and keep abreast with international 
developments and trends of ensuring radio spectrum efficiency and to discourage 
spectrum hoarding (ICASA, 2010e).   
AIP regulation attempted to address challenges brought by a legacy of radio spectrum 
assignments. Legacy radio spectrum refers to the radio spectrum assigned to government 
entities such as Telkom and Sentech through first-come-first-served and beauty contest 
methods before the regulator became empowered. The approach of first-come- first-
served and beauty contest encouraged radio spectrum hoarding and led to inaccurate 
evaluation of radio spectrum by the regulator and some inefficiency in terms of usage of 
radio spectrum as scarce natural resource by these entities. Since the implementation of 
the regulation, Telkom returned some of the radio spectrum it was not efficiently using 
and Sentech returned all its high demand assigned radio spectrum (Kedama, 2014). The 
implementation of AIP regulation by ICASA in 2012 partly succeeded, firstly in placing a 
more accurate evaluation on radio spectrum holdings. Secondly, the regulation 
introduced greater efficiencies, particularly where radio spectrum assignments for access 
networks were used for point-to-point links (Kedama, 2014). Thirdly, the regulation 
assisted in implementing the “use it or lose it” principle to mitigate radio spectrum 
hoarding.    
Subsequently, in an effort to implement the converged legislation ECA, the minister 
published the draft policy directions on the use of digital dividend and licensing of high 
demand radio spectrum in 800 MHz and 2.6 GHz bands in 2011 (RSA, 2011). To date 
this policy direction is still a draft and is yet to be finalised by the minister, which resulted 
in another delay in assigning radio spectrum required for broadband services. 
The 2011 draft policy direction on electronic communications services in high demand 
radio spectrum introduced some radio spectrum reforms. Firstly, it directed ICASA to 
assign radio spectrum licensees to potential operators who will participate in the 
contribution to broad-based black economic empowerment. Secondly, ICASA was 
directed to issue radio spectrum to new entrants (RSA, 2011). Thirdly, the draft policy 
direction directed ICASA to consider radio spectrum auction as an assignment method to 
assign high demand radio spectrum (RSA, 2011). This is another attempt by the policy to 
introduce radio spectrum reform.The policy directions also pronounced that in order to 
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ensure efficient usage of radio spectrum, the possible usage of TV white spaces 
technologies should be explored by ICASA (RSA, 2011). 
1.3.4 Radio spectrum reforms in the broadband era  
At the end of 2011, ICASA resuscitated the process to release the high demand radio 
spectrum, this time excluding 3.5 GHz in the combinational assignment of 800 MHz and 
2.6 GHZ. ICASA issued another ITA on draft assignment plan for the combinational 
licensing of 800 MHz and 2.6 GHz, the process that was halted pending finalisation of 
policy direction by the minister. 
The ITA attempted to introduce aspects of radio spectrum reforms by firstly, introducing 
radio spectrum sharing, which further introduces flexibility in radio spectrum usage. The 
attempt was made through the reservation of 20 MHz radio spectrum in the 2.6 GHz band 
for radio spectrum commons for the purposes of sharing and self- managing the radio 
spectrum by users. The sharing in this regard should be achieved by users on agreed 
rules or per prescribed rules by ICASA (ICASA, 2010b). Secondly, the pronouncement of 
assignment of 40 MHz radio spectrum in the 800 MHz band and 70 MHz radio spectrum 
in the 2.6 GHZ band in order to provide network services on a wholesale open-access 
with the purpose of allowing other entities to provide services (ICASA, 2011a). 
Subsequently in March 2011, ICASA published radio spectrum regulations to revise the 
radio regulations issued in terms of Radio Act of 1952. The purpose of these regulations 
among, other things is to prescribe ways and requirements for awarding radio spectrum 
licences for competing applications or to meet the demand in cases where there is not 
enough radio spectrum (ICASA, 2011b).    
In 2013, ICASA published the radio spectrum migration regulations and radio spectrum 
migration plan. The purpose of these Regulations and Plan was to establish the 
framework by which ICASA can migrate users of radio spectrum under the national radio 
spectrum plan (ICASA, 2013a). The radio spectrum plan sets out the intentions of the 
regulator with regard to future migrations of users. 
1.4 GLOBAL TRENDS IN RADIO SPECTRUM REFORMS AND MARKET 
LIBERALISATION 
1.4.1 Command-and-Control 
Globally radio spectrum allocations and assignment have been based on a command-
and-control philosophy, which is a traditional radio spectrum management approach that 
supports a rigid procedure for radio spectrum assignment and allocation. For example, 
this means allocating one specific service on a specific band. An example of this is the 
television (TV) broadcasting allocation that cannot change over space and time 
(Olafsson, Glover, & Nekovee, 2007).   
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However, for the past few years there have been several important improvements that   
informed radio spectrum reforms such as radio spectrum commons, radio spectrum 
property rights, and radio spectrum auctions with an attempt to move towards market-
based approaches. This has also included the technological development to enhance 
radio spectrum reforms such as dynamic radio spectrum access and cognitive radio in 
the radio spectrum policy and regulatory domain to accelerate opportunistic uses of radio 
spectrum (Chapin & Lehr, 2007). Through radio spectrum reforms, both the specific 
assignments to specific transmitters can and have changed, as well as the allocation in 
terms of the 700 MHz and 800 MHz digital dividends.  
To date the command-and-control assignment approach continues to be employed even 
in markets that are perceived to be liberal. Both developing and developed countries such 
as the UK, USA, New Zealand, India, South Africa and Nigeria have used and are still 
using the command-and-control approach despite introduction of  market-based methods 
such as auctions. Figure 3 is the radio spectrum chart published by ICASA based on the 
command-and-control management approach employed in South Africa. 
Under the command-and-control approach, these countries have assigned radio 
spectrum on a “first-come-first-served” basis since the demand for radio spectrum was 
considerably less than supply. However, where radio spectrum demand exceeds supply, 
there was a need to choose between competing applicants. In that instance, countries 
will opt to use comparative hearings or “beauty contests” as an option for assignment of 
radio spectrum. This approach is based on some specific requirements, such as the 
financial and the technical capacity of the applicant (ITU, 2004). In some cases on 
employment of command-and-control approach, lotteries were also used to award radio 
spectrum licences where the method used will be random selection of applicants (ITU, 
2004). 
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Figure 3: South African radio spectrum allocation chart 
 
Source: Chiwewe & Hanker, 2015   
For example, in the United States of America, the national regulator, the Federal 
Communication Commission (FCC), has the centralised authority of assigning and 
allocating civilian radio spectrum. In the early years when the regulator attempted to 
implement the Telecommunications Act, it adopted a variety of methods to assign radio 
spectrum for commercial use, such as first-come-first-served basis and comparative 
hearings to assign radio spectrum (ITU, 2004). The approach was, where there was more 
than one applicant for a portion of available radio spectrum, the regulator used an 
alternative method referred to as comparative hearings method. In this method, the 
applicants are afforded an opportunity to motivate why they should be awarded radio 
spectrum instead of the other applicants (GAO, 2003). In 1983, the FCC allocated the 
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radio spectrum for the first generation of mobile technologies/networks using command-
and-control. It used the radio spectrum, which was originally designated for the use of 
broadcasting service. This process of reallocation of the radio spectrum from 
broadcasting services effectively gave birth to the mobile industry in the US (GAO, 2003). 
The USA did not only assign radio spectrum through beauty contests. It also employed 
lotteries as a method to assign radio spectrum. In the 1980s Congress authorised the 
FCCto use lotteries to assign radio spectrum which allowed the regulator to randomly 
award radio spectrum licensees from a qualified applicant pool (GAO, 2003). 
The United Kingdom also applied and is still applying command-and-control methods to 
manage radio spectrum. Initially with the Radiocommunication Agency (RA), an Executive 
Agency of the UK Department of Trade and Industry responsible to manage radio 
spectrum allocations and assignment has used a command-and-control approach (ITU, 
2004). The philosophy for the command-and-control approach is that the radio spectrum 
is allocated for a particular application, for example, the television broadcasting allocation 
that cannot be changed quickly (Olafsson, Glover, & Nekovee, 2007), although  one of 
the primary purposes of the ITU WRC meetings is to coordinate changes in allocations. 
However, these changes happen relatively gradually. The radio spectrum license will 
further specify the type of technology and the use of that radio spectrum with 
administrative costs of radio spectrum management activities by the regulator in a form 
of AIP.  
Prospective players would be expected to hand in proposals to the regulator and 
reciprocally, the regulator would select the proposal considered to meet the expected 
economic and social benefits in terms of the Wireless Telegraphy Act of 1998. This was 
later changed in 2003 when a new regulator was formed in terms of the Communications 
Act of 2003 referred to as the Office of Communications (Ofcom). Ofcom then became 
responsible for management of civil radio spectrum and awarding of radio spectrum 
licences, authorising users to operate over a specific band and geographic area 
(Department of Trade & Industry, 2001).  
Asian countries like India (since 1992) had also employed radio spectrum assignment 
using the command-and-control approach, in the early years of introduction of wireless 
communication. The Indian approach  included identifying the ‘best use’ of the radio 
spectrum  band, by  choosing users for example on a  on first-come-first-served basis  or 
through  beauty contest method (Sridhar & Prasad, 2011).Their approach also included 
amongst others (Sridhar & Prasad, 2011): 
 the setting of prices and efficiency achievement or consumer benefits by 
interventions such as setting roll-out obligations (to cover a certain percentage of 
the License Service Area (LSA) within a stipulated period) and   
 introducing the “use it or lose it” principle to mitigate radio spectrum hoarding by 
radio spectrum licensees. 
The Indian traditional approach also includes  the duration of the radio spectrum licence 
which is a  twenty year radio spectrum license given concurrently with a service licence.  
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Actual assignment of start-up radio spectrum was based on availability and was on a first-
come-first-served basis for all radio spectrum licensees.The command-and-control 
approach was successful in achieving early rollout and rapid growth of mobile telephony 
in India (Sridhar & Prasad, 2011). However, the approach had some flaws and 
vulnerabilities in that radio spectrum was not equitably assigned to users. The weakness 
of first-come-first-served was confirmed by the Supreme Court verdict in February 2012.  
The court recognised the first-come-first-served and beauty contests method of 
assignment of 2G radio spectrum licenses as arbitrary and deliberately designed to favour 
certain undeserving candidates (India, 2012). The verdict led to a decision by the court 
on the following (India, 2012): 
 to cancel all 122 radio spectrum licenses awarded through beauty contests 
method. 
 the regulatory to make fresh recommendations to the Department of 
Telecommunications on the assignment of radio spectrum. 
 delink radio spectrum from service licenses through auctions, as has been done in 
the 3G licenses case. 
Thus, the court forced radio spectrum reforms upon the regulator, Telecom Regulator 
Authority of India (TRAI).    
Similar to many developed nations, the African continent was also no stranger in following 
the trend of employing the command-and-control approach to manage radio spectrum. 
The Nigerian Communications Commission, the regulator in Nigeria in the late 1990s held 
comparative hearings and beauty contests to award radio spectrum to four operators to 
provide GSM services just like South Africa (Doyle, et al., 2001). The process, which was 
cancelled and replaced by radio spectrum auction when the allegations of corruption 
associated with the process, erupted at that time (Doyle & McShane, 2001).      
1.4.2 Radio spectrum reforms and market-based approaches 
According to the ITU, radio spectrum reform is an attempt by regulators to move from the 
traditional approach of command-and-control towards a market-based approach 
perceived to be flexible radio spectrum assignment (ITU, 2004). Forms of  radio spectrum 
reforms adopted by countries includes amongst others, radio  spectrum auctions, market-
based approaches which includes novel ways of defining radio spectrum property, radio 
spectrum commons, radio spectrum trading and dynamic radio spectrum assignment to 
allow flexible ways of using radio spectrum which will result in radio spectrum efficiency. 
There appear to be two waves of radio spectrum reforms. The first wave was pushed by 
the increase in radio spectrum using technologies e.g. smart phones, mobile devices, 
laptops, video-on-demand services, videos in high definition etc. The second wave was 
pushed by supply and demand for broadband by wireless technologies to support 
infrastructure networks for wireless technologies to deliver services to the end-users as 
depicted in Figure 1 (ITU, 2004) and (ITU, 2012a). Moreover, the so-called “industrial 
internet of things” that is industrial revolution 4.0 and the Internet of things (IOT) also 
pushed the second wave of radio spectrum reforms. This paradigm shift has forced 
regulators across the globe to turn towards radio spectrum reforms, which are more 
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flexible and can accommodate current and future requirements for industrial internet of 
things and broadband. Early attempts of radio spectrum reforms started with radio 
spectrum auctions, a market-based approach to license radio spectrum (ITU, 2012a).  
1.4.2.1  First wave of radio spectrum reform pushed by increase in use of radio 
spectrum by technologies    
a) Radio spectrum auctions  
Gradual increase of technologies using radio spectrum brought about new ways of 
assigning radio spectrum such as monetising usage of radio spectrum. Monetisation was 
in a form of market-based approaches such as auction of radio spectrum and radio 
spectrum property rights. The licensing of radio spectrum through market-based 
approach authorise competitive bidding. The first introduction for auction as a reform was 
in the mid-1930s and in the 1990s, was adopted as the shift from administrative 
assignment by the US government to assign radio spectrum (ITU, 2004). This has led to 
most of the developed countries such as the UK, USA, and Germany (amongst others) 
becoming leaders in radio spectrum auctions ( Cramton, 2001) and (Hazlett, 2003). Radio 
spectrum auction as a reform started to monetise the use of radio spectrum.     
New Zealand is the first country to apply auctions as an approach to assign radio 
spectrum in 1990 through the selling of radio spectrum. By 2010, already 132 countries 
had employed this approach to assign radio spectrum. India auctioned its 3G radio 
spectrum in April 2010. Countries such as Colombia, UK, USA, Argentina, India, Australia 
and Hungary, have widely adopted auctions as policy to assign high demand radio 
spectrum (Jilani, 2015). At the same time, India auctioned radio spectrum to operators to 
provide three services in 2010 (Tripathi & Prasad, 2013). 
According to Nahlik and Jamison (2007) auction of radio spectrum is a process where 
firms bid on each parcel and are committed to buy the parcel if they “win” the auction. The 
ITU sees radio spectrum auctions as one of the biggest radio spectrum policy changes to 
ever be adopted by regulators to manage radio spectrum for market-based approaches 
(ITU, 2004) and (Nahlik & Jamison , 2007). 
With this view from the ITU, the centralized administrative techniques often called 
command-and-control with beauty contests and first-come-first-served basis used by 
regulators in many countries to assign radio spectrum at a particular period started to be 
under scrutiny (ITU, 2004). Questions started to be asked, such as whether these 
methods are an efficient way of managing radio spectrum. In an attempt by regulators to 
reform radio spectrum management, they introduced a market-based approach in the 
form of auctions of radio spectrum as a method to license radio spectrum. 
However, the auction of radio spectrum as a reform did not address the deregulation of 
radio spectrum. True, as regulators in many countries have not relinquished the 
centralised functions of radio spectrum management such as allocation and assignment 
of radio spectrum using command-and-control through prescribing the type of mobile 
services to be provided. This can be observed in countries such as USA, UK, 
Netherlands, Australia and Switzerland. These countries adopted the radio spectrum 
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auctioning method, which was still prescriptive in terms of the service to be provided by 
winners of the radio spectrum (Sokol, 2001). 
Regulators in many countries to date are still using the centralised radio spectrum 
management method; this is independent of whether it is through the national regulator 
or government. This applies to markets perceived to be liberal such as the US, UK, India, 
Australia, New Zealand, Nigeria where radio spectrum management is still centralised. 
There are a number of compelling reasons as to why regulators choose to use auctioning 
methods as a way to award radio spectrum. Some argue that radio spectrum auctioning 
leads to more efficient outcomes than administrative techniques. Another reason could 
be that auctioning is perceived to be more transparent and objective than both the beauty 
contests and first-come-first-served methods (Regulation Toolkit, n.d). This means that 
the risks of corruption in the process are significantly reduced, as well as being a more 
cost-effective process. For example, the FCC projected the cost of administrative 
hearings to be more costly than that of employing auctions, which may results in a lack 
of service delivery (Sokol, 2001).  
New Zealand, through its Radio Communications Act of 1989, became the first country 
to authorize auctions method in 1990. Countries such as Australia and UK followed New 
Zealand in adopting market-based approaches to assign radio spectrum whilst USA 
moved to towards this approach a bit later. The rationale for the move was to ensure that 
radio spectrum gravitates towards those who value and make use of it (Marcus, et al., 
2005). 
In the UK, radio spectrum auctions were introduced in 1998, where radio spectrum was 
auctioned for commercial used with the first auction carried out in 2000 for the 3G radio 
spectrum (NATO, 2001).The auction process managed to raise about GBP 23 billion and 
introduced the fifth player to offer GSM services for the UK (NATO, 2001). Regulatory 
interventions in the form of roaming conditions were added in the radio spectrum licence. 
The new entrant will be allowed to use the incumbent networks to offer services while it 
is rolling out its own network infrastructure (NATO, 2001). 
On the one hand, the USA’s first auction was carried out in July 1994. The radio spectrum 
was auctioned for narrowband Personal Communication Service (PCS) licenses 
(Chakravorti, Sharkey, Spiegel, & Wilkie, 1995). By 2010, the FCC had already conducted 
over 80 spectrum license auctions with over US$52 billion in revenue generated and 
deposited in the US Treasury (Kelly & LaFrance, 2012). The market-based approach of 
auctions of radio spectrum resulted from the mass adoption of mobile services, which 
resulted in a conducive environment for innovation and investment in the US (Kelly & 
LaFrance, 2012).  
On the other hand, the Indian government started auctions in 1992, with auctioning 900 
MHz radio spectrum to provide GMS services, and in 2010, there was an auction for 1800 
MHz radio spectrum (Sridhar & Prasad, 2011). India further auctioned radio spectrum for 
3G and broadband wireless access in the period 2012 to 2013 for 800 MHZ and 900 MHz 
(Tripathi & Prasad, 2013). 
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For India, it appears that the use of radio spectrum auctions had been motivated by the 
desire to raise revenues as well as to ensure transparency in the assignment of radio 
spectrum licenses (Kokil & Sharma, 2006). Even though the rationale for radio spectrum 
auction was to maximise revenue for India, competition in downstream markets was also 
a policy and regulatory goal (Tripathi & Prasad, 2013). While the 2G radio spectrum in 
800/900/1800 MHz bands were licensed either through first-come first-served basis or 
beauty contest method in India (Sridhar & Prasad, 2011).  
Almost all assigned radio spectrum in India without auction is “technology specific”, which 
means that they can provide mobile services using GSM or CDMA technologies with 
respect to the specific band (Tripathi & Prasad, 2013, p. 166). While the radio spectrum 
awarded through auctions is “technology neutral”, meaning that radio spectrum licensees 
are free to use any technology to provide services. These radio spectrum reforms for 
assignment of radio spectrum have resulted in the mobile network coverage (providing 
2G services) in almost every part of India.  On the contrary, insignificant mobile network 
coverage is available in the case of 3G services (Tripathi & Prasad, 2013). 
Operators are however making progress in trying to roll-out 3G network infrastructure in 
many parts of India with Long Term Evolution  (LTE) based 4G service slowly entering 
the Indian market in the 2.3-2.4 GHz band (Tripathi & Prasad, 2013). Recently, Bharti is 
reported to have launched 4G networks in 296 towns across India (ETTelecom.com, 
2015). 
b) Radio spectrum property rights   
With value placed on radio spectrum through its awarding using market-based approach, 
the  licensing policy and regulation allowed the concept of defining “radio spectrum rights 
of use” (radio spectrum property rights)  by licensees as another  form of radio spectrum 
reform (ITU, 2012a). This approach allows radio spectrum licensees to gain ownership of 
radio spectrum. 
A novel way of defining property rights allows flexible use of radio spectrum, which will 
lead to innovation and ultimately more spectral efficiency (Peha, 2007). Through this 
approach, radio spectrum can be traded in secondary markets. However, it has been 
observed that there is no common approach for the procedure used for trading in different 
countries. For example, in Australia and New Zealand, the property rights are clearly 
stated with respect to technical or core parameters that prescribe significant level of 
emissions (Sridhar & Prasad, 2010). However, if this level is exceeded, the radio 
spectrum licensee that owns the technology responsible for the interference is expected 
to either employ interference mitigation procedures or deactivate the operation (Sridhar 
and Prasad, 2010). Similarly, the licensee is given authority to act as it sees fit; this may 
include changing the type and the form of the services offered, given that the interference 
requirements are met. 
Through the promulgation of the Radiocommunication Act of 1989, New Zealand is one 
of the first countries to usher in radio spectrum reform in the form of property rights 
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through assignment of radio spectrum in a tradable form to facilitate the markets (ITU, 
2004). 
The New Zealand’s regulator established a management rights regime with the intention 
of decentralising radio spectrum assignment. Under the rights regime, radio spectrum 
rights are created and have maximum terms of 20 years (Foster & Alden, 2008). The 2G 
and 3G radio spectrum, radio spectrum for fixed wireless access and broadcasting radio 
spectrum in the VHF and UHF TV bands was assigned under the management rights 
regime (Foster & Alden, 2008). 
In the UK, a property rights regime was introduced through a radio spectrum framework 
review, which envisaged the opportunity to accomplish a reform that will birth a   balance 
between traditional and market-based methods of radio spectrum management (Ofcom, 
2006). With this framework, Ofcom’s approach was to shift radio spectrum policy towards 
a flexible system of radio spectrum management. Through the liberalisation of radio 
spectrum usage rights and radio spectrum trading where radio spectrum licensees will 
trade in an open market and change the use thereof (Ofcom, 2006).  
Most of African countries have a perception that radio spectrum belongs to government. 
Therefore, the adoption of radio spectrum property rights has not been realised in this 
region. 
1.4.2.2 Second wave of radio spectrum reform pushed by supply and demand for 
broadband     
a)  Radio spectrum trading   
Increased traffic on wireless networks increased the demand for radio spectrum to enable 
roll out of infrastructure for broadband services, which thus led to increased financial 
value for radio spectrum through trading (ITU, 2012a). Moreover, Radio spectrum trading 
in secondary markets is understood to be one other flexible radio spectrum assignment 
mechanism that can be used to address the growing demand for more radio spectrum. 
This reform entrenched element of monetisation to radio spectrum policy and regulation. 
According to the ITU, radio spectrum trading refers to the transfer of usage rights between 
parties in a secondary market. Trading may happen through sale, lease, or other trading 
options. Through this radio spectrum reform, participants of the market assume the 
responsibility that is usually performed by regulators of assigning of radio spectrum and 
how it supposed to be used (ITU, 2012a). 
Trading transactions are initiated voluntarily by a radio spectrum license holder who wants 
to sell some of their radio spectrum and once a buyer is found, and the financial 
transaction is completed, the new owner of the radio spectrum obtains the spectrum 
usage rights (Marks, Williamson, Burns, Doyle, & Cave, 2006, p. 2) and (Bastidas & Stine, 
2013). 
Introducing trading in radio spectrum over time gives authority to the market to assume 
the responsibility of assigning radio spectrum and determining its usage (Bastidas & 
Stine, 2013) and (ITU, 2004). While liberalisation of radio spectrum use entrusts the 
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responsibility of assignment and allocation to radio spectrum users, similarly the market 
will usually conclude on the usage of the radio spectrum (Bastidas & Stine, 2013). This 
illustrates the relationship that exists between radio spectrum trading and liberalisation of 
radio spectrum for the creation of market.  
New Zealand and Guatemala are the first countries to adopt a radio spectrum trading 
reform approach. New Zealand adopted the radio spectrum trading assignment approach 
in 1989 through the implementation of the Radiocommunication Act of 1989.  
For Guatemala, the Superintendencia de Telecomunicaciones (‘SIT’) the regulator has 
three days to approve trades of radio spectrum. While for the US, the FCC can process 
radio spectrum trades within one day provided certain requirements are meet such as 
competition, the legitimacy and ownership issues are beyond board (ITU, 2004).   
The UK introduced radio spectrum trading in 2004 as a key element of their market-based 
reform. The Wireless Telegraphy Act of 2006 together with the Wireless Telegraphy 
Radio Spectrum regulations of 2004 provided the legal and policy framework for radio 
spectrum trading in the UK (ITU, 2004). The framework outlined the conditions under 
which radio spectrum trading is permissible. It further gave effect to Article 9 of the EU 
Framework Directive 2002/21/EC (‘the Framework Directive’) on radio spectrum trading 
for European countries (Ofcom, 2013). The UK, in 2004, introduced radio spectrum 
trading for other services such as the national and regional Business Radio (‘BR’), 
broadband fixed wireless access and terrestrial fixed and point-to-point links.  Taxi 
operators and couriers with radio spectrum licenses were also given an authorisation to 
trade radio spectrum (ComReg, 2015). This radio spectrum reform led to the increase 
with regard to radio spectrum that can be tradable in the UK,  with tradable licences 
increasing from about 1,500 to 50,000 (Ofcom, 2009). Trading created an incentive in the 
management of the radio spectrum through making radio spectrum that was previously 
used for public usage for commercial users (Ofcom, 2009). 
While radio spectrum trading in Europe is widely practiced, in developing countries such 
as India, commercial users have little incentive to trade radio spectrum.  According to 
Indian policy, no trading is allowed for radio spectrum assigned in 900 MHz and 1800 
MHz (Sridhar & Prasad, 2011). 
Even though the 2010 National Telecom Policy introduced spectrum trading, this radio 
spectrum reform is yet to be implemented in India. With about three to four operators 
having almost 80% of the market share, using radio spectrum assigned to them through 
administrative approaches (Purnendu, Tripathi, & Prasad, 2013).Contrarily, other 
operators were assigned radio spectrum through market mechanism. 
The National Telecom Policy of 2012 not only introduced radio spectrum trading but also   
proposed new policy positions such as technology neutrality, liberalisation of radio 
spectrum and delinking radio spectrum from service licence. This enabled radio spectrum 
pooling, sharing and later enabled the optimal utilization of radio spectrum through 
(Purnendu, Tripathi, & Prasad, 2013). 
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b) Radio spectrum commons    
There is a high demand of radio spectrum by internet host providers and individuals for 
Wi-Fi (Wireless local area network (WLAN) and other low-power devices (key fobs, 
garage openers) and the evolution of radio spectrum reforms (ITU, 2012a). The evolution 
of reforms led to the emergence of flexibility in using radio spectrum reforms through 
open-access, unlicensed radio spectrum and radio spectrum commons as supported by 
researchers has also managed to capture attention of regulators in recent years (Lehr & 
Crowcroft, 2005) and (ITU, 2012a).  
Managing radio spectrum through commons is to allow a radio spectrum to be used by 
many while allowing joint-ownership of the resource with no exclusive ownership given to 
a single entity (Brito, 2007) and (ITU, 2012a). The usage of radio spectrum is however, 
subject to adherence to a set of rules such as maximum power level and lawful usage of 
a particular technology (ITU, 2004). 
In some instances, licence exemption is used as a commons approach. If it is used, it is 
usually in limited bands for short-range applications. However, significant innovation has 
emerged in these bands (e.g. Wi-Fi) which have led some to call for more radio spectrum 
to be made available and managed in a similar manner. Radio spectrum commons as a 
radio spectrum reform can be seen as a manifestation of radio spectrum property rights 
in that a number of radio spectrum users in that particular band can have property rights.   
New Zealand is the first and the only country, which has licensed radio spectrum for 
commons in a form of “managed radio spectrum park” licence (Cave, Minervini, & Mfuh, 
2008). South Africa attempted the introduction of managed radio spectrum park through 
ICASA’s draft assignment plan for combined licensing of 800 MHz and 2.6 GHz a propose 
which was later withdrawn. The draft plan proposed the reserving of 20 MHz in the 2.6 
GHz for “managed radio spectrum park” (ICASA, 2011a).   
The radio spectrum under this approach was assigned on a first-come-first–served basis 
along with applicable licence administration fees for resource rental and management 
charge (ITU, 2004). UK has also authorised 50 MHz radio spectrum commons to give 
effect to radio spectrum sharing with the FCC controlling the power limits (Brito, 2007).  
c) Dynamic spectrum access    
While the debate on the scarcity of radio spectrum continues, technological development 
has managed to find a way to offer itself as a solution to increased access to radio 
spectrum through dynamic spectrum access (DSA). This development further supports 
the reformed approach of regulating radio spectrum through DSA ( Mfupe , Masonta , 
Olwal, & Mzyece, n.d). DSA refers to accessing radio spectrum with dynamism while 
having the capability to change utilisation of radio spectrum guided by a number of 
technical factors (Zhao & Sadler, 2007). DSA allows multiple users to share the same 
radio spectrum another technique of radio spectrum, which increases access to radio 
spectrum. DSA may be viewed as a radio spectrum reform that presents an opportunity 
to circumvent an authorisation process that is usually applied to use radio spectrum while 
at the same time allowing sharing (ICASA, 2015b).  
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DSA facilitates flexibility in radio spectrum management through technology to enable 
efficient usage of radio spectrum usage. It further provides incentive to facilitate a number 
of reforms such as radio spectrum trading, radio spectrum commons and sharing (Anker, 
2010). The DSA approach would for example permit a service provider to use licence 
exempt devices to offer services. The usage of radio spectrum will be through active 
management of individual use of the radio spectrum (Mfupe, Masonta, Olwal, & Mzyece, 
n.d).  
On one hand, the development of ‘Software Defined Radio (SDR)’ allows the user(s) to 
use or switch to different radio spectrum in a dynamic manner without large increases in 
the cost of equipment and thus allowing the operation of dynamic spectrum access 
(Singh, Sign, & Kang , 2013).  According to Masonta, Mzyece & Ntlatlapa (2013) cognitive 
radio networks seek to deploy DSA regulation approaches. 
Cognitive radio building as contained in SDR architecture, a benefit intelligence to ensure 
efficient resource utilization is realised (Masonta, Mzyece, & Ntlatlapa, 2013). This 
regulatory approach is seen as a solution to address the current threat of radio spectrum 
scarcity, Cognitive Radio systems (CRS) are widely proposed to build DSA-based 
secondary networks for secondary users with low priority  (Masonta, Mzyece, & Ntlatlapa, 
2013).    
Since radio spectrum sharing is perceived as an approach that allows radio spectrum to 
be used most efficiently in radio spectrum management, the DSA as an approach promise 
to increase radio spectrum sharing among competing service providers and thus 
overcome the problem of scarcity of radio spectrum and ensuring efficiencies in radio 
spectrum usage (Chapin & Lehr, 2007). Moreover, DSA according to Chapin and Lehr 
present an incentive of using DSA according to is that it allows real-time trading of 
spectrum access rights and use of high-power transmissions at times when the primary 
users of a radio spectrum in a particular band and location are inactive (Chapin & Lehr, 
2007).  
Since this form of radio spectrum reform is in its early stages of development, the USA is 
one of the few countries that are currently permitting DSA. The regulator has made one 
block of radio spectrum in the 700 MHz band to be auctioned with the condition that public 
safety services would be able to pre-empt its usage in case of any emergency/ public 
safety requirements for the purposes of allowing DSA (Garg, Dua, & Chandra, 2013). 
Another area, which is currently in the process of development, is dynamic sharing of TV 
white spaces. The whole purpose of this is to use the broadcast radio spectrum left in 
between channels during planning purposes to avoid interference to ensure efficiency. 
According to Garg, et al. (2013) the usage of this radio spectrum can only be feasible 
through low power systems, which, on a pre-emptive basis, can be considered for shared 
usage with the TV radio spectrum.   
In the case of DSA, the so-called “smart radio” technologies such as cognitive radios and 
software-defined radios are seen as tools to enable the exploitation of unused radio 
spectrum. They are further seen as main technologies in achieving objectives of efficient 
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usage and flexibility in spectrum management (Bernthal, et al., 2007). Hence, radio 
spectrum reform views the DSA as another way to support radio spectrum sharing and 
result in radio spectrum efficiency with the sole purpose of combating the rigid approach 
of command-and-control model (Bernthal, et al., 2007).  
1.5 SUMMARY OF RESEARCH PROBLEM 
The biggest problem for telecommunications and broadband penetration in South Africa 
is effective competition and an inability to achieve national objectives of stimulating the 
economy and universal access as stated in the National Broadband Policy. This results 
in high costs of communication. According to RIA with 1GB data package South Africa is 
ranked at 16th of out 47 in African countries terms of pricing  (ICTafrica.net, 2016).   
The current radio spectrum reforms regulatory frameworks encourage a vertically 
integrated market structure dominated by four mobile operators that have access to high 
demand radio spectrum. This resulted in market problems such as infrastructure sharing 
bottlenecks, concentrated broadband infrastructure in urban areas, entrenched 
exclusivity rights to radio spectrum etc.Therefore, further liberalised market would be 
required to deal with the undesirable market structure and address the market problems 
of ineffective competition faced by South Africa. The NDP and SA Connect claim that 
radio spectrum is a bottleneck for competition in the industry and, hence, an inhibitor of 
market liberalisation.  
Command-and-control has been the primary approach for radio spectrum management. 
The regulator has been unable to release the required radio spectrum for broadband, 
despite numerous attempts, due to command-and-control approach, which brings conflict 
between government and the regulator. The command-and-control approach adopted in 
South Africa has resulted in an artificial scarcity of radio spectrum, arguably, the greatest 
challenge for the telecommunications industries not only in South Africa but also across 
the globe. The approach is also not able to address the radio spectrum demand-supply 
problem and competition problem in the industry. There are about 400 potential service 
providers waiting to access radio spectrum to provide broadband services. Command-
and-control and other regulatory weaknesses have created an oligopoly market structure, 
which has elements of anti-competitive behaviour of incumbent operators. The approach 
has also resulted in the hoarding of radio spectrum by players of the market. For example, 
2.6 GHz radio spectrum were assigned to Sentech for a number of years without 
sufficiently being used and in the end returned to the regulator, an end-result that can be 
viewed as a lost opportunity for the telecommunications sector. 
In recent years, market-based approaches have also been introduced. However, most of 
these approaches, similar to command-and-control, have entrenched exclusivity in 
allocation of radio spectrum. Therefore, further liberalisation in the market would require 
further radio spectrum reforms that are flexible and encourage inclusivity. However, clear 
identification of the challenges for radio spectrum reform and specific recommendations 
have been carefully identified and prescribed in a coherent manner.  
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1.6 PURPOSE STATEMENT 
The purpose of this research is to understand applicable radio spectrum reforms i.e. 
command-and-control and pure market-based approaches in order to prove the existence 
of a relationship between radio spectrum reforms and market liberalisation. The 
hypothesis is that command-and-control and pure based approach encourage exclusive 
rights to radio spectrum users.   
The study will evaluate the perspectives of the operators, vendors, industry experts, 
research institutions, regulator and policy maker in further adding to the understanding of 
reforms and market liberalisation.  
The analytic approach will enable the study to draw conclusions on the impact of radio 
spectrum reforms on competition, thus ensuring universal access and services to 
broadband services by 2030 as completed in the NDP and “South Africa Connect”.  
1.7 MAIN QUESTION 
The primary question is to what extent command-and-control has and radio spectrum 
reforms employed in South Africa supported market liberalisation for achieving universal 
access and service to broadband services?       
1.7.1 Sub-questions  
In order to respond to the primary question, the following questions are posed:  
Q.1. How does current policy and regulatory radio spectrum management approaches 
in South Africa assist towards achieving universal access to broadband services?       
Q.2. Are current radio spectrum regulatory approaches of licensing radio spectrum, 
largely on an exclusivity basis, capable of encouraging competition and ensuring 
infrastructure sharing? 
Q.3. Are there any alternative radio spectrum regulatory approaches to licensing radio 
spectrum to encourage competition? 
Q.4. Would alternative radio spectrum regulatory approaches to licensing radio 
spectrum assist in addressing the cost associated with the usage and access of 
broadband services?   
Q.5. What are regulatory interventions that ICASA can possibly adopt to limit the 
possibility of consolidation of markets to distort competition and hinder universal 
access to broadband? 
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2 CHAPTER TWO: REVIEW OF RADIO SPECTRUM MANAGEMENT    
2.1   INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND  
This chapter seeks to explore and review academic literature on the employment of 
different radio spectrum reforms to assign radio spectrum for efficiency in the 
management of radio spectrum. It also explores in academic literature the pros and cons 
of radio spectrum reforms and their effect on market liberalisation and competition. It 
further creates a conceptual framework that will be used to deliver the analysis of the 
study in chapter five.    
The literature reviewed in this this study will provide a guide on the direction to be followed 
based on the problem it has identified in chapter one and that will essentially channel the 
study (Ellis & Levy, 2009).  
2.2 STIMULUS FOR REGULATING RADIO SPECTRUM   
Recommendation ITU-R SM.1046-1 states that radio spectrum is a limited natural 
resource of great economic and social value (ITU, 2005a). Furthermore, it is a key 
strategic asset for both developed and developing nations with a rapid increase in 
demand (ITU, 2012).Thus, management of radio spectrum has to be optimal with 
regulation and policy to ensure maximisation of the benefits presented by this strategic 
asset (Doyle, 2007). 
Telecommunications infrastructure supported by efficient radio spectrum management 
has the potential to contribute positively to both social and economic development of 
societies (ITU, 2012a). However, the supply and demand for radio spectrum by 
technologies pose a threat to the conventional way of managing radio spectrum. 
Therefore, the optimal allocation of it to users is an important element for market 
liberalisation and through this, development can be achieved (Wellenius & Neto, 2008, p. 
3) and (Qiang & Rossotto, 2009).  
As shown in chapter one, literature has revealed that there are two approaches that can 
be applied to manage radio spectrum by regulators; that is command-and-control and 
market-based mechanisms. The command-and-control approach is the conventional 
approach and the market-based approach is the reformed way of managing radio 
spectrum (Regulation Toolkit, n.d) and (Wellenius & Neto, 2008).  
Literature has also presented the reason for using both approaches as ways to access 
radio spectrum. The rationale behind conventional radio spectrum regulation and reforms 
is to protect harmful interference amongst services of adjacent radio spectrum and 
neighbouring geographical areas. Economic and technical efficiency also needs to be 
achieved (Regulation Toolkit, n.d) and (Wellenius & Neto, 2008).Therefore, efficient and 
effective management of radio spectrum becomes an important aspect of radio spectrum 
management principles in terms of the ITU. According to Cave, Doyle & Webb (2007) the 
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main reason to manage and regulate radio spectrum is to enable countries to protect their 
society from any abuse of market power and to provide a framework for the management 
of shared resources.  
Literature further indicates that radio spectrum management regimes have an effect on 
how the industry evolves, ways of accessing radio spectrum influences prices, as well as 
entry costs and of services (Hazlett, 1998).They further have an effect on the market 
structure as well as how effective market players can create innovation (Bauer, 2002, p. 
11). Therefore, one can conclude that there is a relationship between radio spectrum 
reforms and markets liberalisation as shown in Figure 4.    
The other key reason for managing radio spectrum is to maximize the value that society 
derives from radio spectrum. The value can be achieved by allowing many different users 
to make use of radio spectrum while ensuring that there is less harmful interference for 
socially and economically desirable outcome (Cave, Doyle, & Webb, 2007), (Stine, 2005) 
and (Anker, 2013). Shared radio spectrum usage allows for more available radio 
spectrum for users and lower access to barriers for new entrants.   
 
Figure 4: Linkage between spectrum management, market structure and its effects 
 
Source: Bauer, 2002   
While there  is wide support for radio  spectrum policy  and regulation in order to enhance 
the efficient utilisation of radio spectrum due to its scarcity (Cave, 2002), and (Sridhar and  
Prasad, 2012). Scarcity and harmful interference are not necessarily the only reasons 
behind the need for radio spectrum regulation. Literature further shows that there are 
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other issues such as competition, quality of service, access and consumer protection. All 
these issues make radio spectrum management remain a relevant and necessary policy 
and regulatory intervention for the telecommunications markets liberalisation. 
Radio spectrum regulation similarly becomes necessary, as it propels the standardization 
of equipment and transmission methods (ITU, 2004). Basic effective regulation is 
accomplished through the harmonisation of allocation and assignment of a particular 
frequency band to specific services. For example, the allocation of 470- 862 MHz to the 
broadcasting service across all ITU regions. The adoption of this approach in turn assures 
that there is a mass market for radio equipment available at a cheaper price and facilitates 
radio services across continents of the world (ITU, 2004).The benefit of this impact is 
directly proportional to the end user’s affordability and access. This is because service 
providers would not have any justification to pass on high costs.  
The ITU states that fast growing wireless communications has made it necessary to 
manage radio spectrum through administrative regulations of ex ante as opposed to ex 
post as prevention of harmful interference is better than curing it afterwards (ITU, 2004). 
Therefore, for efficient management of radio spectrum, it is vital that regulators put in 
place effective and efficient regulatory framework for desirable outcomes.      
As mentioned in above paragraph, traditionally, regulators across the globe managed 
most the radio spectrum through command-and-control. Command-and-control uses 
administrative process such as beauty contest, first-come-first-serve, comparative 
hearings and lotteries to award radio spectrum to users (Abrams, Kedama, Naidu, & 
Pillay, 2014) and  (Matheson & Morris, 2012). Its initial intention was to prevent harmful 
inferences between services and as an approach it was relevant because the demand for 
radio spectrum was not as high as it is currently (Cave, Doyle, & Webb, 2007).  
Typically, the definition of command-and-control is a government-centralised approach 
where radio spectrum is awarded to a user for specific use on an exclusive basis (Anker, 
2013). The usage of radio spectrum is usually prescribed by the regulator with one type 
of service allowed for a particular radio spectrum band. Command-and-control is 
characterised by two main elements - protection of services from harmful interferences 
and harmonisation.  
The command-and-control approach will use an ITA as in the case of South Africa for 
high demand radio spectrum, where demand exceeds the available radio spectrum. The 
ITA will for instance outline the required criteria for the applicant to meet in order to qualify 
for the award of the radio spectrum. The required criteria might include technical 
requirements, such as the speed of infrastructure deployment, project viability, radio 
spectrum efficiency, and other innovative requirements.This is true if the requirements 
have the ability to ensure that competition is stimulated in the telecommunication sector 
(Marcus, et al., 2005). 
According to Cave, Minervini, & Mfuh (2008) command-and-control as an approach 
managed to facilitate allocation and assignment across all three regions of the ITU. The 
benefit also filtrated at the regional level with regions of the world benefiting in terms of 
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economies of scale regarding equipment manufacturing. The effect of this, is realisation 
of competition and liberalisation of the telecommunication markets (Cave, Minervini, & 
Mfuh, 2008) and (Cave, 2006). For markets, command-and-control further managed to 
ensure expansion of the telecommunications infrastructure to ensure universal services. 
In some instances, it further brought some level of competition in many markets for mobile 
telephones.This approach resulted in market structures of three to four mobile operators 
in most countries globally, a stride which brought some level of competition (OECD, 
2014). Command-and-control also ensured basic efficiency in radio spectrum 
management usage by different radio communications services without experiencing 
harmful interferences (ITU, 2004). 
In addition, command-and-control approach was successful in creating 
telecommunication infrastructure as a network industry allocating and assigning of radio 
spectrum to provision of 2G services (ITU, 2004). The success of mobile telephony in 
Africa is a classic example of how command-and- control managed to create a network 
industry (Aker & Mbiti, 2010). 
According to literature, the command-and-control approach is static and inflexible, with a 
regulator holding all the rights to use frequency while authorising usage to the licensees 
(Ard-paru, 2010) and  (Masonta, Mzyece, & Ntlatlapa, 2013). The licensee has the 
exclusive right to use the radio spectrum with all the imposed conditions. This implies that 
to ensure that there is efficient radio spectrum management; users of radio spectrum will 
be given a licence that will indicate a particular frequency and an area using a prescriptive 
approach of command-and-control (ITU, 2004). 
As shown in chapter one, the 900 MHz, portion of 800 MHz, 1800 MHz, and 2100 MHz 
bands were allocated for Code Division Multiple Access (CDMA) GSM and 2G services.  
The assignment of these bands was conducted through command-and-control; this is 
especially true in ITU region one of which Africa is a member. Many of these 2G radio 
spectrum bands were technology specific (in this case 2G communication). The notion of 
technology neutrality did not apply; hence, much of the spectrum was restricted for the 
use of GSM technology (2G technology). In these radio spectrum bands, operators were 
allowed to use GSM technology to provide mobile services. 
On the downside, command-and-control as an approach does not support market 
liberalisation as it tends to promote monopolies, and they have the potential to protect the 
interests of incumbents over those of consumers. Embedded in this approach is the 
notion that radio spectrum should be given free since it is a state-owned resource 
(Macmillan, 2004), (ITU, 2004) and (Sokol, 2001).  
Command-and-control as an approach is also rigid; it presents less opportunity to change 
the radio spectrum assignment that provides minimal incentives for radio spectrum users 
to innovate (Hazlett, 2003) and (Masonta, Mzyece, & Ntlatlapa, 2013). It further tends to 
have a high entry barrier to the latest technologies in radio spectrum assignment 
(Masonta, Mzyece, & Ntlatlapa, 2013). This high entry barrier is the reason behind the 
spectral inefficiency in wireless networks. The latest technologies not only have 
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advantages of spectral efficiencies, but also further promote radio spectrum sharing 
between different services (Doyle, 2007).  
The notion of putting value to the radio spectrum is ignored when command-and-control 
is employed. However, when there is a demand in terms of available radio spectrum, the 
licence will typically be awarded to the applicant that made the request first (Hazlett, 2003) 
and (Cave, Doyle, & Webb, 2007).  
Command-and-control approach has the potential of stifling growth in the wireless 
communications market, because it does not manage to achieve the full objective of 
maximising the benefits that can be derived from radio spectrum due to its rigidity (Cave, 
Doyle, & Webb, 2007). Typically, the regulator will decide on both the use of the band, 
called allocations, and on which organisation can use the band, called assignment (Cave, 
Doyle, & Webb, 2007, p. 4). In many countries, these methods have created markets 
structures that are mostly dominated by monopolies and duopolies. They also created a 
situation, which makes it difficult for new entrants to enter the market with infrastructure 
sharing bottlenecks, entrenched exclusivity rights to radio spectrum and infrastructure 
concentration in urban areas (Stine, 2005). 
The command-and-control method is further prone to political interference with the 
potential to make it difficult to keep up to pace with rapid advances in technological 
development and it is also unfriendly to commercial interests as it favours politicians 
(Somdyala, 2012). Moreover, it is a slow and wasteful approach of managing radio 
spectrum. This is supported by what happened in the USA, where it took the FCC almost 
two years to assign a third cellular network ( Cramton, 2001). South Africa has also 
experienced a similar thing, with the process of releasing both the 800 MHz and 2.6 GHz 
radio spectrum that has been debated for more than eight years now since 2008. This 
approach is partly to be blamed in creating an artificial radio spectrum scarcity through its 
inefficiency in spectrum usage (McHenry, Tenhula, McCloskey, Roberson, & Hood, 2006) 
and (Qiang & Rossotto, 2009, pp. 79-89). 
The literature also indicates that in addition to the approach’s potential to create markets 
which are dominated by incumbents, it further presents a number of limitations such as 
the possibility of significant parts of the radio spectrum hardly being used (Cave, Doyle, 
& Webb, 2007) and (Ard-paru, 2010). This encourages hoarding of radio spectrum by 
licence holders because of the lack of incentives to radio spectrum holders to maximise 
the value of radio spectrum. It is also seen as an approach that is quite slow to respond 
to changes in markets and technologies as a result of its rigidity (Anker, 2013) and 
(Macmillan, 2004).Therefore, the application of command-and-control cannot be viewed 
as a solution to increased access to radio spectrum.    
 
As mentioned in chapter one, South Africa, like many other countries, has awarded radio 
spectrum licenses to operators using the traditional methods such as command-and-
control. This resulted in the scarcity of radio spectrum to be used to deliver wireless 
broadband services in the hands of few operators. Some of the radio spectrum license 
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holders have not used such radio spectrum to rollout networks. The relevant example is 
the 2.6 GHz radio spectrum, which was assigned to Sentech. However, Sentech never 
used it until it was returned to ICASA in 2013. According to the regulator, the same applies 
for the 800 MHz radio spectrum which was licensed to WBS which was never used  until 
the company was acquired in 2015 (Interview, 22 May, 2015).  
2.3  FLEXIBILITY AND EFFECIENCY OF RADIO SPECTRUM USAGE 
Over the past decade, the increased demand for radio spectrum, convergence, facilitation 
of open-access to radio spectrum to promote competition and innovation has led to 
market-based and flexible approaches to radio spectrum management (Horne, 2009). It 
is argued that the key purpose of radio spectrum management is to maximise the value 
that can be gained from It. Literature presents an argument that flexibility in radio 
spectrum regulation allows increase access to radio spectrum by many users while 
ensuring that there is no harmful interference   (Cave, Doyle, & Webb, 2007) and (Forge, 
Horvitz, & Blackman, 2012). 
According to Forge, et al. (2012)   radio spectrum reforms are expected to ensure efficient 
radio spectrum management as depicted in figure 5. Through the introduction of reforms, 
regulators formulate regulatory interventions to provide users with the right to use radio 
spectrum through licenses, which will indicate a particular frequency and an area using 
different radio spectrum reforms. Radio spectrum reforms such as radio spectrum 
auctions, radio spectrum trading, definition of property rights and radio spectrum 
commons or radio spectrum sharing, are regulatory tools, which can increase access to 
radio spectrum (ITU, 2004). Customarily, these regulatory tools for access to radio 
spectrum are used to respond to demand and supply of radio spectrum needs.   
2.3.1. Flexible approaches responding to demand and supply of radio 
spectrum needs  
According to literature, a market-based approach to radio spectrum management is 
based on market forces as opposed to the administrative approach of command-and-
control, and is favoured by economists as shown in Figure 5 (Marcus, et al., 2005). The 
proponents of market-based approaches argues that radio spectrum should be managed 
through markets forces since  administrative approach has no value to management   and 
it results in wasted radio spectrum” (Coase, 1959). Economists believe in establishing a 
market for radio spectrum, where their theory is advocating access to radio spectrum by 
those who value it and ensures efficiency. 
Literature asserts that market-based approach allows radio spectrum to be traded like a 
commodity, where owners can buy, sell, subdivide and aggregate units of radio spectrum 
(Marcus, et al., 2005). Moreover, the approach allows for more efficient assignment and 
flexible approach of managing radio spectrum (Marcus, et al., 2005). Through market-
based approaches, the regulations are flexible and market-oriented, which is contrary to 
the inflexible and static characteristics associated with command-and-control (Masonta, 
Mzyece, & Ntlatlapa, 2013) and (El-Moghazi, Whalley, & Irvine, 2014). Contrary to the 
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notion of sharing of resources, Cramton (2001) and (Cave, Minervini & Mfuh (2014) assert 
that market-based approaches provide the licence holder with ‘large’ exclusive usage 
rights to radio spectrum. 
In terms of these approaches, the radio spectrum can be traded, bought and sold in the 
secondary markets. This approach allows flexibility with regard to usage and spontaneous 
response to constantly changing technological environment. According to the proponents 
of market-based approach, the priority of this approach is technology and service 
neutrality (Cave, Doyle, & Webb, 2007) , (Marcus, et al., 2005) and (Hazelett, Ibarguen, 
& Leighton, 2007). Thus, literature postulates that through the market-based approach, 
radio spectrum can be neutrally used by different technologies and priority is not placed 
on any technology (Cave, Doyle, & Webb, 2007). Consequently, the market-based 
approach can be seen as another form of regulatory intervention that can be used by 
regulators to increase access to radio spectrum.  
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Figure 5: Spectrum assignment approaches 
 
Source: Bohlin, Forge, & Renda, 2007 refined by researcher 
Literature asserts that the introduction of market-based approaches resulted in market 
liberalisation for the telecommunication sector (Wellenius & Neto, 2008), (Hazelett, 
Ibarguen, & Leighton, 2007) and (ITU, 2004). Consequently, the application of a market-
based approach minimises the regulators’ involvement in radio spectrum usage with the 
market driving management of radio spectrum (Marcus, et al., 2005). It appears that the 
elements which best describe this approach is market orientation and flexibility to access 
radio spectrum. The proponents of these approaches view command-and-control as the 
most inefficient way of assigning radio spectrum because of its static approach of 
managing radio spectrum (Foster & Alden, 2008). 
Similar to command-and-control, the market-based approach has a number of classes to 
be employed when radio spectrum is licensed. For the purpose of this research, only 
auctions, radio spectrum property rights and radio spectrum commons will be analysed. 
This is due to the high demand of radio spectrum for wireless communications services 
and the contributions that the telecommunications sector makes to the economies of 
countries. Market-based approach has trended worldwide especially in developed 
economies as a method to access radio spectrum (Cave, Doyle, & Webb, 2007) and 
(Marcus, et al., 2005). 
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Under the market-based approaches, licensees can transfer frequency to other parties 
through market mechanism. The proponents view radio spectrum as a commodity to be 
traded in the market (Bastidas & Stine, 2013) and (ITU, 2004). The market-based 
approach is an access method to radio, which incentivises users of radio spectrum to buy 
radio spectrum from secondary markets (Bastidas & Stine, 2013). It also incentivises the 
assignee an exclusive right to use frequency. The powers of the regulator to alienate radio 
spectrum are transferred to the users and these powers include the right to sell, lease, 
and transferred radio spectrum through this reform tool (Wellenius & Neto, 2008). Users 
are also expected to adhere to imposed conditions on the use of the radio spectrum to 
avoid harmful interferences, such as the standard of devices (Cave, Doyle, & Webb, 
2007). Thus, it incentivises users with flexibility in using radio spectrum as opposed to the 
command–and-control approach. The end result of the application of market forces is that 
they become the deciders of radio spectrum access and efficiency.  
  
a) Radio spectrum auctions   
 
As shown in Figure 5, auction is one of the market approaches, which can be used to 
access radio spectrum. According to (Sokol, 2001) theory of auctions is that, radio 
spectrum as an asset is transferred from a seller to a buyer. An auction is defined as a 
“market institution which explicitly sets rules to establish resource allocation and prices 
on the basis of bids from market participants” (Mcafee & McMillan, 1987, pp. 699-738). 
In some instances, auctions are employed because some products have no standard 
value (Sokol, 2001). 
There are different types of auctions that can be employed to achieve a particular 
outcome in a market. Types of auctions include (Mcafee & McMillan, 1987):    
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 English auction - the price of the product is raised continuously until one bid 
remains, 
 
 Dutch auction -  the converse of an English auction in that from the beginning a 
high price is announced by the auctioneer and continues to reduce the price until 
a bidder accepts the price, 
 First Price Sealed auction - the highest bid wins the product after bidders submit 
sealed bids.  
 Second Price Sealed auction - bidders are told that the highest bid wins the product 
but will not pay the price equal to their bids but to the highest second bid. 
The proponents of this approach argue that auctions are flexible public policy tools that 
can be used to attain specific policy objectives such as raising revenues. However, 
Cramton, et al. (2011) maintains that regulators should use auctions to assign radio 
spectrum efficiently and create competition and worry less about raising revenue as 
broadband services usage have huge potential to contribute positively to the economy.   
Literature asserts that auctions can use to address previous mistakes of guaranteeing 
access to radio spectrum by state-owned entities. This can be done through the setting 
aside of radio spectrum for specific groups of society e.g. women, small firms, the 
disabled etc., as in the case of the USA resulting in efficiencies  (Cave, Minervini, & Mfuh, 
2008), (Caicedo & Weiss, 2009) and ( Banks, Olson, Porter, Rassenti, & Smith, 2001). 
However, the setting aside of radio spectrum in most case has resulted in entries with 
fewer offerings than incumbents (Cramton, Kwerel, Rosston, & Skrzypacz, 2011, p. 171).        
The rationale behind auctions is that markets are seen as a more efficient way of 
assigning radio spectrum to maximize its use, rather than the rigid way of allowing 
regulators or administrators to assign radio spectrum (Cave, Doyle, & Webb, 2007) and 
(Wellenius & Neto, 2008) and (Cave & Foster , 2010). Proponents of market-based 
approaches see radio spectrum auctions as making the process of radio spectrum 
licences more efficient and transparent as opposed to the command-and-control 
approach ( Cramton, 2001),  (Jilani, 2015),(Cave, Doyle, & Webb, 2007), (Cave & Foster 
, 2010) and (Mcafee & McMillan, 1987).  
Literature postulates that these regulatory tools will ensure that the resources are placed 
at the hands of those who value it ( Cramton, 2001). While achieving transparency and 
fairness in assigning radio spectrum since the procedures to award the ownership and 
pricing will be documented (Prat & Valleti, 2001), ( Banks, Olson, Porter, Rassenti, & 
Smith, 2001) and ( Cramton, 2001). Literature further claims that auctions have the 
potential to stimulate investment and encourage efficient usage of radio spectrum. 
Therefore, this reform best describes efficiency in radio spectrum management.   
Proponents of radio spectrum auction believe that it has the potential to foster innovation 
and competition (Cave, Doyle, & Webb, 2007), ( Banks, Olson, Porter, Rassenti, & Smith, 
2001) and (Cramton, Kwerel, Rosston, & Skrzypacz, 2011). However, competition and 
innovation can only be realised if entry into auction is encouraged since incumbents are 
most likely to bid aggressively to deter new entrants to provide wireless services 
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(Cramton, Kwerel, Rosston, & Skrzypacz, 2011). At the same time, Cramton, et al. ( 2011) 
argue that auctions can bring social value in that incumbents may be given an opportunity 
to own more radio spectrum and leverage off their existing infrastructure  to a new 
generation of services. 
Radio spectrum auctions can further assist governments to address challenges of the 
concentration of infrastructure in urban areas ( Cramton, 2001), (Jilani, 2015) and 
(Mcafee & McMillan, 1987). The objective is that only feasible governments and 
regulators have explicitly stated the conditions before the beginning of the auction 
process (Jilani, 2015). In countries where there is no competition among players, 
approaches such as auctions are employed to assign radio spectrum to address such a 
problem.   
Different auction formats are employed as a form of regulating players in the market.   
These formats force the players to behave in a particular manner. For instance, through 
Sequential auctions, a participant can choose to sell multiple objects simultaneously to 
maximise benefits (Leme, Syrgkanis, & Tardos, 2012). While with Single-round, sealed 
bid auctions are usually employed to maximise social benefits (Doyle & McShane, 2001). 
Therefore, usually countries will choose a particular auction format to address a particular 
challenge. 
While auctions as market-based approach have benefits, they also have disadvantages. 
Administrative approach theorists argue that auctions can increase the price of radio 
spectrum, which has to be ultimately borne by consumers. Similarly, this approach can 
also lead to radio spectrum hoarding, where the radio spectrum can be bought but not 
used, which has the potential to restrict a potential buyer from offering competitive 
services ( Banks, Olson, Porter, Rassenti, & Smith, 2001) and ( Cramton, 2001).  
In as much as auctions are seen as the best approach to maximise the value of radio 
spectrum through mobilizing revenue, as an approach, it can equally create little adverse 
impact for consumers (Wellenius & Neto, 2008) , (Ard-paru, 2010) and ( Cramton, 2001). 
According to a KPMG report, an Indian auction of 3G radio spectrum for wireless 
broadband resulted in 17 million new subscribers realized every month after the auction. 
Despite this huge subscriber base, the mobile penetration rate remained very low in India. 
This was coupled with uneven tele-density for urban and rural areas and by poor quality 
of service especially, in dense urban areas (KPMG, 2006). 
 
Radio spectrum auctions can result in selling radio spectrum, which makes it difficult to 
reassign in the new future. In the main auctions, an approach encourages exclusivity in 
radio spectrum access and ownership of an outcome, which is not desirable given the 
growing demand for bandwidth by different technologies. 
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b) Radio spectrum property rights approach 
 
The approach employs rights to the licensee to allow assigned radio spectrum to be used 
by a number of operators in that radio spectrum can be sold or lent to third parties 
(Macmillan, 2004), (Hazlett, 2001), (ITU, 2004) and (ITU, 2012a). De Vany, Eckert, 
Meyer, Hara & Scott (1996) postulates that spectrum property rights regime can be 
defined in three elements clear rights that are compatible with radio spectrum, 
development of a mechanism to enforce property rights and use rights to the spectrum 
owned by governments. In the radio spectrum property rights regime, the dimensions of 
rights and obligations in a radio spectrum licence among others includes a radio spectrum 
band that is available for use, area, license duration led; the type of service to be provided, 
etc. (Foster, 2006). According to Ard-paru (2010) an alienation right is defined as 
ownership that can be sold, leased, or transferred. For example, the frequency auction in 
the primary market and frequency trading in the secondary market provide ownership of 
frequency for the owner to trade. Normally, the alienation right is defined by the authority, 
regulator, or administrator (Ard-paru, 2010).  
Proponents of market-based approaches argue that this is the best method to assign 
radio spectrum. They also made conclusions through literature that the shortage of radio 
spectrum comes from outdated rigid radio spectrum policies (Coase, 1959), (Wellenius & 
Neto, 2008), (Hazlett & Munoz, 2008) and (Hazelett, Ibarguen, & Leighton, 2007). 
Through these policies, regulators give radio spectrum licensees exclusive access to 
radio spectrum. Pro commons and market-based approaches argue that the exclusive 
access to radio spectrum results in most of the radio spectrum left idling most of the time 
when there is no transition happening. They, therefore, argue that for extreme radio 
spectrum reform, spectrum efficiency and increase access must be enabled (Masonta, 
Mzyece, & Ntlatlapa, 2013), (Coase, 1959), (Wellenius & Neto, 2008) and (Hazlett, 2003). 
The radio spectrum property rights approach is more about auctioning the rights to use 
radio spectrum, not necessarily the spectrum itself, to improve assignment and allocation 
of spectrum. It is seen as a method that allows flexibility in the use of radio spectrum, 
which in return employs incentives to make economically efficient use of radio spectrum. 
It further allows the reuse of communications facilities such as transmitters, receivers and 
spectrum itself (De Vany, Eckert, Meyer, Hara, & Scott, 1996). Proponents of this market-
based approach postulates that the relaxation of regulation of radio spectrum usage 
where the market plays a vital role can lead to radio spectrum efficiency through private 
ownership (Matheson & Morris, 2012). 
 
Proponents of this model support it because the existence of property rights provides 
incentives for radio spectrum license holders to use radio spectrum (Furubton & Pejovich, 
1972, pp. 113-1162). Consequently, the model influences the behaviour that the market 
players thus the promotion of innovation is realised. The utility function will be associated 
with an individual decision maker and will further provide the liberty to pursue different 
options in putting the goods in question to use (Furubton & Pejovich, 1972). Similarly, 
efficiency becomes a positive input for usage of radio spectrum resulting in customer 
satisfaction in terms of price and quality.      
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Literature further theorises the support of this approach because property rights are 
important for successful economic development since freedom of usage if given through 
ownership (Sheehan & Small, 2002). Efficiencies of property rights depend on clearly 
defined rights where owners have exclusive use of their property and this right must be 
transferable (Kerekes , 2011, pp. 315-338). Property rights are characterised by the 
following: duration; flexibility; exclusivity; transferability; and divisibility result in economic 
development (Sokol, 2001). It is argued that property rights result in management power, 
ability to have income, and benefit as well as the ability to sell and alienate interest 
(Sheehan & Small, 2002).  
Literature on radio spectrum property rights draws a conclusion that radio spectrum 
scarcity is created by rules created by regulators on the manner in which radio spectrum 
can be used as per the license issued for a particular portion of radio spectrum. These 
imposed restrictions create artificial radio spectrum scarcity. Property rights clearly 
defined in a spectrum licensing regime will attract demand as investors will want to invest 
their resources as result of incentive of ownership given to the licensee (Coase, 1959), 
(Wellenius & Neto, 2008) and (Hazlett, 2003). 
Proponents believe that renting radio spectrum does not drive efficiency, however, 
exclusive property rights through control of the usage does compensate the owner 
(Benjamin, 2007). This is supported by (Peha, 2007) who argues that radio spectrum 
users should have the right to keep their radio spectrum and lease and rent it to others 
as this will allow flexibility in radio spectrum management. This radio spectrum 
assignment approach assists in deploying the most efficient technology without any delay, 
as the regulator will not be expected to grant any approvals (Benjamin, 2007).  
In the same vein, the property rights approach is not totally viewed as a panacea for 
resolving challenges faced by radio spectrum management. This approach has its own 
disadvantages too. The fact that the spectrum ownership is now with the licensee 
prevents regulators from imposing standards (Hwang & Yoon, 2009). It creates exclusive 
ownership of radio spectrum which can be a problem given the scarcity of supply and 
demand associated with this natural resource. The challenge, which might arise, is radio 
spectrum hoarding which can hamper prospects of competition in the market. The 
duration of a license is another aspect that makes this approach a not-so-suitable solution 
to everything (Ard-paru, 2010). There is an argument that spectrum rights should not be 
permanent, as renewal of rights will allow the regulator to intervene whenever there is 
market failure as soon as the time for renewal arises. An example of this is harmonization 
of unused spectrum which increases the value of that spectrum through releasing it in 
blocks (Peha, 2007), (Milgrom, 1985) and (Gent, 1999).  
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c) Radio spectrum trading in secondary market   
Radio spectrum trading is another market-based tool for radio spectrum management. 
Similarly, with radio spectrum trading market forces are managing access to radio 
spectrum (Ofcom, 2009) and (ITU, 2004). The actual trade may take a number of forms, 
including sale, lease or other options. With the radio spectrum trading approach, trading 
transactions are initiated voluntarily by a licensee who wants to sell some of their radio  
spectrum and once a buyer is found, and the financial transaction is completed, the new 
owner obtains right to utilise radio spectrum usage (Caicedo & Weiss, 2009). This 
approach establishes a secondary trading market of supply and demand with market 
forces not only determined by access but also setting prices (Caicedo & Weiss, 2009) 
and (ITU, 2004).  
For application of this market-based tool to succeed, the framework should be clearly 
outlined with entities to participate in the known market. The participants can be 
summarised as follows: licensee, licensee requester, radio spectrum exchange and 
market maker (Bastidas & Stine, 2013). This framework further demonstrates the 
transparency and efficiency associated with market-based approaches for radio spectrum 
management.    
Moreover, the proponents theorises radio spectrum management approach where 
regulators play a lesser role to ensure access with the market determining allocation and 
assignment of radio spectrum (Cave, Minervini, & Mfuh, 2008). They believe that trading 
as a reform can foster market liberalisation through the introduction of competition where 
there will be increased access to radio spectrum as facilitated by the markets. Relation 
between spectrum trading and liberalisation of spectrum is vital in the process of creating 
the spectrum market (ITU, 2004).  
Trading in radio spectrum management add value in that there is optimal use of the 
resource and efficient access to it (ITU, 2012a). Users are in the best position to 
determine their current and future requirements of radio spectrum, hence market forces 
as a radio spectrum manager. Proponents argue that market-based approaches prevent 
hoarding while promoting efficiency, resulting in positive benefits for consumers.  Theory 
further argues that market-based tools allow dynamism in relation to change of use of 
radio spectrum as influenced by technological development. (Wellenius & Neto, 2008). It 
is also viewed as a reform which encourages competition in the market as new entrants 
can access radio spectrum in the markets (Oxera, 2012). 
Radio spectrum trading has the potential of perpetuating monopolies in a market where 
secondary trading is allowed. Market structure can be determined by the markets through 
transfer of ownership of radio spectrum. It has the potential of creating ineffective 
competition for markets and encourages exclusivity and rivalry, the tragedy of anti-
commons (Wellenius & Neto, 2008) and (ITU, 2004).  
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d) Administrative Incentive Pricing  
As mentioned in chapter one, AIP is a pseudo-market-based approach used to recover 
administrative costs of radio spectrum management through radio spectrum license fees 
paid by users (Marcus, et al., 2005) and (Lundborg, 2013). AIP is one of the techniques 
used to determine the price radio spectrum by regulators. Regulators will set prices for 
radio while looking at cost opportunities to bands that are congested with incentivised 
properties.  
According to the ITU, AIP is based on the economic rationale that market-based pricing 
of radio spectrum will lead to more efficient and productive use of radio spectrum as a 
resource (ITU, 2012).    
Even though this is a market-based approach, it is still prone to radio spectrum 
inefficiencies. Firstly, if radio spectrum fees price are set too high, this may result in 
underutilization of radio spectrum. Secondly, if prices are set too low, this may result in 
hoarding and congestion, therefore finding the right balance is critical to ensuring 
efficiency (Doyle, 2007, p. 1). Literature postulates that the main aim of AIP is to ensure 
that radio spectrum is used efficiently. It may also be used to correct the imperfections of 
auction designs, incomplete information and transactional costs to ensure radio spectrum 
efficiency (Marcus, et al., 2005). 
Even though AIP has an effect in shaping the market, it also has an impact in public 
finances because radio spectrum charges can be treated as a source of revenue for 
governments (Marcus, et al, 2005). In the absence of a well-functioning radio spectrum 
market, AIP can act as an opportunistic cost, which helps to ensure that radio spectrum 
is at high value usage (Minervini & Piacentino, 2006).  
AIP as opportunistic pricing for radio spectrum prevents users of spectrum from hoarding 
it. It further encourages users to use radio spectrum in an optimal manner. AIP also 
provide an alternative to less congested frequency bands. It further encourages radio 
spectrum users to move to more spectral and efficient equipment (Minervini & Piacentino, 
2006), (Doyle, 2007), (Marcus, et al., 2005) and (Lundborg, 2013).  
AIP can potentially act as an impediment if prices for radio spectrum are set too high for 
new market entry (Lalitha & Nawaz, 2011). It does not facilitate competition, but it favours 
incumbents players with little opportunity created for market entry. 
 
2.3.2. Open access based radio spectrum management 
a) Radio spectrum commons  
According to Brito (2007), a commons as a reform creates a platform where a resource 
common owns and provides a platform for the control of radio spectrum multiple users. 
This radio spectrum regulatory approach is characterised by rules and procedures that 
set parameters on usage of radio spectrum.  While in terms of the ITU, the radio spectrum 
commons approach means no one has exclusive rights to radio spectrum anyone can 
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use a portion of it subject to certain rules such as maximum power level and lawful usage 
of a particular technology. An example of a radio spectrum commons is the assignment 
of radio spectrum for amateur radio service. 
Commons or parks are based on the notion of radio spectrum sharing. There is a belief 
that radio spectrum is not a commodity and is not scarce but rather misallocated (Forge, 
Horvitz, & Blackman, 2012) and (Brito, 2007). In the commons approach, regulation 
should be on technology and communication that enables the sharing of rather than on 
radio spectrum itself. This approach facilitates the break away from treating radio 
spectrum as private property that should be owned but employs universal communication 
privilege (Lehr & Crowcroft, 2005). 
Commons is a reform which increases access to radio spectrum by allowing sharing by 
an unlimited number of players to use the same radio spectrum with no ownership rights 
required (Brito, 2007) and (Lehr & Crowcroft, 2005). The FCC defines commons as 
follows: “a model that allows unlimited numbers of unlicensed users to share frequencies, 
with usage rights that are governed by technical standards or etiquettes but with no right 
to protection from interference” (FCC, 2002, p. 30). 
The proponents of this approach challenge the spectrum property rights assignment 
favoured by market-oriented and trading of radio spectrum believers. As they don’t 
believe in ownership of radio spectrum but rather the sharing of a resource.They, 
however, agree with the market-oriented approach on the issue of command-and-control 
as being an inefficient way of assigning spectrum (Brito, 2007). 
The radio spectrum commons approach compares radio spectrum to grazing land and 
other shared resources. Under this model, the common element for justification of 
spectrum efficiency is sharing where devices can coexist or cooperate without ownership 
attached to the resource (Peha, 2007). 
New sharing technologies make it easy for many users to share a particular portion of 
radio spectrum without causing any harmful interference, which results in rendering 
ownership of rights and control from government and operators in radio spectrum 
management unnecessary. According to Brito (2007) Time-Division Multiple Access 
(TDMA), the use of etiquette such as “listen before speak” (LTB) allows the sharing of 
radio spectrum by multiple users through the division of the radio spectrum use into 
different time slots. 
The proponents of this regime propose an “open-access” or commons regime calls for 
anyone to use radio spectrum as long as they are not causing any harmful interference. 
They further suggests that control of radio spectrum by government and ownership 
thereof, through radio spectrum trading, falls away if this approach is employed as a form 
of spectrum assignment (Brito, 2007). 
Proponents of the commons model argue that this approach presents greater 
opportunities for efficiency and innovation while increasing access through sharing   
(Brito, 2007) and (Bauer, 2002). It further presents an incentive of the possibility to change 
the use of radio spectrum by users. On the other hand, licensed radio spectrum typically 
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sits idle when the license-holder is not transmitting (Brito, 2007) and (Ard-paru, 2010). 
Commons model precludes warehousing of radio spectrum, and has the potential of 
avoiding the disadvantage of an exclusive use model (Lehr & Crowcroft, 2005).  
With commons, there is greater possibility of congestion and interference because of 
multiple users of radio spectrum. Further to that, there is the possibility of compromised 
services quality (Ting, Wildman, & Bauer, 2005).These disadvantages do not support 
innovation and has the potential of discouraging radio spectrum in that users would face 
uncertainty and would further lack  interest to invest in new technologies or services. 
Radio spectrum commons can result in overuse, interference, and under investment 
(FCC, 2002). 
With poorly designed system of commons, “although economically more feasible for 
some, would only lead to undue hardship” for other radio spectrum users (Ting, Wildman, 
& Bauer, 2005), (FCC, 2002) and (Peha, 2007). 
Commons method does have aspects of command-and-control, in that government 
through the regulator, have to set rules of operation as the owner of radio spectrum. The 
framework for commons is characterised by set rules with enforcement agencies with 
sharing as objectives for access to radio (Forge, Horvitz, & Blackman, 2012).  
 
b) Radio spectrum reform through game changing technology 
It is generally agreed that the available radio spectrum might not be able to meet the 
demand of the bandwidth by the recent end-user devices that deliver broadband services. 
For example, the ITU have estimated that, based on global traffic, a range of 1340 to 
1960 MHZ of spectrum is required for broadband services by 2020, a clear indication that 
radio spectrum demand for wireless services is on the rise (ITU, 2013a). 
For this reason, there is a shift in thinking that radio spectrum management regime needs 
to evolve to meet the demand for  broadband services  through the introduction of radio 
spectrum efficiency approaches, such as DSA using  cognitive radio system technologies  
(Chapin & Lehr, 2007). The IEEE defines cognitive radio systems as a technology that 
can intelligently detect which communication channels are in use and which are not in a 
given frequency band, and instantly move into vacant channels while avoiding occupied 
ones (Lee, et al., 2010).  
The proponents of the DSA approach sees the regulation of radio frequency through static 
ways of allocating spectrum of exclusive use of the frequency band, resulting in spectrum 
underutilisation in time and space (Chapin & Lehr, 2007, Anker, 2010, (Masonta, Mzyece, 
& Ntlatlapa, 2013) and (Zhao & Sadler, 2007).They postulate that DSA is a radio spectrum 
reform through game changing technologies for additional capacity in the radio spectrum. 
Dynamic approach guarantees flexibility through third-party usage of frequency bands 
assigned to a certain licensee (Chapin & Lehr, 2007) and (Masonta, Mzyece, & Ntlatlapa, 
2013). 
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Dynamic radio spectrum access is linked to the opportunistic accessing of TV white 
spaces of digital TV by using cognitive radio system ( Nekovee, 2010). TV white spaces 
is the “portions of radio spectrum left unused by broadcasting service which may be  used 
for other services on a secondary basis, i.e. on the condition of not disrupting 
broadcasting services and not claiming protection from them” ( ITU, 2013b, p.2).  
According to Marcus (2012) the operation of dynamic spectrum approach is achieved 
through a geo-location white space database of primary users of the radio frequency 
band, authorising the usage of such bands at specific times with allowed transmitter 
power. Similarly, Chapin and Lehr state that the main characteristic of dynamic spectrum 
access is a hierarchy of radio spectrum access rights classified as the primary user, a 
radio spectrum licensee who is protected from interference and secondary users (Chapin 
& Lehr, 2007). Usually the right to use radio spectrum is given to a single licensee unless 
there is a co-assignment in that particular band. A regulation may set out rules that will 
enable the possibilities of platforms, that envisage sharing and shared access to radio 
spectrum based on innovative technologies such as cognitive radio innovative 
technologies (ITU, 2008). 
South Africa concluded a TV white space trial in 2013. Google as the operator for the 
geo-location database conducted the trial, the Tertiary Education Network supplied the 
backhaul connectivity with the CSIR as trial license holder where the results 
demonstrated that it was possible to achieve communication using TV white spaces 
without causing harmful interference (Stucke, 2015). Stucke (2015) suggests possible 
regulatory regimes for DSA as licence exempt as used in the case of the USA and UK. 
Dynamic spectrum access has the potential to succeed in delivering quality services if a 
hybrid regulatory approach for dynamic spectrum access wherein licence-exempt is used 
in conjunction with managed spectrum (Stucke, 2015). 
 
DSA as an approach to access radio spectrum allows for sharing in a sense that even 
though radio spectrum is assigned to a licensee, the next user can also access radio 
spectrum. The access can be realised through market-based approach such as trade and 
lease, which is made possible by radio spectrum property rights and technology neutrality 
regimes. This approach further brings about flexibility in radio spectrum regulation as the 
right to use whatever technology neutrality to provide any service neutrality, which is 
adopted as the principle in this approach of radio spectrum assignment (ITU, 2008). 
 
In spite of cognitive radio technologies fast emerging as the next generation wireless 
networking platform, issues of security such as different attacks from malicious users are 
overlooked in the research.These attacks may happen in the form of jamming with 
malicious intent of distorting normal secondary communications (Ren, Wang, Du, & Xu, 
2012). There is also the possibility of a denial of service attack which may happen in the 
form of  emulating characteristics of primary users of the spectrum band (of evacuating 
the secondary users from the radio spectrum band and capturing the band  (Ren, Wang, 
Du, & Xu, 2012). Even though DSA has been used successfully in achieving certain policy 
goals such as universal access, it is not favoured for commercial services as service 
quality is not guaranteed (Stucke, 2015). There is also a possibility of eavesdropping by 
emulating characteristics of secondary users. Hence, it is an important aspect to build 
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sensing and detection of the attacks from malicious users to ensure an efficient and 
secure DSA system (Zargar, Weiss, Caicedo, & Joshi, 2009).  
2.4 RADIO SPECTRUM REFORMS AND MARKET STRUCTURE  
While radio spectrum plays a critical role in the provision of electronic communications 
services, it is a limited resource, which can only be assigned to a number of network 
operators (RSPG, 2009) and (Doyle and Smith, 1998). Inclusive mobile communications 
market structures are key issue for policy makers and regulators. Access to radio 
spectrum is substantial economies of scale in building network facilities for industry 
players (OECD, 2014). Therefore, management of radio spectrum also become a key 
issue for regulators. Typically, in managing radio spectrum, regulators will design plans, 
which show how to ensure access to radio spectrum guided by the policy goals.  
 
The process of ensuring radio spectrum access typically determines the market structure 
through the number of network operators that are able to deliver competitive 
communications services. Radio spectrum can further be accessed through MVNOs or 
resellers to provide services to the end users. For example, South Africa through 
managed liberalisation policy, managed to assign radio spectrum to three mobile 
operators including two fixed line operators as well as IBurst and Sentech to provide 
wireless broadband services. There is also quite a number of MVNOs in the South African 
market, while (OECD, 2014) most of the OECD countries have at least three mobile 
network operators (MNOs) that operate nationally to provide services. 
Hence, countries usually place a limit to the number of licenses, which can provide 
wireless services (OECD, 2014). These have led to the creation of oligopolistic market 
structures with a small number of players dominating the market, considering that each 
player has the power to influence the price.  
Lack of radio spectrum has the potential of holding back competition in the electronic 
communication network and service markets. Similarly, the traditional radio spectrum 
gatekeeper can actively and passively ensure that radio spectrum become an entry 
barrier for market entries (ICASA, 2014a). According to Marcus, et al., (2005) levelling of 
the playing field for competitors is as equally important as interference free radio spectrum 
and usage of radio spectrum efficiently as these are important elements of regulation to 
ensure sustainable market competition. 
Even though competition in the mobile sector is perceived to be aggressive and viable 
compared to the fixed service sector, access to radio spectrum can be used by operators 
to distort competition to the detriment of the end-users where policy objectives such as 
universal access and affordability can be compromised (RSPG, 2009). Therefore, 
regulators should exercise more care when employing radio spectrum reforms to ensure 
that effective competition is realised through proper regulatory interventions.   
Literature states that the scarcity of radio spectrum most often creates an oligopoly 
market structure, therefore radio spectrum should be assigned in a manner that creates 
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a market structure that maximises possible degrees of competition is realised (Marcus, 
et al., 2005). 
2.5 RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN RADIO SPECTRUM REFORMS AND 
MARKET LIBERALISATION – A CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK   
The literature has shown that there is a direct correlation between market liberalisation 
and radio spectrum reforms. However, market liberalisation is not always dependent on 
radio spectrum reforms (Tripathi & Prasad, 2013). Most markets have implemented 
market liberalisations without reform of radio spectrum. South Africa is a classic example 
where market liberalisation with little intervention on radio spectrum reforms has been 
experienced.  
 
Figure 6 depicts the relationship between spectrum reforms and market liberalisation. 
This relationship forms part of the conceptual framework for this study. As observed in 
the figure, the x-axis describes the evolution in radio spectrum management (from 
command-and-control to full realisation of radio spectrum reformation, while the y-axis 
represents market liberalisation. The red dash line in the figure shows the market 
liberalisation-based regulatory approach. This is when the regulatory intervention is 
focused on achieving market liberalisation with less focus on radio spectrum reformation. 
This approach is capable of rapidly liberalising the market. However, in the end, this 
liberalisation cannot be sustained. Hence, the saturation point shown in the graph, which 
represents the plateau of market liberalisation. The literature further substantiates this; it 
claims that in the telecommunication sector, because of supply and demand, there will 
come a point where access to radio spectrum becomes a bottleneck for effective 
competition (ITU, 2007) and (Melody, 1980).  
 
On the contrary, the solid blue line represents regulatory interventions that prioritise radio 
spectrum reform while marginalising market liberalisation. In this approach, the 
liberalisation of the market is minimal; however, it is a necessary stride in ensuring further 
market liberalisation. The graph further shows that when radio spectrum reforms are 
making strides, further growth in market liberalisation can be realised. There is a depiction 
of this phenomenon at the end of the dashed and solid lines, where there is a disruption 
plateau phase to further allow market liberalisation. The literature emphasises this 
phenomenon when it states that radio spectrum reform will be a necessity to allow further 
market liberalisation (Melody, 1980) and (Tripathi & Prasad, 2013). The result will be a 
liberalised market with the following characteristic: low costs, low entry barriers and high 
innovation.  
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Figure 6: The conceptual framework 
 
Source: Researchers’s own    
The literature addressed in this chapter has shown that excessive radio spectrum reforms 
have the potential to yield negative results for the markets. Wellinius and Neto (2008) 
postulate a phased approach in employing radio spectrum reforms to address challenges 
of command-and-control for developing countries. They post a number of strategies to 
address challenges posed by the administrative approach for managing radio spectrum, 
i.e.  
 allowing greater flexibility for radio spectrum use 
 allowing technology neutrality when radio spectrum is assigned 
 constant updating of national table of allocation to align with international table of 
allocation 
 for high demand radio spectrum auctions to be a standard method of assigning 
radio spectrum 
 introducing other market tools such as radio spectrum trading in secondary market  
 introducing market discipline for public radio spectrum use, e.g. AIP as a method 
for  radio spectrum fees (Wellenius & Neto, 2008).  
 
Literature however, cautions that there is also a need to strike the right balance through 
the creation of market liberalisation regulation for radio spectrum reforms (Hazelett, 
Ibarguen, & Leighton, 2007). This will ensure that radio spectrum reforms are supported 
to enable effective competition, innovation and ensure quality of service.   
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2.6  SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION  
With respect to the issue of the relationship between radio spectrum reforms and market 
liberalisation, there is a consensus that radio spectrum reforms are crucial for efficiency 
in radio spectrum management. However, there are divergent views in terms of access 
to radio spectrum by users to achieve efficiency. Certain scholars believe that radio 
spectrum should be exclusively assigned to users, whereas others believe in the open-
access principle to radio spectrum. The following chapter explains the research 
methodology considered for the study.  
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3 CHAPTER THREE: RESEARCH METHODOLOGY     
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter outlines the detailed theoretical framework underpinning the research as 
introduced in chapter two. It contextualises the study, research approach, and states the 
research gap. It explains the research objectives and poses the research questions. It 
further presents the data analysis strategy to be employed and the instruments to be used 
to collate the data for the research. In conclusion, it illustrates how the results of the data 
analysis will be presented.  
3.2 RESEARCH GAP 
Radio spectrum reforms have been reviewed based on the traditional radio spectrum 
allocation and assignment approaches such as command-and-control, market-based 
approaches and open access. The objective is to facilitate radio spectrum sharing such 
as licence exempt, radio spectrum commons and spectrum parks. However, to the best 
of our knowledge, there is a lack of studies focusing on the relationship between radio 
spectrum reforms and market liberalisation. 
3.3 RESEARCH LIMITATION 
This research includes some technical aspects of radio spectrum reforms. However, it is 
not the intention of the study to address technical issues associated with spectrum 
reforms. The focus is on the policy and regulatory aspects of these reforms rather than 
functionality and interpretation. 
3.4 RESEARCH APPROACH   
The research methodology employed in this study is guided by the problem statements, 
the nature of the data available, body of knowledge, and data available (Ellis & Levy, 
2009).  
In this research, the problem is on the conceptual level of spectrum management policy 
and regulations. Suitable data should contain the rationale and clearly describe the 
interactions between the regulator and other stakeholders involved in considering the 
employment of different spectrum reforms in the South African context. The research 
approach employed in the collection of empirical data was qualitative, not quantitative.  
This research is non-numerical, but rather descriptive and uses words which mean the 
approach followed is qualitative. This allowed for more detailed investigation on the 
implications of employing different reforms It is able to answer questions such as who is 
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affected, why are they affected, what factors are involved, do individuals react or respond 
differently to one other, or not they not (Brynard & Hanekom, 1997). 
Qualitative researchers often depend on four methods of gathering data, namely, 
participation in the settings, direct observation, in-depth interviews and analysis of 
responses (Nelson, Silverman, and Thomas, 2011). Therefore, this research adopted in-
depth interviews and analysis of responses as an approach to gather data. 
The aim was to describe the radio spectrum reforms and their implications through the 
use of nonnumeric data such as words as described by (Chinnathambi, Rajaseker, & 
Philominathan, 2013). Radio spectrum reforms are defined normally in national policies 
and regulations of countries.  This made numeric data a non-useful method for collecting 
data as numbers will not be elaborate enough on issues of radio spectrum reforms. This 
was especially so, considering the manner in which radio spectrum reforms are perceived 
in relation to competition, market structure and universal access to wireless broadband 
services.  
In addition, it was also impossible to quantify policy and regulatory issues in terms of 
numeric data. The conceptual framework of the report relates to relationships between 
radio spectrums reforms, competition, universal access, and affordability. These 
relationships will be assessed through regulation and policy by exploring available 
documents containing radio spectrum management issues relating to the reforms and 
competition. 
Since competition and radio spectrum reforms are theoretical frameworks that underpin 
this research, different radio spectrum reforms including disruptive technologies and 
innovation on radio spectrum management will be critically analysed. The critical analysis 
will provide theoretical frameworks for understanding the constructs that impact on the 
employment of radio spectrum reforms in relation to competition.  
The strategy followed is a naturalistic inquiry, through the studying of a real world 
situation. This has allowed openness to whatever emerges with no predetermined 
findings. In this regard, radio spectrum reforms have been critically analysed with the pros 
and cons of adopting either of these approaches clearly outlined and what impact they 
have on competition. 
3.5 RESEARCH DESIGN AND RATIONALE 
Research design articulates what data was required to conduct this research, and which 
methods were used to collect and analyse the collected data (van Wyk, 2012). It further 
articulates how this process managed to answer the research question of whether current 
South African radio spectrum reforms support market liberalisation. It also serves as an 
enrichment of the chapters of the research. 
As  Chinnathambi, Rajaseker, & Philominathan (2013)  argues, the research design for 
this research showed various approaches used to solve a research problem of assessing 
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the effects of radio spectrum reforms to market liberalisation. It did so through sources 
and information related to the problem studied. 
The research design presented an opportunity for this study to anticipate the appropriate 
research methodology and its tools to maximize the validity whether indeed there is a 
relationship between radio spectrum reforms and market liberalisations or not (Cohen, 
Manion, & Morrison, 2007). 
Research design served as an orderly and carefully planned enquiry which followed a 
particular approach to verify the validity, reliability and truthfulness of the collected data 
from both document studied and interviews (Brynard & Hanekom, 1997). Therefore, this 
study will strive to achieve sentiments shared with regard to the research design by using 
relevant documents. 
As Maxwell suggested, the process of “collecting and analysing data, developing and 
modifying theory, elaborating or refocusing the research questions, and identifying and 
dealing with validity threats took place simultaneously, with one process influencing all of 
the others” (Maxwell, 1997, p. 214). It should be noted that there were some modifications 
to the design of the study as new information was discovered during document studying, 
interviews and observations on the development of the ICT sector in South Africa.  Hence 
the adoption of a flexible, non-sequential approach with a broader and less restrictive 
concept of “design” was adopted for the study “interactive model” (Maxwell, 1997).  
Tools used to collect qualitative data for the research are document analysis of printed or 
electronic documents, interviews methods and case study. These tools assisted in 
capturing direct quotations about perspectives and experiences that affected 
stakeholders. Furthermore, it captured the following: 
 Their perception on the implementation of policies and regulations relating to radio 
spectrum management in South Africa.  
 Their understanding of how ICASA and the policy maker have embraced the radio 
spectrum reforms.  
 Their views on how policy and regulation have impacted on market liberalisation 
for South African.  
How ICASA’s regulations can assist in achieving national policy objectives as expanded 
in the NDP and SA Connect of broadband for all by 2030. 
3.6 RESEARCH QUESTIONS  
The primary question is to what extent have command-and-control and radio spectrum 
reforms employed in South Africa supported market liberalisation for the purpose of 
achieving universal access and service to broadband services? 
3.6.1 Sub-questions  
In order to respond to the primary question, the following questions are posed:  
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Q.1. How does current policy and regulatory radio spectrum management approaches 
in South Africa assist towards achieving universal access to broadband services?       
Q.2. Are current radio spectrum regulatory approaches of licensing radio spectrum, 
largely on an exclusive basis, capable of encouraging competition and ensuring 
infrastructure sharing? 
Q.3. Are there any alternative radio spectrum regulatory approaches to licensing radio 
spectrum to encourage competition? 
Q.4. Would alternative radio spectrum regulatory approaches to licensing radio 
spectrum assist to address the cost associated with the usage and access of 
broadband services?   
Q.5. What are regulatory interventions that ICASA can adopt to limit the possibility of 
consolidation of markets to distort the competition and hinder universal access to 
broadband? 
3.7 DATA COLLECTION 
Common qualitative data-gathering techniques used for the purpose of this research 
includes interviews to obtain detailed information on radio spectrum reforms as articulated 
in policy and regulations to ensure universal and affordable broadband services. 
Documents were also studied as a second technique to collect data.  Documents 
produced by the Department of Communications such as policies, legislations, reports 
and etc., regulations and discussion documents produced by ICASA on radio spectrum 
and other related issues. This does not preclude any government documents addressing 
issues in relation to this research. 
International publications such as reports and manuals on radio spectrum reforms and 
wireless mobile markets were also studied for the purpose of collecting data. It is worth 
mentioning that each report or document studied as well as interviews as tools used for 
data collections presented advantages and disadvantages. The pros and cons ranged 
from level of insensitivity, opportunity to review during the collection process, and 
prejudice from both the researcher and stakeholder’s participated in interviews (Mack, 
Woodsong , MacQueen, Guest, & Namey, 2011). 
The resulting pieces of data took the form of text. As explained by Teddlie & Yu (2007) 
the purposive sampling method to select data was employed in the study, both documents 
and stakeholders were chosen for a purpose. The selection process for documents was 
based on the fact that those documents addressed issues of radio spectrum reforms and 
as well as issues of market structure and competition. The documents further outlined 
government’s intention on how both regulation and policy should unfold with regard to 
radio spectrum management. Therefore the important characteristics of sources were the 
basis of the selection for the study. 
3.7.1 Interviews  
The objectives of the interviews as stated by Gill, Stewart ,Treasure, & Chadwick (2008, 
pp.291-295) are as follows: exploring the views, experiences, beliefs and/or motivations 
of affected stakeholders on governing approaches for radio spectrum management 
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reforms which may assist to achieve objectives as outlined in national broadband policy. 
An example of those objectives is universal access to affordable broadband services. 
Interviews were used as one of the methods to collected data. The interview process 
assisted in gathering detailed views, perceptions and insight of the participants. 
Interviews assisted to ascertain industry response to strides made as far as radio 
spectrum and market liberalisation in South Africa. Interviews play a vital role as sources 
for this research.    
A recorder was used to do interviews. They are essentially three type of research 
interview that can be employed for qualitative research which is structured, semi-
structured and unstructured interviews (DiCicco-Bloom & Crabtree, 2006, pp. 314-321). 
For the purpose of this research two types of interviews, structured and semi structured, 
were used. The reason of employing two types of interviews was to be flexible and derive 
more information that one can get from stakeholders who participated in the interview 
process. The whole process of the interview was to answer the following question: to what 
extent do radio spectrum reforms adopted by South Africa support market liberalisation? 
The interview process assisted in understanding the views of the stakeholders if the 
status quo in relation to radio spectrum reforms were to remain the same. And if so, would 
that ensure effective competition and ultimately lead to universal access to broadband 
services by 2030? 
Interviews were in the form of in-depth face to face verbal interactions with the 
interviewees. Stakeholders consisted of representatives from mobile operators, a 
representative from ICASA, a researcher from the Council for Scientific and Industrial  
Research (CSIR), a representative from the Department of Telecommunications and 
Postal services (DTPS), an organisation representing interests of mobile operators -  the 
Wireless Access Providers Association (WAPA), an organisation representing interests 
of mobile operators worldwide - GSMA, one expert representing the Vendor community 
and industry experts as well consultants doing work on various telecommunications 
issues, including  radio spectrum as shown in Table 2.  
During interviews, an empathic neutrality approach was adopted to ensure that there is 
understating without judgement. For example when operators were interviewed, there 
was some showing of openness, sensitivity and awareness in relation to issues that each 
operator might be dealing with at that particular moment. The same principle was applied 
when both the policy maker and the regulator were interviewed. The intention of the 
approach to was acknowledge the developments which were happening within the sector. 
It is common knowledge that government is busy with the development of an ICT 
integrated white paper; there are proposed mergers and consolidations by operators and 
some infrastructure sharing proposals. The regulator is also expected to develop an ITA 
that will ensure the release of high demand radio spectrum for broadband services.  
Similarly, the industry is also developing strategies on how to participate in ICASA’s ITA 
process. These developments had a bearing on most of the issues addressed in this 
research. They also relate to challenges that are currently facing South Africa in radio 
spectrum management.  
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Interviews were very helpful in addressing the issues of radio spectrum assignment and 
allocation in South Africa, the bottlenecks associated with awarding the high demand 
radio spectrum and the impact of the delays and non-action on radio spectrum 
assignment from the policy maker and the regulator. The interviews were also flexible in 
that interviewees preferred a conversation rather than sticking to the questionnaire. An 
advantage that came with adopting a hybrid model of interviews that is, both structured, 
semi-structured and unstructured interviews is the flexibility aspect.  
Predetermined questions were asked through a questionnaire. This represented the 
structured interview element. Elements of an unstructured interview were also present 
because questions such as the experience of the stakeholders in the telecommunications 
sector were asked. The purpose was to establish how well versed the stakeholder 
participating in the interview is with the South African telecommunications sector.  Usually   
“unstructured interviews are generally considered where significant ‘depth’ is required, or 
where virtually nothing is known about the subject area” (Gill, Stewart, Treasure, & 
Chadwick, 2008, pp. 314-321). Because there is little research work done around South 
Africa’s regulations on radio spectrum management, for this reason an unstructured 
interview was adopted as the preferred interview method..  
The interviews employed a face-to-face approach with two interview approaches 
(structured and semi-structured). Brynard and Hanekom argued the approach of meeting 
face to face with the interviewee has a benefit in case there is the need to clarify a 
problem. This could be beneficial on the person being interviewed in that he or she might 
open up with a lot more information to the extent of even providing examples (Brynard & 
Hanekom, 1997). The stakeholders interviewed were asked questions for clarity on some 
of the predetermined questions which were sent to them prior the actual interview. They 
were also able to provide example of cases where some of the answers were relied upon. 
To be specific, Table 1 depicts the stakeholders which are interviewed.  
Stakeholders for interviews were chosen on the basis that they will be in a position to 
provide different perspectives on the topic researched. The Regulator, 22/05/2015 was 
able to provide a regulator perspective on the effectiveness of radio spectrum reforms 
employed by ICASA for market liberalisation. Policy Maker, 23/01/2016 was able to 
provide a policy maker perspective in relation to radio spectrum reforms to be considered 
by ICASA to achieve objectives of SA Connect. While operators, Operator-A, 24/04/2015 
Telkom and Operator-B, 14/05/2015 Cell-C were able to provide a perspective of small 
operators with smaller market shares compared to MTN and Vodacom about radio 
spectrum reforms employed and proposed by the regulator, and how radio spectrum 
reforms by the regulator entrenches the dominance of the big operators and how it 
improves effective competiveness of the sector. Both Operator-C, 26/05/2015 Vodacom 
and Operator-D, 26/05/15 MTN as operators with a bigger market share were able to 
provide their perspective on market-based approaches as effective for competition and 
do they believe that radio spectrum should be consolidated with them as they have the 
capacity to roll-out infrastructure. 
Excerpt-F, 28/05/2015 WAPA also shared their perspective on radio spectrum commons 
as a method to ensure market liberalisation. While Expert-E, 28/04/15 GSMA was able to 
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provide their perspective on the South African market structure and competition, GSMA 
is of the view that the South African market does not have the capacity to handle any new 
entrants. According to Expert-E, 28/04/15 the existing market players have the capability 
to ensure market liberalisation with proper regulatory intervention. Expert-C, 21/04/2015, 
Lottery Board, Expert-B, Consultant 24/04/15, Expert-A, ZET Comms, 12/05/15 and 
Expert-D, 26/05/2015 were able to provide answers on how radio spectrum reforms will 
support market liberalisation. In conclusion, engaging Researcher, 29/04/2015 CSIR 
assisted in gathering views through thought leadership from research. For example, CSIR 
and some consultants were able to provide information that illustrated the research that 
is currently underway to improve efficiency in radio spectrum access and usage by 
different users. Their perceptive managed to balance the views expressed by operators, 
government and regulators as they have competing interests in radio spectrum 
management and regulation. An introduction of balance from a group which does not 
have a biased view like the other stakeholders with strong sectional interest on the aspect 
of radio spectrum management was achieved.  In general, engagement with stakeholders 
through interviews assisted in establishing the perceptions and understating of the 
market. This is with regard to the effects of radio spectrum reforms to market liberalisation, 
as well as the importance of efficient regulation for radio spectrum efficiency. 
 
Table 1: List of stakeholders who participated in the interview session 
 Respondent Institution  Years of 
Experience 
Interview date  
1 Regulator ICASA  More than 15 
years  of 
experience in  
ICT engineering, 
policy and  
regulatory 
22/05/2015 
2 Policy Maker  DTPS     More than 15 
years  of 
experience in  
ICT engineering, 
policy and  
regulatory 
23/01/2016 
3 Operator-A   Telkom   More than 20 
years  of 
experience in  
ICT engineering, 
policy and  
regulatory 
24/04/2015 
 
4 Operator-B Cell C  More than 20 
years  of 
experience in  
ICT engineering, 
14/03/2015 
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policy and  
regulatory 
5 Operator-C Vodacom   More than 20 
years  of 
experience in  
ICT policy,  
regulatory and 
strategy 
management 
26/05/2015 
6 Operator-D MTN  More than 20 
years  of 
experience in  
ICT engineering, 
policy and  
regulatory 
26/05/2015 
7 Expert-A  ZET-Comms   More than 20 
years  of 
experience in  
ICT engineering, 
policy,  regulatory 
and strategy 
management 
12/05/2015 
8 Expert-B Consultant  More than 20 
years  of 
experience in  
ICT engineering, 
policy,  regulatory 
and strategy 
management 
24/04/2015 
9 Expert-C  Lottery Board  More than 20 
years  of 
experience in  
ICT engineering, 
policy,  regulatory 
and strategy 
management 
21/04/2015 
10 Vendor   Ericsson  More than 20 
years  of 
experience in  
ICT engineering, 
policy,    
regulatory and 
strategy 
management 
18/05/2015 
11 Researcher   CSIR  More than 10 
years  of 
29/04/2015 
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experience in  
ICT engineering, 
policy,    
regulatory,  and 
research 
12 Expert-D   Sentech  More than 10 
years of 
experience in ICT 
engineering, 
policy and     
regulatory 
26/05/2015 
13 Expert E GSMA  More than 20 
years  of 
experience in  
ICT engineering, 
policy,    
regulatory and 
strategy 
management 
28/04/2015 
14 Expert F   WAPA More than 20 
years  of 
experience in  
ICT policy,    
regulatory and 
strategy 
management 
28/04/2015 
Source: Researcher’s own 
  
 Advantages of Interviews  
Interviews as a method of collecting data were useful in understanding the evolution of 
radio spectrum reforms and market liberalisation. It also helped in keeping the 
interviewers on track and focused until completion. The method was also used in allowing 
interviewees to express what is important to them in relation to radio spectrum reforms. 
Face-to-face interviews also assisted in asking for clarity from the interviewees when 
required. 
 
 Disadvantages of Interviews  
Because the research employed both structured and unstructured methods to do 
interviews, there were times when interviewees who went off topic when responding to 
questions. As indicated above, the issue of radio reforms is currently topical in South 
Africa. The interviews took longer than the time allocated. In the end it created some 
difficult to report findings and compare data from different interviewees for the study. Most 
of the time interviewees were subjective in responding to questions.    
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3.7.2 Document Study 
In order to strengthen the study and make the findings more credible, multiple secondary 
data was used. (Brynard & Hanekom, 1997) And  (Okoli & Schabram, 2010) states that 
relevant literature review is important in that it assists researchers in making use of 
literature to determine the truth about the studied phenomena. (Taylor-Powell & Renner, 
2003) Is of the view that literature is an account of what has been published on a topic by 
accredited scholars and researchers. In undertaking the literature review of this study, 
more focus will be given to information that could assist in exploring the issues about 
spectrum reforms, market structure and competition. This includes information from the 
following sources: the Internet, policies and legislation, relevant published books, 
unpublished dissertations and theses, research reports, official reports, documentation 
and speeches, and articles from academic journals. However, it will be possible to 
supplement the existing documents with information that could be gathered from the 
questions posed during face-to-face interviews, a closed or restricted form of 
questionnaire and any new information from observation. 
Data will be collected from a variety of sources. Amongst those will be a survey of 
documents by ICASA, the regulator, to establish as to whether they have developed any 
programmes and strategies to meet the radio spectrum assignment efficiency 
requirements with the main aim of achieving broadband policy imperatives. To further 
share the regulator’s experience with regard to the previous programmes and strategy 
employment on radio spectrum reforms, how will that have an effect on competition? A 
similar approach of a survey of documents by the Department of Communications and 
any other government policy documents and related research studies will be adopted with 
the same aim of establishing experience, behaviour and beliefs on radio spectrum 
management reforms to meet government policy objectives for 2030 in line with national 
broadband policy, South Africa Connect and the NDP. For the purpose of this research, 
data analysis ideally occurred concurrently with data collection. It assisted the researcher 
to generate an emerging understanding about research questions on radio spectrum 
reforms, which in turn informs both the sampling and the questions being asked on radio 
spectrum management. 
Secondary data was also used in the form of international organizations such as the ITU. 
This data assisted in providing context for the global perspective of different radio 
spectrum reforms in relation to market liberalisation.   
 
 Advantages of document study  
Document study assisted in gathering more information which was not known before radio 
spectrum reforms. This method was relatively low cost because most of the documents 
analysed were government documents and ICASA‘s documents, which are readily 
available from the Internet. ITU documents are also available from the Internet and easily 
accessible. The documents studied were also a good source of background information 
on radio spectrum reforms and market liberalisation.      
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 Disadvantage of document study 
Most of the documents studied were too long and time consuming to read. Most of the 
documents were stating the same issues that the study was looking at. Some of the 
documents presented radio spectrum reforms from a subjective point of view without any 
empirical evidence supporting issues stated.      
3.8   DATA ANALYSIS FROM INTERVIEWS AND DOCUMENTS 
STUDIED 
There is no prescribed ”right way” of analysing data in qualitative study (Kawulich , 2004, 
p. 96), (Leddy & Ormrod, 2005, p. 150) and (Taylor-Powell & Renner, 2003). The data 
analysis process involved making sense out of data recorded in text and in audio during 
interviews and the large number of documents studied. Literature  suggests that “data 
analysis normally occurred concurrently with data collection to enable a researcher to 
generate an emerging understanding about research questions, which in turn informs 
both the sampling and the questions being asked” (DiCicco-Bloom & Crabtree, 2006, pp. 
314-321), (Creswell, 2013) & (Leddy & Ormrod, 2005). Data analysis occurred 
concurrently with data collection, and the strategy assisted with making sense of research 
questions which interviewees were asked and making sense of documents studied. It 
further assisted in how to choose the document to be studied and how to make sense out 
of them in relation to spectrum reforms and competition.    
As Kawulich (2004) stated, data analysis is critical in order to get the researcher more 
involved in the data and enable them to be familiar with it, as that will assist with 
identification of themes, patterns and relationships between data. Further Tellis (1997) 
states that data analysis is the least developed area and the most complex in case study 
approaches. With Taylor-Powell & Remer (2003) suggesting that the process of analysing 
data depends on the following elements: the questions the researcher wants to answer, 
the needs of those who will use the information and the availability of the resources to be 
used. For the purpose of this research data analysis will occur concurrently with data 
collection. The strategy assisted in understanding emerging issues which might arise 
relating to questions. The understanding of emerging issues was captured during the 
process; the sole intention was to improve questions asked on radio spectrum reforms 
and their effect on competition (DiCicco-Bloom & Crabtree, 2006). Since the questions to 
be asked on radio spectrum reforms were very direct, this approach might assist in 
discovering the new issues during interviews. It also helped improve and expand the 
research questions.   
Progressive focusing strategy was also adopted, as was data analysis during data 
collection. This assisted in jotting down ideas with the intention of getting to understand 
the meaning of the text and how it might relate to other issues directly (Bitsch, 2005).  
In addition, thematic analysis will be employed in this research as that will assist in looking 
across all the data to identify the common issues that recur, and identify the main themes 
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with regard to employment of different aspects of spectrum reforms and  summaries all 
the views  collected to formulate an opinion (Braun & Clarke, 2006).    
There will be four stages of thematic analysis as pointed out by (Braun & Clarke, 2006) 
preliminary observations as the first stage, followed by identification of themes from the 
notes made and documents analysed and interviews, development of coding schemes is 
third, and lastly, coding of data. Data will be interpreted by attaching significance to the 
themes and patterns that were observed, prepare findings, and ultimately compile a 
detailed report with recommendations and propose adjustments. 
Presentations of the filed work will also ensure that all the views, perceptions and 
experiences of the sampled interviewees about radio spectrum reforms and market 
liberalisation are presented in a form of themes created from the questions asked. Filed 
work will be supplemented by an in-depth analysis of the South Africa policy and 
regulatory framework in relation to radio spectrum reforms.  
3.9 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION   
Research methodology chosen for this study is of a qualitative approach because of the 
nature of the problem being investigated. The descriptive approach is followed throughout 
the study to understand the implication of employing reforms for market liberalisation. 
Sampled interviewees and their vast ICT technical, regulatory, policy and strategy 
management are highlighted. Findings of the field work and document analysed will be 
reported in the next chapter.         
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4 CHAPTER FOUR: PERSPECTIVE OF ACHIEVING MARKET 
LIBERALISATION THROUGH SPECTRUM REFORMS 
4.1 INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND   
The research seeks to explore required radio spectrum reforms necessary to enable 
South Africa to fulfil national objectives as defined in the NDP and the National Broadband 
Policy, which among others, includes market liberalisation. This is necessary to achieve 
universal access for broadband services. This will be achieved through the collection 
methodology, which will include analysis of the data collected during interviews and 
documents analysis. The chapter was constructed through the adoption of a two-pronged 
approach, where document analysis and interview process were adopted for the 
purposes of collecting data. Therefore, document findings will be presented first and these 
finding will be followed by findings of the stakeholders and conclusions in this chapter.  
Due to the high volume of documents available that require examination, sampling, 
purposive and interpretation techniques were employed. This was useful in aiding the 
selection of documents to be interrogated for the data collection process. The documents 
examined are more inclined towards radio spectrum management policy and regulations 
for broadband access and a roll-out in relation to competition and market structure.  
In the case of interviews conducted with the stakeholders, a sampling approach was 
employed for selecting interviewees. The selection of the stakeholders to participate in 
the interviews was based on their experience. It was important to select interviewees who 
played or are currently playing in the South African electronic communications sector and 
those with an in-depth understanding of radio spectrum issues.  
Document analysis is structured in three sections. The first section describes policies and 
legislation issues; the second section outlines for regulatory framework by the regulator, 
and the last is international reports.  
4.1 POLICIES AND LEGISLATION  
This section introduces the convergence of legislation and policy that entrenches 
command-and-control for the management of radio spectrum. This further included some 
elements of radio spectrum reforms embraced for the purpose of ensuring efficient 
spectrum management to realize the objective of Vision 2030 of affordable universal 
access of broadband for all. 
4.2.1. National Development Plan 2030  
The National Development Plan entails the vision for South Africa to eliminate poverty 
and lessen inequality by 2030 (NDP, 2012, p. 24). The Plan comprises of 15 chapters, 
wherein chapters 3 to 15 provide a summary of objectives and actions which will lead to 
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Vision 2030. The main goal of the Plan is to eliminate poverty and reduce inequality 
through different sectors which contribute to the South African economy. 
Chapter 4 of the Plan discusses Economic infrastructure, which is important for the study 
to consider as it covers actions and activities that are required for the ICT sector to realise 
the Vision 2030. In particular, the NDP covers radio frequency spectrum for wireless 
mobile broadband. According to the Plan, by 2030, ICT will underpin the development of 
a network infrastructure which is universally available and accessible. Moreover, the Plan 
supports the development of an infrastructure that is accessible and that meets the needs 
of businesses, citizens and the public sector (NDP, 2012) 
According to the NDP, the duopoly in the mobile market has resulted in Telkom 
dominating in the telecommunication backbone and fixed telephony market. The apparent 
dominance has been ineffectively regulated, consequently resulting in high costs for 
business and increasing costs of services and products (NDP, 2012). The Plan provides 
that for South Africa “to achieve its ICT policy goals, the country must have a coordinated, 
enabling plan and strategy with reviewing of the market structure and analysis of benefits 
and costs of duplicating or sharing infrastructure, given that the radio frequency spectrum 
on which mobile broadband depends is limited” (NDP, 2012, p. 191).  
The Plan claims that radio spectrum is a scarce, natural resource that needs to be 
optimally assigned to meet the needs of the South African people and its economy. 
Therefore, streamlining the assignment of the radio frequency spectrum can assist in 
addressing the regulatory bottleneck in the deployment of wireless broadband. It further 
provides that a significant amount of spectrum will be made available through the 
migration of broadcasting services from an analogue to digital process, that radio 
frequency spectrum should be swiftly assigned to ensure the expansion of wireless 
services  (NDP, 2012, p. 192). 
The Plan further makes pronouncements on the mechanism that should be adopted on 
making the assignment of the radio spectrum that will be released as the result of the 
digital broadcasting migration process, the digital dividend. It puts emphasis on the 
transparent process of licensing the digital dividend spectrum. The licensing process 
should be accompanied by clear conditions where those applying for the spectrum need 
to indicate the type of services they will be providing (NDP, 2012, p. 194). With this, the 
Plan seems to suggest that the digital dividend spectrum will be licensed based on a 
technology-specific basis. This contradicts other parts of the Plan which support the 
flexible use of the radio spectrum. This part seems to support command-and-control for 
licensing radio spectrum. 
It further suggests market-based approaches such as auctioning or reverse bidding of the 
radio spectrum as a form of licensing as well as radio spectrum trading. It also supports 
the policy that promotes the notion of technology neutrality for the licensing of radio 
spectrum. This should allow for flexible use and competition where incumbents will not 
be prohibited from gaining access to the digital dividend radio spectrum (NDP, 2012, p. 
194). With this provision in the Plan, it shows the willingness to shift some aspects of 
radio spectrum reforms for the licensing of the radio spectrum. 
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In conclusion, the Plan outlines the phasing of priorities to create an enabling ICT 
environment to achieve Vision 2030. For the period of 2012 to 2015, the Plan provides 
the review of the ICT policy, which has not been done since 1995. In the process of the 
ICT policy review, the plans for assignment of digital dividend radio spectrum should be 
included with clear targets of monitoring and evaluation. It further highlights the policy 
issues which require urgent policy attention such as adjustment of market structure and 
removal of legal constraints to enable full competition in services (NDP, 2012, p. 195). 
The Plan prioritizes the review of ICT policy, which in turn presents an opportunity for 
adoption of some aspects of radio spectrum reforms. Consequently, effective competition 
in the market through proper market review is ensured, which may result in driving the 
affordability of mobile broadband services. 
4.2.2. National Broadband Policy “South Africa Connect” 
South Africa Connect is a South African Broadband Policy that gives effect to Vision 2030 
as envisaged in the National Development Plan. The policy outlines the plan of the 
government to develop a seamless information infrastructure for South Africa. It should 
be universally available, accessible and meet the needs of businesses, citizens and the 
public sector (DoC, 2013, p. 2). The Policy defines broadband as an “ecosystem of high 
capacity, high speed and high quality electronic networks, services, applications and 
content that enhances the variety, uses and value of information and communications for 
different types of users” (DoC, 2013, p. 18). 
The Policy creates a framework to realize South Africa’s broadband ambitions with three 
pillars of strategies: digital development, digital readiness and digital future. In each 
strategy, there are plans and actions outlined and attached to a responsible key 
stakeholder for the realisation of affordable and universal access of broadband services 
by 2030 for all South Africans. The Policy states that its purpose, amongst other issues, 
is to remove policy constraints, regulatory bottlenecks and other hurdles that create the 
slow diffusion of broadband in South Africa (DoC, 2013). 
The policy acknowledges the increasing demand for radio frequency spectrum as a result 
of increasing reliance on mobile or wireless communications as stated in a number of 
scholarly documents (DoC, 2013, p.16). Similarly to the NDP, the Policy concludes that 
the delays in the broadcasting digital migration process in South Africa has resulted to 
non-realisation of effective competition and fewer contribution of ICT to economic 
development. The delay of policy and regulatory allocation and assignment of radio 
frequency spectrum results in a lack of competition and less return on investment in ICT 
(DoC, 2013, p. 16). 
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Table 2: South Africa Connect targets for accessing broadband services 
Target  Penetration 
measure 
Baseline 
(2013) 
By 2016  By 2020 By 2030 
Broadband 
access in 
Mbps user 
experience 
% of 
population 
33.7% 
Internet 
access 
50% at 5 
Mbps 
90% at  5 
Mbps 
50% at 100 
Mbps 
100% at 10 
Mbps 
80% at  100 
Mbps 
Schools % of schools 25% 
connected 
50% at 
10 Mbps 
100% at 10 
Mbps 
80% at 100 
Mbps 
100% at 1 
Gbps 
Health 
facilities 
% of health 
facilities 
13%  
connected 
50% at 
10 Mbps 
100% at 10 
Mbps 
80% at 100 
Mbps 
100% at 1 
Gbps 
Government 
facilities 
% of 
government 
offices 
 50% at 5 
Mbps 
100% at 10 
Mbps 
100% at 100 
Mbps 
Source: DOC, p. 18 
Section 4 of the Policy outlines a number of principles as envisaged in the NDP, which 
will enable the success of broadband as an evolving phenomenon. One of the realised 
principles is the introduction of open access in radio spectrum management. Open access 
has been identified as a means to enable sharing of infrastructure platforms by service 
providers (DoC, 2013). This is expected to allow competition at service and technology 
level, while facilitating service neutrality to allow flexibility in the usage of resources. This 
will further facilitate the flexibility in usage of common principles and standards, which are 
expected to enable interoperability and universal access to broadband services, while 
focusing on providing services in underserved areas and communities (DoC, 2013). 
Section 8 of the policy provides the targets which are expected to be achieved to realise 
policy goals of vision 2030 as envisaged in the NDP in Table 2. Given the slow pace at 
which South Africa has moved in implementing policies in the electronic communications 
sector, sceptics see the targets set out in the policy as ambitious. 
The policy states that the targets as provided for in Table 2 will be achieved through a 
combination of both wireless and fixed broadband technologies. To realise this, the 
Minister of Communications is expected to consider the viability and competitive impact 
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of the introduction of open access wholesale fibre and wireless broadband networks 
(DoC, 2013, p. 5). 
South Africa Connect concedes that the South African electronic communication market 
structure is vertically integrated and this results in structural constraints that hamper 
effective competition (DoC, 2013. It suggests the importance of restructuring, which will 
be complemented by a flexible regulatory framework that will enforce open access 
principles/method. This restructuring will be a necessary catalyst towards the reduction 
of wholesale costs and will encourage service-based competition that will enable the roll-
out of broadband (DoC, 2013, p. 4). However, the Policy is not clear on the issues of open 
access principles. It gives an impression that these principles will be enforced in both 
competitive and uncompetitive areas. 
Section 12 presents the overview on the digital readiness pillar which lays the foundation 
for the South African broadband future. The section further acknowledges a point 
supported by literature that radio spectrum is a scarce resource that requires to be 
managed efficiently to realize its potential to provide wireless broadband services. This 
point is pertinent to South Africa, given the dominance of mobile access compared to 
fixed access (DoC, 2013, p. 34). Section 12 of the Policy further highlights that “the 
removal of all bottlenecks in the regulatory environment, re-allocation and assignment of 
broadband radio spectrum, encouraging radio spectrum sharing and increase access to 
license exempt radio spectrum” (DoC, 2013, p. 34).Through this section, the Policy 
indicates the support for some aspects of alternative radio spectrum reforms. 
The Policy realises the importance of reviewing the radio spectrum licensing as envisaged 
in the NDP. To ensure continuous, effective competition in the electronic communication 
sector, the Policy is considering the adoption of alternative radio spectrum reforms in 
order to ensure that there is an effective market structure.  This will assist in the realisation 
of universal and affordable wireless broadband services for all South Africa by 2030.  
4.2.3. South African National Radio Spectrum Policy of 2010  
The primary objective of the Policy is to provide ICASA a directive on how to promote the 
rational, efficient, and economic usage of the radio spectrum. This is while keeping pace 
with technological wireless developments guided by national governments policy 
objectives (RSA, 2010, p. 7).  
In paragraphs 2.1.1 and 4.4 of the Policy, we observe some strides of radio spectrum 
reforms, which are the intentions of the policy - to increase the available amount of radio 
spectrum, where different radio communications services can share the radio spectrum. 
In paragraph 7.6 the Policy supports the employment of market-based approaches for 
instance (RSA, 2010 p.16).  
However, the Policy in some parts continues to emphasise the centralised control of the 
radio spectrum. Paragraph 6.2, states that the rights to radio spectrum rest with the state 
and the regulator will grant licenses to use radio spectrum (RSA, 2010, p.14).  
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The Policy in paragraph 6 provides that usage of radio spectrum should be based on the 
technology neutrality principle in order to ensure competition among radio 
communications services, other stride of radio spectrum reforms (RSA, 2010 p.14). 
4.2.4. Draft Policy Directions for Electronic Communications Services in 
High Demand Spectrum 
In December 2011, the Minister of Communications issued a draft policy direction for high 
demand radio frequency spectrum (800 MHz and 2.6 GHz bands). The aim of the policy 
direction was to pave the way for the licensing process of high demand radio spectrum 
with the intention of achieving universal service and affordable broadband for all (RSA, 
2011). The draft policy direction supports the combinational award or licensing of radio 
spectrum. The draft policy direction further provides that the process outlined will assist 
in achieving efficient radio spectrum usage and promote effective competition in the 
communications sector. 
Paragraph 2.1.1 of the draft policy direction highlights the need for sharing the limited 
radio spectrum. The first step was to assign the 800 MHz radio spectrum on an open 
access basis, which should ensure access by multiple electronic communications 
licensees to high demand radio spectrum (RSA, 2011).  
A market-based approach in the form of auctions can be considered as the last resort to 
license high demand spectrum. To facilitate the introduction of competition in the 
electronic communications sector, radio spectrum will be set aside for new entrants (RSA, 
2011).  
The draft policy further directs the regulator to conduct an inquiry on the possible use of 
white space technologies (RSA, 2011). The policy pronouncement in the draft policy 
directions made further strides towards radio spectrum reforms. 
4.2.5. National Integrated ICT Policy Review Report 
The Policy review panel of experts in March 2015 produced a report to the minister with 
a number of policy recommendations. The report made a number of recommendations, 
on various issues such as open access approach, infrastructure sharing, universal access 
to broadband services, market structure and competition and radio spectrum 
management. 
 
a) Open Access systems and infrastructure sharing  
The report noted that access to critical and essential infrastructure is of vital importance 
in achieving South Africa Connect policy objectives of universal and access broadband 
services for all by 2030. It further pointed out that there are a number of bottlenecks that 
exist in the electronic communications sector that negatively affect market competition, 
consequently limiting broadband services diffusion more than in its peer countries (DTPS, 
2015). 
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The report, based on the issues noted, makes a number of policy recommendations which 
are needed to promote an access regime. This is followed by a clear access regime that 
is enforceable and that supports the reduction of universal access gap, creation of uniform 
access based on service and technology neutrality (DTPS, 2015, p. 36). The report further 
makes policy recommendations that call for an open access regime supported by the 
regulator. This is expected to affect access to the infrastructure, transparent services and 
access in a non-discriminatory manner (DTPS, 2015). The policy recommendations 
stated in the report take cognisance that radio spectrum is a scarce, natural resource that 
must be used effectively to ensure maximum benefits. 
The report also explains the principle of infrastructure sharing as a way of promoting 
effective competition, avoiding duplication of infrastructure, and giving a reduction of cost 
of services in order to realize universal access of broadband services. The report 
recognizes the vertically integrated incumbents that continue to practice anticompetitive 
behaviour (DTPS, 2015).  
The panel recommendation that infrastructure sharing must be regulated at all levels of 
the network supported a thorough market analysis into the behaviour of the dominant 
operators (DTPS, 2015). The report further makes a recommendation that encourages 
sharing of active electronic elements of the network or national roaming based on market 
competition analysis (DTPS, 2015). The policy recommendations recognise that the rigid 
way of assigning radio spectrum is the command-and-control approach. In this approach 
other radio spectrum reforms are supported, which results in the sharing of Radio Access 
Network (RAN) (DTPS, 2015). 
 
b) Universal access and service 
The report makes policy recommendations that state that there is a need to expand the 
current definition of universal service access, which is limited around availability, 
affordability, and accessibility. The expansion should include awareness and ability to 
ensure that users are empowered to realize the opportunities and benefits presented by 
electronic communications services. The panel notes what the National Broadband Policy 
states on Universal Service Access Fund (USAF) includes new innovative ways to fund 
infrastructure roll-out. The funding model recommends the need to share investment risk 
between the public and private sectors (DTPS, 2015, p. 42). 
 
c) Market structure and competition 
The report highlights the importance of reviewing the market structure to support the 
introduction of effective competition in order to achieve the policy outcomes as envisaged 
in the NDP and South Africa Connect (DTPS, 2015). The recommendations seem to 
support mergers and acquisitions; the report indicates that this is an innovative way for 
players in the electronic communication sector to access the radio spectrum (DTPS, 
2015). 
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d) Radio spectrum management  
The report states that market-based approaches ensure that the radio spectrum is placed 
in the hands of users who value it the most. This will realise efficiency in radio spectrum 
usage (DTPS, 2015). The report further highlights the pros and cons of market-based 
approaches. It states that market-based approaches such as auctions can deliver the 
best revenue for governments. It however, has the potential of favouring players with 
substantial resources (DTPS, 2015). For achievement of policy objectives, the report 
proposes the need to set aside some radio spectrum for small players. 
The report makes recommendations for assigning radio spectrum using a hybrid model 
approach, which combines elements of traditional method of command-and-control, 
market approaches, and radio spectrum commons (DTPS, 2015). In general, the policy 
recommendations support the introductions of radio spectrum reforms to ensure 
efficiency in radio spectrum. 
4.2.6. Electronic Communication Act, No 36 of 2005 
The Electronic Communications Act is the primary legislation that governs the radio 
spectrum in South Africa. Section 2 in Chapter 1 outlines  some of the primary objectives 
of the Act as to facilitate convergence in the electronic communications sector, 
technologically neutral licensing framework, ensure efficiency in radio spectrum, promote 
competition and promote open, fair and non-discriminatory access telecommunication 
networks and etc. (RSA, 2005). 
It is clear from the objectives of the Electronic Communications Act that there is a 
correlation between the governing and licensing of the radio spectrum and competition 
which will result in affordable universal access to electronic communication services. 
Chapter 2 in section 3 empowers the minister to make policies on matters of national 
policy applicable to the ICT sector in relation to the radio spectrum. Section 4 states that 
ICASA should make regulations in relation to the control and the use of the radio spectrum 
and licensing thereof (RSA, 2005). This provision implies that the legislation supports a 
centralized radio spectrum management approach. The system still has some elements 
of command-and-control with a bit of flexibility in the usage of radio spectrum through the 
doctrine of service-technology neutrality and interoperability as a result of the usage of 
common standards (RSA, 2005). 
In section 6, the regulator is empowered to develop regulations which permit licence 
exemption for radio spectrum. This implies that operators can use the radio spectrum 
without having a license (RSA, 2005). This provision of the legislation paves the way for 
some elements of radio spectrum reforms with the combination of centralised radio 
spectrum management regime.  
Section 30 of Chapter 5 states that the regulator controls, plans, administers, and 
manages the use and licensing of the radio spectrum. However, the minister has a role 
to play through the approval of the national radio frequency plan. The minister also 
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represents the country in the ITU (RSA, 2005). Section 30 further supports the centralized 
management of radio spectrum, where the regulation of radio spectrum management is 
again entrenched in command-and-control (RSA, 2005).  
Section 31 (2a) provides that “a radio spectrum license may not be assigned, ceded or in 
any way transferred to any other person without the prior written permission from the 
regulator (RSA, 2005). This aspect supports a centralized regime of radio spectrum, 
which is favoured by the national radio spectrum policy of 2010. The Act, through section 
31 (3a) and (3b), empowers the regulator to prescribe regulations to cater for situations 
where demand of radio spectrum exceeds supply. It further prescribes for a situation 
where there is a need to amend, transfer, renew, suspend, cancel and withdraw the radio 
spectrum licenses and permission to assign (RSA, 2005). To change a radio spectrum 
licence, the licence holder will have to get approval from the regulator. This provision of 
the legislation entrenches command-and-control. 
4.2.7. Independent Communications Authority Act of South Africa Act   
The main aim of the ICASA Act is to establish the electronic communications regulator. 
Section 4(c) of the Act empowers the regulator to control, plan, administer and manage 
the use and licensing of the radio spectrum (RSA, 2000). Section 4(e) grant the power to 
the regulator to issue, grant, renew, amend, transfer, and revoke radio spectrum licenses.   
These provisions of the Act which grant ICASA the power to control the radio spectrum 
seem to entrench the notion of centralised governance of the radio spectrum. 
4.2 ICASA’S REGULATORY FRAMEWORK  
4.3.1. Radio Frequency Regulations  
ICASA published the radio spectrum regulations in 2011. The purpose of the regulations 
among other things was to establish a framework for the regulator to allocate and assign 
radio spectrum. The framework further presents standards and procedures applicable to 
all radio spectrum bands with the aim of allowing flexibility. The radio regulations provide 
procedures and criteria for awarding radio spectrum licences for competing applications. 
This should assist where there is insufficient radio spectrum (ICASA, 2011b, p. 9).  The 
2011 radio spectrum regulations embrace flexibility in management of radio spectrum in 
that it introduces some elements of radio spectrum reforms. Radio spectrum reforms are 
flexible in relation to processes and procedures for radio spectrum licenses.  
Section 7 of the regulations provides that the regulator must always prepare an ITA when 
radio spectrum will be awarded on competitive basis (ICASA, 2011, p. 12). This section 
supports the provision of the ECA given in section 31 (3). The section further provides 
that the regulations should be prescribed to cater for situations where demand of radio 
spectrum exceeds available radio spectrum.  
Section 10 outlines the procedure of transferring a radio spectrum licence, where the 
regulator is fully involved in the transfer process. This section even though it supports 
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some form of radio spectrum reform has elements of command-and-control in it. 
Paragraph 1 of section 10 states that the regulator should approve the transfer of a 
spectrum licence, licensees has no authority to transfer a license to another party without 
approval of the regulator (ICASA, 2011b).    
Paragraph 2 provides that where the radio spectrum has been granted through a market-
based approach such as an auction, the amount to be paid by the transferor must not 
exceed the value paid by the original licence holder (ICASA, 2011b, p. 15). This 
paragraph defeats the whole intention of market-based approaches of treating radio 
spectrum as a commodity and the theory of auction which is explained in (Sokol, 2014).  
Through adoption of self-coordination and radio spectrum sharing, the 2011 radio 
regulations continue to embrace radio spectrum reforms and promote flexibility in radio 
spectrum management. Section 13 of the regulations states that radio spectrum licensees 
must agree among themselves on how to undertake coordination (ICASA, 2011b). 
Section 16 states that the regulator may require a licensee to share an assigned radio 
spectrum with other licensees and applicants may apply for the radio spectrum on a 
shared basis (ICASA, 2011b, p. 19).  
4.3.2. The 800 MHZ AND 2.6 GHz draft Spectrum Assignment Plan for 800 
MHz and 2.6 GHz bands 
In December 2011 ICASA issued a draft radio spectrum assignment Plan to provide a 
framework for the combined assignment and licensing of 800 MHz and 2.6 GHZ bands. 
The assignment Plan was aimed at deriving economic and societal benefits characterized 
by coverage and capacity. The inclusion of the complementary bands ensures the 
effective use of the radio spectrum (ICASA, 2011a, p. 3).  
The motivation for the framework was to further enable government policy objective of 
making affordable broadband services available to South Africans as contemplated in the 
2010 Broadband Wireless Access (ICASA, 2010c). The assignment plan contemplated 
that the 2030 vision of achieving universal and affordable broadband services can be 
realized through roll-out of mobile infrastructure (ICASA, 2011a). It was the regulator’s 
view that the combinational award or licensing of the bands 800 MHZ and 2.6 GHZ will 
surely bridge the digital divide.  
The framework in the licensing philosophy introduced a number of radio spectrum 
reforms. The intention is to allow many entities to access radio spectrum. Through 
consideration of the introduction of “Wholesale Open Access model explained as a 
sharing model where a licensed entity allows other entities to offer services using its 
network with no locking and  blocking”. This will be achieved through agreed procedures, 
with the aim of encouraging efficient use of the radio spectrum (ICASA, 2011a, pp. 4-5).  
4.3.3. International Mobile Telecommunications Roadmap 
The regulator published the IMT roadmap in 2014 which identified the frequency bands 
to be used for deploying wireless broadband services in South Africa as shown in Table 
3. The roadmap also timelines the deployment of IMT radio spectrum to support the 
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targets set by South Africa Connect in order to ensure universal access to broadband 
services by 2030 (ICASA, 2014b). 
The document states that the primary objective of the regulator is to “ensure radio 
spectrum efficiency, universal availability of broadband services as well as a vibrant and 
competitive telecommunications industry while promoting investments” (ICASA, 2014b, 
p. 12). The IMT roadmap highlights the critical role spectrum assignment plays in effective 
competition of the electronic communication sector that will ensure universal access to 
wireless broadband services. 
The IMT roadmap continues to support spectrum reforms, where it states that the award 
for high demand radio spectrum will be through an ITA, which will outline the process of 
assigning spectrum which may include market-based approaches (ICASA, 2014b).   
Through IMT roadmap can be viewed as another form of regulatory certainty to promote 
market liberalisation through increasing access to radio spectrum. 
4.3.4. Discussion document regarding the use and licensing of the 
frequency bands 57-66 GHz (V Band) and 71 -76 GHz paired with 81- 
86 GHz band.  
In September 2015, ICASA published a discussion document on the licensing of V and E 
bands consisting of frequency ranges 57- 66 GHz (V Band) and  71-76 GHz with 81-86 
GHz (E Band). These bands are useful for short links providing high data transmission 
rates. The regulator believes that these bands will be useful for future deployment of 
4G/LTE architectures (ICASA, 2015a). In the discussion document, ICASA is considering 
the use of four possible approaches in regulating the use of V and E bands: 
 A self-coordination approach (coordination done by the user); 
 A regulator-coordinated approach;  
 And a regulator-coordinated with fixed channel assignments and a license-exempt 
approach (ICASA, 2015a, pp. 18-19).  
The consideration of these regulatory approaches by the regulator is a sign of awareness 
and appreciation for flexible radio spectrum management regime. This is further a move 
towards radio spectrum reforms. 
4.3.5. Discussion Document on Framework for Dynamic and Opportunistic 
Spectrum Management    
ICASA issued a discussion document that presents a framework for Dynamic and 
opportunistic radio spectrum management in October 2015. The framework gives 
effect to policy options as envisaged in South Africa Connect to enable dynamic radio 
spectrum allocation. It achieves this through the development of a regulatory 
framework that will enable dynamic spectrum assignment to promote efficiency in 
spectrum usage (ICASA, 2015b).  
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The discussion document promotes the principle of radio spectrum sharing, where 
broadband services will be allowed to share the 470 - 694 MHz radio spectrum with 
the incumbent broadcasting services. The proposed radio spectrum reform will make 
168 MHz of radio spectrum available for provision of broadband wireless services 
through dynamic spectrum access in the TV White Spaces enabled by geo-location 
databases (ICASA, 2015b, p. 6). 
The discussion paper highlights some shortcomings of exclusive allocation of radio 
spectrum to services. This results in the underutilisation of radio spectrum, which is 
currently in high demand for the realisation of South Africa Connect objectives that aim 
to ensure universal and affordable broadband services by 2030 ( (ICASA, 2015b). 
In section 5, the discussion paper further emphasizes the adoption and implementation 
of radio spectrum reforms ushered in by policy and legislation. It provides for the 
implementation of service and technology-neutral flexible licensing regime, which 
should foster a flexible use of resources. It concede  that service and technology- 
neutrality is more vital considering that more radio spectrum should be made available 
urgently for next generation services (DoC, 2013) & (RSA, 2005) .It  further states the 
importance of flexible radio spectrum management as a necessity to unlock industry 
developments and advancements. Moreover, it is necessary in facilitating the rolling 
out of broadband infrastructure with the sole intention of achieving broadband 
coverage (ICASA, 2015b).   
The ICASA discussion document lists the following licensing models: License-exempt, 
unmanaged; license-exempt, managed; light-licensed; fully licensed and a mixture of 
models as potential licensing regimes for dynamic spectrum access (ICASA, 2015b, p. 
29). Both the regulator and operators in the dynamic spectrum mechanism have roles 
to play in radio spectrum management. The dynamic spectrum regime provides users 
with incentives which will foster innovation in providing services. While they are 
presenting flexibility in radio spectrum management, they further require a well-
resourced regulator with the technological means to enforce the rules (ICASA, 2015b). 
The discussion document acknowledges how important it is to adopt flexible regulatory 
interventions to foster competition to ensure harmonisation of local regulation with 
global regulatory arrangements, and to promote technological innovation for sector 
advancement (ICASA, 2015b). Quality of services as an important component of 
electronic communications regulations is also not overlooked in the dynamic spectrum 
licensing mechanism.  
4.3.6. National Radio Frequency Plan 2013 (8.3 GHz – 3000 GHz) 
In 2013, ICASA published the National Radio Frequency Plan as required by the ECA. 
The published Plan formalises the requirement as expected in the law to provide the 
regulatory framework for allocation of the radio spectrum to services in the radio spectrum 
bands between 8.3 kHz and 3000 GHz for South Africa (ICASA, 2013b). Similar to plans 
of other countries that are part of the ITU, the South African National band plan 
incorporates the decisions of the ITU discussions (ICASA, 2013b). This implies the 
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decisions taken at the World Radiocommunications Conferences (WARC-92, WRC-1995, 
WRC-1997, WRC-2000, WRC-2003, WRC-2007, WRC-2012, WRC-15, and more to 
come) are taken into account for the planning of the radio spectrum. The South African 
Plan adopted the global harmonization regime of allocating radio spectrum for 
radiocommunications services. The harmonised allocation regime is covered in chapter 
three of the National Radio Frequency Plan. The chapter outlines all the frequency 
allocations for all radiocommunications services including applications as depicted in 
Table 3. The Plan mirrors the frequency allocation table of the ITU as contained in Article 
5 of the 2012 ITU Radio Regulations as depicted in the Table 4. 
Table 3: South African National Radio Spectrum Frequency Allocations 
ITU Region 1 allocations 
and footnotes 
South African allocations and 
footnotes 
Typical Applications Comments 
790-862 MHz 
FIXED 
MOBILE except 
aeronautical 
mobile  5.316B  
5.317A 
BROADCASTING 
5.312  5.314  5.315  
5.316  5.316A  5.319 
790-862 MHz 
FIXED 
 
 
MOBILE except 
aeronautical mobile  
5.316B  5.317A  NF9 
BROADCASTING 
 
 
5.316A 
Fixed Links (856 – 864.1 
MHz) 
IMT800 BTX (791 – 821 
MHz) 
Mobile Wireless Access 
(827.775 – 832.695 MHz) 
IMT800 MTX (832 – 862 
MHz) 
Television Broadcasting 
(470 – 854 MHz) 
The fixed links will be 
migrated along with the 
broadcasting service in line 
with Radio Frequency 
Migration Plan. 
Paired with 832 – 862 MHz 
Paired with Access (872.775 
– 877.695 MHz 
 
Paired with 791 – 821 MHz 
Broadcasting Allotments in 
accordance with GE89 plan in 
the process of conversion to 
GE06. Broadcast assignments 
in accordance with the latest 
version of the Terrestrial 
Broadcasting Frequency 
Source: ICASA, 2013b, p. 75    
 As shown in Table 3 the concept of sharing radio spectrum is embraced in the 
management and planning of the radio spectrum, bands such as 790-862 MHz are 
allocated to both fixed and mobile services on a primary basis by the regulator. This 
implies that both these radiocommunications services can use the band. Column 3 of 
the table further indicates the applications that are typically using the bands which are 
IMT, television broadcasting, fixed links and mobile wireless access. The plan 
encompasses command-and-control and radio spectrum sharing in that it states that 
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radiocommunications services allocated to a particular frequency range. An example 
is the 790-862 MHz band allocated to fixed, mobile except aeronautical mobile 
secondary basis and broadcasting services on a primary basis. However, the national 
radio frequency plan does support the development and evolution of technologies and 
services. For example the plan states that “the pattern of radio use is not static as it is 
continuously evolving to reflect the many changes that are taking place in the radio 
environment; particularly in the field of technology”. Therefore the plan is subject to 
continuous reviews to reflect these changes (ICASA, 2013b, p. 2). Through the 
allocation of 800 MHz and 700 MHz (470-790 MHz and 790-862 MHz) radio spectrum 
for IMT, the frequency band for many decades was planned for broadcasting services 
(ICASA, 2013b). It shows the move of ICASA in embracing radio spectrum reforms in 
a form of radio spectrum sharing. National Band Plan may be viewed as regulation in 
a form of radio spectrum reform that provide certainty in the market to allow for further 
market liberalisation. 
4.3.7. Radio spectrum fees regulations 
In 2010, the regulator published the radio spectrum fees regulations. The main objectives 
of the regulations amongst other things is to provide a pricing fee framework for radio 
spectrum fee that is fair, transparent, competitive and non-discriminatory. This is based 
on an administrative incentive pricing (a market-based approach). This does not preclude 
auctions, but rather encourages efficiency and effective usage of radio spectrum as well 
as promote competition through the simplification of spectrum fees process (ICASA, 
2010e). The regulations provide a formula/guideline to be used in calculating the radio 
spectrum fees taking into consideration the following factors: the frequency band, 
congestion, coverage, geographical area of the operation amongst others. They further 
state the minimum fee per MHz paired is two thousand rands (ICASA, 2010e).        
4.3 INTERNATIONAL REGULATIONS 
In 2010, the regulator published the radio spectrum fees regulations. The main objectives 
of the regulations amongst other things is to provide a pricing fee framework for radio 
spectrum fee that is fair, transparent, competitive and non-discriminatory. This is based 
on an administrative incentive pricing (a market-based approach). This does not preclude 
auctions, but rather encourages efficiency and effective usage of radio spectrum as well 
as promote competition through the simplification of spectrum fees process (ICASA, 
2010e). The regulations provide a formula/guideline to be used in calculating the radio 
spectrum fees taking into consideration the following factors: the frequency band, 
congestion, coverage, geographical area of the operation amongst others. They further 
state the minimum fee per MHz paired is two thousand rands (ICASA, 2010e).  
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Table 4: ITU-R -Table of Frequency Allocation for frequency range 14-15.4 GHz 
 
Allocation to services 
Region 1  Region 
2 
   
Region 3 
14.5-14.75 FIXED 
    FIXED-SATELLITE (Earth-to-space) MOD 5.510  ADD 5.A16 
ADD 5.B16  ADD 5.D16  ADD 5.E16  ADD 5.F16 
    MOBILE 
    Space research  ADD 5.C16 
14.75-14.8 
FIXED 
FIXED-SATELLITE (Earth-to-space) MOD 5.510 
MOBILE 
Space research  ADD 5.C16 
14.75-14.8 
FIXED 
FIXED-SATELLITE (Earth-to-space) 
MOD 5.510  ADD 5.A16  ADD 5.B16  
ADD 5.D16  ADD 5.E16  ADD 5.F16 
MOBILE 
Space research  ADD 5.C16 
  
Source: ITU, 2012b 
4.4 INDUSTRY PERSPECTIVES 
This subsection presents the stakeholder’s views collected through interviews. The 
questions looked at getting the stakeholders’ views on what policy and regulations have 
supported market liberalisation. 
Stakeholders’ views will be delivered through employment of themes approach in mind. 
The theme approach led to the construction of the following themes:  
 radio spectrum governing regimes to achieve universal  broadband,  
 market structure and competition, effective regulatory approach for efficient radio 
spectrum management regulatory for rural connectivity,  
 interventions for affordable roll-out broadband in rural areas.  
The stakeholder's views will be presented through these themes.   
4.5.1. Radio spectrum governing approach to achieve universal broadband 
service 
It was a general feeling of the most respondents that South Africa requires a flexible not 
restrictive radio spectrum regulatory regime to achieve the policy goals of universal 
access and service for all.  
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Policy Maker (23/01/2016) stated that the main objective of SA Connect is increased 
broadband penetration. It stipulates that we need to have ubiquitous coverage of high-
speed, high quality services, affordable services, and le devices. This requires that an 
appropriate suite of applications be developed and side interventions to increase 
awareness of ICT usage be demanded. With this background, it is important that the 
government accelerate the adoption of radio spectrum reform with regards to regulatory 
regime (Policy Maker 23/01/2016). A gradual simplification and liberalisation of the 
regulatory regime is important (ibid). In the case of radio spectrum, these include market-
based competition for spectrum, license fee level, and structure based on opportunity 
cost, secondary trading rules and etc. (Policy Maker, 23/01/2016). International best 
practice shows that market-based approaches can be relied upon to solve the challenges 
of spectrum licensing (Policy Maker 23/01/2016). 
Operator-A (24/04/2015) stated that the adoption of mixed radio spectrum management 
approaches is appropriate for achieving a universal service of broadband services as 
articulated in SA Connect market-based approaches for high demand spectrum, 
administrative approach supported by open access principles for rural connectivity and 
the consideration of spectrum commons and licence exemption. So the mixture of three 
approaches will be suitable (ibid). 
Operator-C (26/05/2015) was of the view that a hybrid approach should be considered, 
especially when the regulator adopts market-based approaches such as auctions. This is 
for urban areas as competition is limited and for rural areas because there is hardly any 
competition. The regulator may then impose conditions such as open access. Operator-
A and Expert-D are of the view that there is no clear definition of open access in policy 
and regulation. There is a need for clearly defined open access in policy and regulation 
for it to be effective (Operator-A, 24/04/2015 and Expert-D, 26/05/2015). 
Expert-C (21/04/2015) suggested that the regime also needs to be supported by clear 
policies with objectives and regulations with technical specifications and standards such 
as transmission powers for technologies. The regulator should also try to include 
performance indicators for operators (Expert-C, 21/04/2015) and (Expert-E, 28/05/2015). 
Command-and-control approach should continue with the continuous issues of 
interference that needs solutions. Command-and control can ensure an acceptable level 
of quality of service amongst other things for effective spectrum management 
(Researcher, 29/04/2015) and (Operator-A, 24/04/2015). However there is also a need 
to introduce market based approaches such as auctions to further enhance spectrum 
efficiency, promote competition and enable innovation for the market (Operator A, 
24/04/2015). 
Spectrum commons should be considered as a spectrum reform approach that is still 
developing, with only a few countries in the developed world having employed it (ibid).   
Currently ICASA's regulations allow sharing for passive infrastructure supported by 
sections (31) and (32) of the ECA which give effect to sharing regulation. However, these 
regulations can be improved through the introduction of deeper sharing such as spectrum 
pooling to allow more flexibility (Operator-D, 26/05/2015). 
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Considering the TV white space radio spectrum and dynamic access of radio spectrum, 
the command-and-control approach as a governing regime for radio spectrum should be 
reconsidered (Researcher, 29/04/2015). A flexible governing regime that covers market-
based approaches and open access should be considered for the radio spectrum 
governing regime (Expert-B, 24/04/2015) and (Researcher, 29/04/2015). 
Regulator (22/05/2015) stated that for the purposes of ensuring effective competition, a 
license exempt spectrum assignment approach will increase the number of electronic 
communication operators in the market. That will promote competition in mobile industry 
for provision of broadband services. The assignment of spectrum to a single provider on 
an exclusive basis is not an efficient way of assigning spectrum, as spectrum is scarce 
natural resource (ibid). In addition to the license exempt model, operators with national 
spectrum licences should be obliged to open their infrastructure on an open, fair and 
neutral wholesale access basis. Another spectrum assignment should be considered to 
increase the number of operators in the market and for the purposes of achieving 
universal access dynamic spectrum assignment should also be adopted (Regulator, 
22/05/2015).  
Vendor mentioned that ICASA never bothered to proactively participate in ensuring that 
the playing fields are level (Vendor, 18/05/2015). They still employ the first-come-first- 
serve approach (ibid). For example, two years ago MTN tried to get 5 MHz in the 2 GHz 
bands, there was no invitation to apply and no process was outlined to get that available 
spectrum. South Africa is a highly competitive market, implying that the spectrum cannot 
be licensed on a first-come-first-served (Vendor, 18/05/2015). First-come-first-served is 
not a competitive way of licensing spectrum; ICASA should not reconsider employing first-
come-first-served but rather employ pro-competitive approaches (ibid).            
Expert-F mentioned that South Africa is currently employing  governing regimes which 
are outdated, even though ICASA is currently looking at modernising spectrum 
management regime (Expert-F, 28/04/2015). Command-and-control approach is still 
relevant to ensure quality of service and the licence exempt regime given the success of 
Wi-Fi is another option which can be considered to improve and expand the spectrum 
governing regime (Expert-F, 28/04/2015).  
Expert-D is of the view that the South African market is not yet matured, therefore 
traditional approaches of command-and-control and reforms be introduced in a phased 
approach (Expert-D,26/05/2015). South Africa may have to address competition 
challenges before introducing advanced radio spectrum reforms (ibid). Market 
approaches such as spectrum trading and auctions won't be for South Africa, since the 
market is dominated by two operators, Vodacom and MTN, who will obviously be the 
beneficiary of auctions and spectrum trading (Expert-D, 26/05/2015).  
Expert-E stated that on high demand spectrum the focus should be given on the 
objectives of the auction approach, which is not making money for treasury, but rather 
focuses on awarding spectrum to the bidder who will use spectrum efficiently. Contrarily, 
in the case of non-high demand spectrum, administrative process to award licences 
should be applied (Expert-E, 28/04/2015). If auctions are employed to award spectrum, 
there should be conditions with the license, which is that the spectrum awarded should 
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not cause interference (ibid). Policy objectives should not be at the cost of the spectrum 
but principles such as resale should be considered as they offer more incentives through 
secondary market (ibid).  
Expert-E advocates for a mixed approach, where command-and-control is identified as 
appropriate for non-high demand radio spectrum, while auctions seem appropriate for 
high demand spectrum. Furthermore, interference conditions should be attached to this 
approach, where the cost of the conditions should not be higher than the money to be 
paid for the spectrum (Expert-E, 28/04/2015). 
Researcher (29/05/2015) pointed out that ICASA might have a challenge in jumping from 
command-and-control, because of the successes that are associated with the approach, 
such as the assurance of no harmful interference and of acceptable levels of service 
quality. However, the approach fails in assuring radio spectrum efficiency and lacks 
standards that ensure that there is differentiation between a primary user and secondary 
user. 
Even if ICASA considers adopting dynamic spectrum access, the reform can’t be a 
standalone method of accessing spectrum. However, it can be complementary to other 
spectrum reforms in the spectrum management regime to ensure efficiency, to allow 
secondary users in the bands to address issues of spectrum scarcity (Researcher, 
29/05/2015).  A combination of a market-based approach and dynamic access ensures 
efficiency; this seems like a probable approach since dynamic access is the mechanism 
to access spectrum but not for assignment through promotion of secondary market (ibid). 
Expert-E (28/04/2015) is of the view that elements of spectrum sharing are encapsulated 
in dynamic spectrum assignment. In the case of unused spectrum, this approach is not 
ideal for providing quality broadband services. Spectrum management through dynamic 
access is not justified yet; rather ICASA should focus on the bands where there is primary 
allocation for monitoring purposes in order to ensure quality of services. Secondary users 
should be subjected to the rules as stipulated in the radio regulation (ibid). Even though 
command-and-control is still relevant and necessary, more spectrum reforms are still 
required to ensure competition with the objective of achieving 2030 policy goals of 
universal access and affordability stated in the NDP and SA Connect (Expert-C 
21/05/2015). 
Regulator (22/05/2015) commented that spectrum trading as a reform is not favoured due 
to its unintended consequences. The players can use spectrum trading as a way of 
discouraging competition through hoarding to ensure that new players are not getting an 
opportunity to enter the market. Some operators had licensed spectrum but did not roll it 
out while still paying for it and their intention is to sell the spectrum when the value has 
increased. For example, WBS had 2.6 GHz spectrum but did not rollout the network and 
they are now being acquired by another company with that spectrum having added more 
value to what the company is worth (ibid). Spectrum, when it is licensed, must be used to 
rollout, but not as a commodity (Regulator, 22/05/15). 
Expert-D (26/05/2015) thinks that ICASA is the one standing in the way of infrastructure 
sharing and radio regulations. Expert-D claims that ICASA left the enforcement of this 
regulation to the operators; consequently the dominant players have power to mitigate 
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full realization of competition. Roaming transaction between Cell C and Vodacom is a 
great example of competition not yielding positive results. Cell C’s quality of service is 
poor, a clear sign that there is no willingness from operators to share infrastructure and 
spectrum (Expert-D, 26/04/2015) and (Expert-C, 21/04/2015). Therefore, regulations do 
not encouraging sharing. The introduction of AIP through spectrum license fee regulation 
has had an effect which resulted in massive increase of point to point usage, which has 
boosted universal access in rural areas providers through the encouragement of 
competition (Expert-F, 28/04/2015) and (Operator-D, 26/05/2015). 
Operator-D (26/05/2015) mentioned that AIP has worked well as a market-based 
approach; it had the ability to even out the playing field for all players in the market. For 
example, MTN was paying more for fees than some of its rivals on 1800 MHz who were 
paying less. However, ICASA should find a way of making broadcasters pay spectrum 
fees, and security services must also be charged the same amount rather than be given 
an 80% discount as suggested by the current regulation. The discount for security 
services encourages inefficiencies for spectrum management as spectrum hoarding may 
still be experienced. Further to that, the regulation that unit cost will go up by CPI yearly 
does not help when it comes to issues of driving the communication costs down. If 
operators will be charged spectrum fees based on CPI, this will cost them more as it in 
terms of raising their operational costs (Operator-D, 26/05/2015). 
4.5.2. Market structure and competition 
Telecommunications market structure in South Africa is oligopolistic in mobile services, 
with high degree of concentration in infrastructure (BMI-T, 2013, p.77). In terms of 
hearings conducted by ICASA on the state of competition and the market, the regulator 
indicated that it is concerned about the intentions of Vodacom and MTN. Their intentions 
are to acquire 80% of other electronic communications network and services licensees 
(ICASA, 2014). 
Operator-D states that the number of operators does not determine competitiveness in 
the market (Operator-D, 26/05/2015). What determines market competitiveness is the 
ability of operators to compete amongst each other. The cost to communicate has been 
driven down in South Africa for the data market. The market can't sustain more operators 
since Cell C and Telkom mobile are already struggling to compete with MTN and 
Vodacom (Operator-D, 26/05/2015). 
Operator-B (14/05/2015) is of the view that spectrum regulation certainty is required in 
relation to mergers and acquisitions. Currently there is a lack of clear rules and principles 
with the Electronic Communications Act making reference to concepts such as cede, 
transfer of radio spectrum licence with non-existence of the criteria, guidelines and clear 
rules from ICASA (ibid). It is important for ICASA to provide a framework on the conditions 
of approving these transactions (Operator-B, 14/05/2015). 
Operator-D states that the number of operators does not determine competitiveness in 
the market (Operator-D, 26/05/2015). What determines market competitiveness is the 
ability of operators to compete amongst each other. The cost to communicate has been 
driven down in South Africa for the data market. The market cannot sustain more 
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operators since Cell C and Telkom mobile are already struggling to compete with MTN 
and Vodacom (Operator-D, 26/05/2015). 
Operator-A (24/04/2015), Operator-B (14/04/2015) and Policy Maker (23/01/2016) stated 
that the South African market structure is characterised by four market players; i.e. 
Vodacom, MTN, Telkom and Cell-C. Two of these operators, MTN and Vodacom, are 
dominant. The regulator should find ways of strengthening the small players - Cell C and 
Telkom - by fostering regulations that will ensure these operators are effectively 
competitive (Operator-A, 24/04/2015). It is also important that government focuses on 
levelling the playing field to foster meaningful and sustainable competition amongst other 
objectives such as affordability, universal service, access, and etc. (Policy Maker, 
23/01/2016). 
Operator-D (26/05/2015) is of the view that number portability and big corporates are 
giving business to Telkom. Telkom has a de facto monopoly on corporates numbers 
including toll free numbers. Telkom is the only operator with the 3.5 GHz, which was 
initially assigned for fixed links to deliver point to point services. However, Telkom is 
currently using it for mobile services, which put it in a better competitive position. Change 
to use this particular spectrum did not even follow necessary process, which requires 
approval from the regulator. Therefore the delay in releasing the 2.6 GHz is a continuously 
stifling competition (Operator-D, 26/05/2015). 
Policy Maker (23/10/2016) claims that a decision on spectrum award does depend 
critically on whether the policymaker and regulator believe that one or more new wireless 
entrants are required in the market (which could be either mobile or fixed-wireless access 
operators). A change to fixed market structure has little relevance to the award of 
spectrum (ibid). Most mobile markets are best served with three to four players and if the 
enabling environment has been set correctly, all players would have a sustainable 
business (Policy Maker 23/01/2016). 
Regulator (22/05/2015) is of the view that the current approach does not encourage 
competition in the four main players (Telkom, MTN, Cell-C and Vodacom). Telkom does 
not have spectrum below 1 GHz (900 MHz). On the other hand, all the other three do 
have assignments below 1 GHz; this makes it difficult for Telkom to roll-out in areas where 
they need to make bigger cells. The spectrum holding by these players is not balanced 
(ibid). 
Market-based approach AIP does not encourage competition but rather, encourages 
spectrum efficiency (Expert-D, 26/05/2016), (Operator-A, 24/04/2015), (Expert-F, 
28/04/2015) and (Regulator, 22/05/2015). MTN and Vodacom are currently dominating 
the market share despite the AIP (Expert D, 26/05/2015). To address competition 
challenges, the regulator should license a new operator and give them the entire 
spectrum and allow it to compete with the existing operators and impose open access 
(ibid).  
It is important for the regulator to assess the objective of providing the market with multiple 
operators, whether it’s in the best interests of providing universal access and broadband 
services (Expert-A, 12/05/2015). Operator-A (24/04/2015) pointed that there is a problem 
with competition because lots of operators ranging from mobile operators, Internet 
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Services Providers (ISPs) including municipalities are competing for a slice of the market. 
In the case of the urban areas, there is no need for open access while the urban areas 
are still lagging behind when it comes to infrastructure (ibid).  
Vendor (18/05/2015) stated that the current approach of first-come-first-served employed 
by ICASA does not encourage competition. Expert-B (12/05/2015) stated that proposed 
transactions of buying each other in the market by the operators may result in stifling 
competition by limiting the number of the operators in the market. This action has a 
disadvantage of derailing the 2030 policy objectives for SA Connect Policy. Expert-A 
(12/05/2015) further mentioned that these proposed transactions may also result in  the 
quickest way of accessing the spectrum, which is in high demand and may result in 
creating monopolies in the market  (Expert-A, 12/05/2015). 
South Africa always gets it wrong when it comes to the introduction of competition in the 
telecommunications sector for both fixed and mobile. The timing of introducing 
competition is not conducive for South Africa at the network level; there should rather be 
consideration to introduce competition at the service level. This can be achieved by the 
introduction of Mobile Virtual Networks (MVNOs), which is another form of ensuring the 
realization of universal and broadband services (Expert-E, 28/04/2015). The introduction 
of more competition in rural areas is possibly viable as there is enough competition in 
urban areas (Expert-E, 28/04/15).  
Expert-C (21/04/2015) is of the view that the licensing of high demand in South Africa can 
possibly lessen the market consolidation pushed by the operators with proper market 
definition. ICASA’s current regulatory approach is capable of ensuring efficient 
competition as long as there is no interference from policy maker (government). ICASA 
has tried to published a number of ITAs on how to release radio spectrum, however this 
has not yielded any success as a result of interference from the government (Expert-B, 
24/04/2015). 
Efficiency of the licensing of spectrum in terms of the lead time between submission of 
the application and the actual licensing of spectrum requires an intervention as the current 
approach by the regulator is disadvantaging the new entrants (Expert-A, 12/04/2015). 
One reason is that it takes a relatively long period of time to process a license application 
by the regulator, which to a certain, extent gives the incumbent sufficient time to entrench 
/ close the market. This leaves nothing for the potential competitors (Expert-A, 
12/04/2015). 
Looking at the previous ITAs published by ICASA it is a clear indication that the regulator 
is intending to release the spectrum and introduce more players in the market. However, 
there is a tendency from operators to frustrate the process of releasing spectrum in an 
attempt to delay competition (Regulator, 22/05/2015). 
Expert-F (28/04/2015) pointed out that for access networks there is no competition, 
implying that the licensing of the high demand spectrum can assist in introducing 
competition. The TV white space discussion document for licensing of operators will 
encourage competition. However, there is a need to foster a regulatory approach to 
encourage competition for point-to-point links and as a result; this delays the release of 
access spectrum by ICASA (ibid). 
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All three operators have 900 MHz spectrum except for Telkom. There is a need for Telkom 
to be assigned the sub 1 GHz spectrum (Operator-A, 24/04/2015). The other problem is 
that the 800 MHz spectrum will only be available in 2018. This delay will further entrench 
the dominance of the big players, which can access the 2.6 GHz spectrum (ibid) currently 
available. Spectrum availability can be used to facilitate competition, with sub 1 GHz radio 
spectrum having been made available to Telkom (Operator-A, 24/04/2015). 
Policy Maker (23/01/2016) stated that as much as spectrum is not the only lever that can 
be used to correct the imbalance, it is important that we do not repeat the mistakes of the 
past. African countries, with the exception of a few, have been reluctant to do a paradigm 
shift from traditional to market-based mechanisms in spectrum licensing (ibid). For 
instance, auctions have proven to be the best methodology to license spectrum, and they 
can address government objectives if designed correctly. They can also cater for new 
entrants with set-asides and reasonable reserve prices for spectrum lots or blocks (Policy 
Maker, 23/01/2016). 
Expert-A (12/04/2015) claimed that ICASA's regulatory framework is unclear, limited, and 
with no proper road map articulated. This move by ICASA further entrenches the 
dominance of the incumbents. 
ICASA’s current regulatory approach for high demand spectrum and non-high demand 
spectrum as proposed in 2011 is capable of ensuring that there is sufficient competition 
for as long as there is no interference from government (Expert-B 24/04/2015). ICASA 
has tried to publish a number of ITAs on high demand spectrum that has the potential of 
facilitating competition (ibid). The conditions put on the 2.6 GHz band for BEEE in 2011 
prohibited true competition for MTN and Vodacom, however competition is not about 
number of players but more about the effectiveness of players in the market (Expert-D, 
26/05/2015). It is this view that ICASA regulations must talk to policy but not go against 
itICASA’s current regulatory approach for high demand spectrum and non-high demand 
spectrum as proposed in 2011 is capable of ensuring that there is sufficient competition 
for as long as there is no interference from government (Expert-B 24/04/2015). ICASA 
has tried to publish a number of ITAs on high demand spectrum that has the potential of 
facilitating competition (ibid). The conditions put on the 2.6 GHz band for BEEE in 2011 
prohibited true competition for MTN and Vodacom, however competition is not about 
number of players but more about the effectiveness of players in the market (Expert-D, 
26/05/2015). It is this view that ICASA regulations must talk to policy but not go against 
it. 
Proper market review governance and first mover advantage by Vodacom and MTN 
makes it difficult for Cell C to compete effectively in the market. This requires the 
Competition Commission and ICASA to constantly perform market reviews and develop 
informed regulatory intervention to address competition challenges in the market (Expert-
C, 21/04/2015) and (Expert-A, 12/05/2015). Cell C does not have enough spectrum in the 
high demand band (1800 MHz) currently having high volume of dropped calls, which is a 
negative factor for an operator to compete effectively in the market (ibid). Therefore, Cell 
C will need more radio spectrum to meet the targets set out in SA Connect (Expert C 
21/04/2015). 
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Expert-E (28/04/2015) thinks that under normal conditions the market’s maturity and price 
wars between operators will lead to mergers and acquisitions. This calls for South Africa 
to look at developments of markets worldwide. It will assist the South African market if 
ICASA focuses on the pro-competitive conditions to give effect to mergers and 
acquisitions. For example, ICASA should be looking at the wholesale market with the 
focus of developing pro-competitive conditions for that market. For example, South 
Africa’s MVNOs have actually suffered as a result of nonexistence of a wholesale market 
(ibid). 
Access to spectrum has nothing to do with end-user affordability. Rather, facilitation of 
competition through radio spectrum licensing is the solution to address issues of 
affordability (Expert-D, 26/05/2015). Matured market has mastered the art of fostering 
competition where their level of substitutability is very high. In the case of South Africa, 
the level of substitutability is low and the possibility of substitutability is what is required 
for SA market to attain efficient competition (ibid). 
Re-farming and consolidations are currently the only alternative to the 900 MHz and 1800 
MHz spectrum for LTE, a strategy which might not even be sustainable in the long run. 
The majority of South African subscribers are still using 2G services, where more than 
70% of MTN’s traffic still caters to 2G services. This will eventually cause 2G customers 
to suffer in the end, hence the urgency to release high demand spectrum. 
4.5.3. Regulatory Interventions for rural connectivity 
To try and address issues relating to rural connectivity, South Africa may consider 
multiband auctions or spectrum awards with any licensing methodology with coverage 
obligations (Policy Maker, Operator-A, Operator-B, Vendor, Expert-B, Expert-D, Expert-
A and Operator-C). In May 2010, Germany concluded a spectrum auction across four 
bands: 800 MHz, 1800 MHz, 2100 MHz and 2.5 GHz. A total of 360 MHz was on offer at 
this auction (ibid). To ensure rural coverage, BNetzA, the regulator imposed a coverage 
obligation on each of the three offered 800 MHz licences (Policy Maker, Operator-A, 
Operator-B, Vendor, Expert-B, and Expert-D). 
However, Expert-B (24/04/2015) is of the view that the regulator should not insist that 
everyone go to the rural areas before rolling out in urban areas. The requirement should 
not be to start in the rural areas so that there is no force for everyone to roll-out in the 
same rural areas. The operators can decide among themselves who will roll-out the 
infrastructure to each of the least served areas and provide open access before they may 
roll out in urban areas (Expert-B, 24/04/2015). 
However, Expert-B (24/04/2015) is of the view that the regulator should not insist that 
everyone go to the rural areas before rolling out in urban areas. The requirement should 
not be to start in the rural areas so that there is no force for everyone to roll-out in the 
same rural areas. The operators can decide among themselves who will roll-out the 
infrastructure to each of the least served areas and provide open access before they may 
roll out in urban areas (Expert-B, 24/04/2015). 
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There is no one size fit all solution for South Africa. All metropolitan areas of South Africa 
have sufficient competition and there is high demand of services. This results in high 
spectrum density, which implies the need for additional spectrum in order to address the 
problem. While in rural areas there is no infrastructure and the demand for services is 
also low. Therefore, the problem in rural areas is not spectrum but the viability of models 
in the rural areas to ensure access to services. The proposed solution is for the state to 
subsidize the roll-out of infrastructure in rural areas (Expert-D, 26/05/2015). 
Alternatively, proper definition in policy and regulations for open access can assist in 
increasing universal access and service in rural areas, through the creation of NBN which 
is funded by universal service fund (USAF) and government (Expert-D, 26/05/2015). 
Rural connectivity can be realized through the usage of policy levers where government 
can impose open access principles. Furthermore, the government can put conditions for 
high demand spectrum and use the universal access service fund to subsidise the 
infrastructure to be rolled-out in the rural areas (Expert-E, 28/04/2015), (Expert-B, 
24/04/2015), (Operator-B, 14/05/2015), (Operator-D, 26/05/2015) and (Operator-C, 
26/05/2015). 
A clear incentive framework has to be developed by both ICASA and policy makers in 
order to provide applicants with an opportunity to roll-out infrastructure in rural areas 
(Expert-B, 24/04/2015). The framework should not have too many restrictions and should 
at least include those environmental issues which will be negotiated by the regulator. 
These are alternative ways of accelerating rural deployment of broadband (ibid). 
The Policy Maker suggested that other regulatory interventions such as Radio Access 
Network (RAN) sharing and national roaming be enforced as conditions of auctions like it 
happened in countries such as Colombia and Czech Republic (Policy Marker, 
23/01/2016). Operator-E (28/04/2015) and Operator-A (24/04/2015) are also of the view 
that there should also be consideration of Public Private Partnerships where both the 
government and private sector can be innovative co-builders of the infrastructure in rural 
areas. 
Expert-E (28/04/2015) suggested that the mixture of approaches can benefit the country 
with operators using their money to roll out infrastructure. Operators should use their own 
resources to roll-out in the rural areas and be innovative with new techniques that allow 
spectrum sharing through wholesale approach and open access model (ibid). Policy 
Maker (21/01/2016) is of the view that for the government to meet SA Connect targets, 
there is a need for ICASA to address rapid deployment guidelines and speed up the 
licensing of IMT frequency bands that have a better ecosystem. The example is the case 
of 1800 MHz, now the remaining bands are the 700 MHz and 800 MHz that are essential 
for the coverage of the marginalised areas and in-building penetration.  
For rural connectivity spectrum, sharing through embracing the Wi-Fi approach has the 
potential of alleviating challenges facing rural connectivity, the same applies to  new 
techniques through the usage of TV white spaces (Expert-B,24/04/2015). Researcher 
(29/04/15) is of the view that dynamic spectrum access can be used as a solution for 
broadband access in rural areas as opposed to urban areas. This is because there is 
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more demand of broadband services in urban than in rural areas, therefore there is a 
need for capacity needed to increase in urban areas through assignment of spectrum to 
operators to ensure quality of services. 
Operator-D (26/05/2015) is of the view that MVNOs represents open access on a non-
discriminatory basis. Therefore, there is no need for South Africa to reinvent the wheel 
through the development of policy for open access. South Africa should consider adopting 
the French model of open access through non-discriminatory access to the incumbent 
networks. 
There was overwhelming view from the respondents that lack of spectrum is stifling 
competition. Operators are unable to switch off the legacy technologies since the majority 
of South Africans are still using 2G services. Therefore, operators are held back from 
introducing new technologies such as LTE as a result of lack of spectrum. Operator-D 
(26/05/2015) suggests light touch regulation to enable competition and the sector to 
growth. 
4.5.4. Interventions for effective regulation 
Capable technical personnel with proper remuneration to attract relevant people who will 
be able to perform technical work will be an intervention that might be able to help ICASA 
to develop effective regulation. This is because at the moment the regulator do not have 
proper personnel (Expert-B, 14/05/2015).  
Policy Maker was of the view that ICASA regulates broadcasting, electronic 
communications and postal services (Policy Maker, 23/01/2016).ICASA has a 
constitutional mandate in broadcasting but its role in electronic communications and 
broadband in particular is governed by legislation. Specifically, it has a mandate to 
provide further direction on universal service and services for schools, and promote 
competition (ibid). 
In a liberalised market, ICASA needs to exercise its mandate especially in relation to 
spectrum licensing (Policy Maker, 23/01/2016). This must be done within the context of a 
modern spectrum policy framework (ibid). The question is ‘what is that modern spectrum 
policy framework?’ In most markets, this framework is government's intention to direct the 
regulator to rely on market forces to the extent feasible under the ECA. Also, to regulate 
radio spectrum in a manner that allows market forces to the minimum extent necessary 
(Policy Maker, 23/01/2016). 
Minimum interventions through government policy imply that ICASA will not have a 
burden to regulate everything given that technology is changing rapidly (Policy Maker 
23/01/2016 and Expert-B, 24/04/2015). But government still has the responsibility to 
ensure that as South Africa strives for an effective spectrum policy and management, that 
shift should continue to serve the social and economic interests of all (Expert-D, 
26/05/2015). 
Policy Maker stated that the effective regulation of markets in Europe, America, Canada 
and Asia has shifted the focus to addressing the following issues: the application of 
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economic incentives and market forces in spectrum management, facilitating the use of 
spectrum, roll-out license conditions, advances in technology, facilitating electronic 
communications in rural and remote areas and public safety (Policy Maker, 23/01/2016).  
To ensure effective regulation for radio spectrum, property rights should not be allowed 
in ICASA’s regulation because that will be incompatible with efficient spectrum use. 
Rather, it encourages spectrum hoarding because a spectrum licensee can refuse other 
spectrum users from using their spectrum as they will evoke the right to property doctrine 
to their licensed spectrum (Expert D, 26/05/2015 and Expert B, 24/04/2015). Policy Maker 
is of the view that the introduction of market-based mechanisms in ICASA’s regulations 
has the potential of complementing market liberalisation (Policy Maker, 23/01/2016).  
The Electronic Communication Act is an open access legislation yet to be implemented 
through the development of regulations (Expert-F 28/04/2015). The regulations need to 
have principles of non-discrimination, quality of service and transparency clearly 
articulated to encourage infrastructure sharing (Expert-F, 28/04/2015) and (Researcher, 
29/04/2015). Mobile networks will have a problem with open access if the regulations go 
deeper the networks (ibid). Wholesale networks can enable service competition in their 
networks, on a non-discriminatory, quality of service and transparent manner as offered 
by the network operators with the pricing as the same as that of the network operators 
service providers (Expert F, 28/04/2015).  
For effective regulation of spectrum, intervention such as spectrum audits conducted by 
the regulator become necessary (Expert-B, 12/05/2015), (Operator-A, 24/04/2015), 
(Expert-E, 28/04/2015) and (Expert-F, 28/04/2015). This will assist the regulator to 
determine how efficiently the licensed spectrum is being used by the operators. In 
addition, the regulator should be in a position to make operators account for the spectrum 
usage and for the quality of service they offer. Lastly, the regulator must ensure universal 
access of services (Expert-A, 12/05/2015). 
Operator-B (14/05/2015) is of the view that ICASA should strive to keep accurate 
spectrum records as that will result in effective regulation of spectrum. Example, currently 
ICASA does not have the C-band spectrum records that will indicate who is in those bands 
between broadcasters and mobile operators. Operator-B further provided an example 
where in one meeting ICASA indicated that mobile operators are buying satellite capacity 
while mobile operators are actually using their own spectrum for the backhaul links 
(Operator-B, 14/05/2015).  
In terms of access to information, ICASA always relies on the industry, hence competition 
in the market is a challenge (Expert-D, 26/05/2015). Operators have a wider knowledge 
base than the regulatory. Regulator is not empowered to perform their regulatory 
responsibilities; they always have to fight their mandate on court bases (ibid). ICASA 
needs to be functional and financially independent because the regulator must not rely 
on industry to access information in order for it to be an effective regulator (Expert-D, 
26/05/2015). 
 83 
4.5 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION  
The researcher identified the following problems relating to radio spectrum reforms as a 
contributing measure to continued market liberalisation:   
 Ineffective regulation for dominant players  
 Inefficiencies of employing conventional command-and-control approach for 
assigning radio spectrum 
 Vertically integrated market structure which resulted in structural constrains for the 
market  
 Delay in assigning radio spectrum  
 Introduction of open access and infrastructure sharing for rural areas    
 Introduction of competition at service level as opposed to infrastructure for urban 
areas  
These issues identified will be discussed in chapter 5.       
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5 CHAPTER FIVE: ANALYSIS OF RADIO SPECTRUM REFORMS AND 
THEIR EFFECT ON MARKET LIBERALISATION  
This chapter declares the results of qualitative analysis of the documentation and survey 
responses as presented in Chapter 4. The results are delivered in the form of strides 
made in radio spectrum reforms and the associated extent of market liberalisation to 
achieve universal broadband for all using the conceptual framework depicted in figure 6. 
This emulate copies a phased approach proposal in addressing radio spectrum reform in 
a country as proposed by World Bank paper (Wellenius & Neto, 2008). It will outline 
reform strategies discovered in the analysis of documents and interviews conducted. 
5.1 STRIDE 1: ESTABLISHMENT OF AN INDEPENDENT REGULATOR 
OF THE INDUSTRY AND RADIO SPECTRUM 
In 1996, an independent regulator was established which led to the introduction of other 
operators to access radio spectrum to provide services. Vodacom and MTN were licensed 
in both the 900 MHz and 1800 MHz bands, a regulatory intervention that brought about a 
level of competition and liberalisation of the market. Few years after 1996, Cell C was 
introduced and awarded similar radio spectrum. It also created a monopolistic market with 
one fixed operator dominating the market until 2005 when Neotel was licensed as a 
second fixed operator. This stride introduced a certain level of competition for mobile and 
fixed services. Further to that, there was access to radio spectrum by players in the 
market.   
 During the survey, the respondents confirmed that a level of competition was 
experienced as a result of the licensing of radio spectrum to the above-mentioned mobile 
operators. However, it was also clear from the survey that the competition introduced was 
not highly effective. On the contrary, there was a rapid uptake of 2G phone services using 
GSM. As shown in figure 6 on the conceptual framework, the radio spectrum regulatory 
intervention was focused on market liberalisation and placed less focus on market based 
approaches, such as auctions.   
The regulator through regulatory intervention it created an exclusive assignment of radio 
spectrum to licensees. This exclusive assignment stifled innovation. Backhaul for radio 
spectrum was reserved for Telkom and this limited operators to innovate and self-provide 
through the roll-out of their own infrastructure. This policy position, in actual fact, stifled 
competition and hampered market liberalisation. However, this stride created availability 
of competing platforms such as end-to-end operators, satellite and the Asymmetric Digital 
Subscriber Line (ASDL). As Cave, Minervini & Mfuh (2008) postulates, command-and-
control introduced competition on an infrastructure level where operators vigorously rolled 
out infrastructure in order to sharpen commercial rivalries and to promote service 
differentiation.     
The regulator, through its regulatory intervention it created an exlusive assignment of 
radio spectrum to licensees which stifled innovation. Radio spectrum for backhaul was 
reserved for Telkom limiting operators to innovate and self-provide through rolling out 
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their own infrastructure. This policy position in actual fact stifled competition and 
hampered market liberalisation This stride however, created availability of competiting 
platfrms such as end-to end operators, satellite and Asymmetric digital subscriber line 
(ASDL). As Cave, Minervini & Mfuh (2008)  postulates command-and-control introduced 
competition on infrstrature level where operators vigorously rolled-out infrastrature in 
order to sahpen commercial rivalries and promotion of service differentiation.      
While the independence of radio spectrum management was realised through the 
introduction of an independent body, command-and-control was still practised as a 
primary approach. For example, radio spectrum was awarded to the operators 
administratively with prescribed conditions akin to command-and-control as a method of 
managing it. The radio spectrum licences precisely described the radio spectrum and the 
type of technology to be used and services to be provided using the assigned radio 
spectrum. This made it possible to create a trajectory of wireless technology for 
harmonisation of radio spectrum, which consequently presented an advantage of 
interoperability and economies of scale (Cave, Minervini, & Mfuh, 2008).       
Through this intervention, the management of the radio spectrum was still centralised and 
the government remained the custodian of the radio spectrum. The challenges associated 
with radio spectrum property rights were never clearly defined. This was another defect 
to market liberalisation. It further introduced a hierarchy of users, i.e. primary and 
secondary, who enjoyed varying levels of protection in terms of usage of radio spectrum 
(Cave, Minervini, & Mfuh, 2008).   
Given the above analysis, there is a call for radio spectrum reformation to increase market 
liberalisation. Radio spectrum management remained a limiting factor for flourishing 
market liberalisation. The command-and-control approach adopted brought about an 
oligopolistic market structure partly due to inefficient radio spectrum management 
approaches. Some of the responses during interviews argued that the fragmentation of 
radio spectrum assigned to one of the operators affects the performance of the network, 
hence the lack of effective competition in the telecommunications sector. While this might 
not explain the technical issues, it points to a lack of flexibility for players to manage 
aspects of the licensed radio spectrum efficiently. For the operators to efficiently make 
use of the radio spectrum awarded to them, it would require a by-in of the regulator which 
has to provide an approval for any change which might arise as a result of ensuring 
efficiency in radio spectrum usage. This is a very tedious and time consuming process.  
Further example of inefficiencies due to command-and-control is the fact that radio 
spectrum pooling has never been practiced in the market by operators. This encouraged 
radio spectrum hoarding by a few, an action which can be attributed to manifestation of 
tragedy of anti-commons. As shown by the interviews, incumbents still argue that 
additional radio spectrum should not be given to new entrants but be consolidated with 
them. It further made any assignment and allocation to displace the rights to the 
incumbents and generates opposition to change. This made the issue of radio spectrum 
assignment and allocation to be an inherently political process with many competing 
interests. It has been evident over years that incumbents have done everything possible 
to ensure that additional radio spectrum is not released in case it falls in the hands of new 
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entrants. This was actually supported by a response provided during interview where it 
was stated, with all ITAs issued by the regulator it is a clear indication that the regulator 
intends to release radio spectrum and introduce more players in the market. However 
there is a strategy by existing players to frustrate the process of releasing radio spectrum, 
in an attempt to delay introduction of competition in the market. Similar challenge has 
further been displayed in the digital migration process which will see the release of the 
digital dividend radio spectrum for the broadband services.  For South Africa, the process 
has taken too long and not even a little progress has been done, while other countries 
have concluded the process with services already been deployed a couple of years ago 
already. 
The first stride made had a huge contribution in ensuring some level of market 
liberalisation; however it was still based on the same traditional command-and-control 
approach, an inefficient radio spectrum management approach. Figure 7 show that the 
first stride has created oligopolistic market structure.  
 
Figure 7: South African mobile market share by players 
 
Source: BusinessTech, 2015   
As a result, Vodacom has 38% market share, MTN has 33.2 %, Cell C has 25% compared 
to Telkom’s 2.6 % market shares, and the remaining 0.7 % market share sitting with other 
(Business Tech, 2015). Over the years, radio spectrum reforms initiated by the 
independent regulator have seen considerable amounts of progress made in terms of 
profits by players in the market over the years. Figure 8 indicates a steady increase in 
terms of profits margins made by the players from the year 2003 to 2013 with tremendous 
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drop of profit margins by Telkom over the years compared to its competitors. This can be 
attributed to market share percentages depicted in figure 7. 
Figure 8: Operators profit margins 
 
Source: BusinessTech, 2013 
5.2 STRIDE 2:  INCREASED ACCESS TO RADIO SPECTRUM 
Up until 5th February 2000 the utilisation of most of the radio spectrum was predominantly 
limited to Telkom. At this point, the eleven incumbent operators became able to self-
provide their own backhaul. The promulgation of the ECA made it possible for every 
ECNS and ECS licensee to apply for use of any types of radio spectrum they deem 
necessary. Using the conceptual framework in chapter 2 there was further controlled 
liberalisation of the market in that players could: 
● to self-provide through building their own infrastructure; 
● provide access and services through microwave radio spectrum; and 
● use license exempt radio spectrum.  
However, this was not fully realised until the 2008 Altech decision took effect, providing 
some 451 VANS licensees with licences equivalent to Telkom and the other ten 
previously advantaged licensees on the 19th January 2009. With the new dispensation, 
new entrants could be able to use access radio spectrum that is not in high demand. This 
allowed better innovation, possible reduction of the cost of doing business and better 
competition. It further provided an opportunity for flexibility in radio spectrum management 
where users of radio spectrum are allowed to access whenever they need to.  
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However, respondents felt competition was still not adequate as a result of ineffective 
radio spectrum management by the regulator. Further, respondents felt that the lead time 
for radio spectrum applications were too long and not properly planned for from the side 
of the regulator and the policy maker. For example, there is no mechanism to release 
“high-demand” access radio spectrum as both the policy maker and the regulator have 
taken too long to give effect to the draft documents such as the 2011 draft policy directions 
and the three ITAs. This is a process that will help to release the radio spectrum for the 
provision of broadband services. Applications for radio spectrum not in high demand can 
take up to  six months to a year and even more, and the requirements are unnecessary 
stringent. This aspect becomes another limiting factor for market liberalisation. 
Even more so South Africa has also experienced unnecessary delays with regard to the 
release of high demand radio spectrum especially 2.6 GHz which does not have any 
dependencies compared to the digital dividend radio spectrum. The digital radio spectrum 
800 MHz and 700 MHz is depended on the digital migration process for it to be used for 
broadband services. The release of 2.6 GHz radio spectrum has a great potential to 
increase access to radio spectrum by players, thus introduce further competitiveness in 
the market and contribute to market liberalisation. 
Due to these challenges some respondents held a mistaken view that the regulator does 
not have records of radio spectrum use and some thought that access to radio spectrum 
could be increased through spectrum audits. The reality is that previous radio spectrum 
audits have not provided any new information and the issues of lead time and inability to 
assign radio spectrum by the regulator has nothing to do with lack of information and 
hence lack radio spectrum audits. The results of previous audits have not influenced any 
regulations by the regulator to increase access to radio spectrum. 
The other inefficient radio spectrum regulatory intervention which demonstrates an 
element of not helping in ensuring that there is an increased access to radio frequency 
spectrum is the licensing of radio spectrum on an exclusive basis. The fact that radio 
spectrum was awarded to operators on a national and exclusive basis, not only stifled 
competition but also exacerbated the dominance of some of players in the market. The 
regulations do not present incentives to radio spectrum holders to innovatively come with 
up ways that will enable an increased access to radio spectrum by other players in the 
market. For example section 31 of the ECA states that no person may transmit any signal 
or radio apparatus to receive any signal by radio except under and in accordance with a 
radio spectrum license, in addition to a license to provide services there is requirement 
that one has to have a radio spectrum license (RSA, 2005). This is another inhibitor of 
progress to further market liberalisation. 
Unlicensed radio spectrum was another reform which greatly benefited some level of 
competition in the broadband wireless and efficient use of radio spectrum, an innovation 
in technology that relies on short-distance radio communication (Public Knowldge , n.d). 
The responses during interviews confirmed the level of competition brought by the 
success of Wi-Fi in the wireless broadband for South Africa. This experienced a lot of 
Internet service providers starting to give more competition through access to 5 GHz radio 
spectrum. Interviewees spoke of an appeal made to the regulator to find ways to expand 
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the availability of unlicensed radio spectrum for the future in order to increase level 
competition for wireless broadband services.  National Broadband Policy states that there 
is a need to make available sufficient radio spectrum for extensive Wi-Fi and other public 
access technologies and services (DoC, 2013). 
The second stride made an appreciable progression for radio spectrum reforms. The 
potential for more effective competition was somewhat increased. However, this was only 
limited to a few players already in the market due to some requirements stated in policy 
and regulations.Therefore, progression for market liberalisation was not extensive 
compared to the reforms. It was at this stride where elemnts of market libeerlisation rising 
quiker than radio spectrum as shown in figure 6 were starting to be evident.    
5.3 STRIDE 3: SERVICE AND TECHNOLOGY NEUTRALITY ON RADIO 
SPECTRUM 
Service and technology neutrality introduce some level of flexibility into radio spectrum 
usage which leads to loss of control for the regulator in radio spectrum management. It is 
also an incentive for innovation, has the potential to reduce barriers to entry and support 
competition. However, as it may liberalise a market, it increases the risk of harmful 
interference  as a result of a combination of technologies using similar radio spectrum 
(London Economics, 2008).Therefore , creation of a strategy to address these challenges 
becomes an integral part to realise the effectiveness of service and technology neutrality 
for the market (London Economics, 2008).  
For South Africa, the doctrine of service and technology neutrality has been advocated in 
a number of documents, namely, the ECA, National Spectrum Policy, and ICASA’s radio 
spectrum regulations, SA Connect, National Broadband Policy and the NDP. Explicitly, 
the NDP states that the policy should promote the notion of technology neutrality for the 
licensing of radio spectrum to allow for flexible use as well as competition where 
incumbents will not be prohibited from gaining access to the digital dividend radio 
spectrum (NDP, 2012). 
This stride further emulated a regulatory tool which alluded to one of the strategies 
postulated by Wellenius and Neto in 2008 for market liberalisation, even though it has not 
been used to the full extent in practice. This element of radio spectrum reforms ensures 
that radio spectrum is not only assigned to those who value it the most, but it is also used 
for services that are most likely to derive value, thus result in radio spectrum efficiency. 
Clearly defined radio spectrum property rights as a reform plays a vital role in this stride 
as it gives users of radio spectrum full rights to implement technology and service 
neutrality. It was indicated that a lack of releasing the high demand radio spectrum by 
both the policy maker and regulator has made it difficult for players to realise the benefits 
presented by service and technology neutrality. This is worsened by a lack of properly 
defined property rights for radio spectrum.  Because most South African consumers are 
still using 2G services, refarming 900 MHz and 1800 MHz to provide LTE services will not 
be idealThis view is supported by some of the respondents who believed that a decision 
to provide dynamic radio spectrum access a chance to be practised in South Africa has 
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a great potential to give effect to this radio spectrum reform. It should however be 
mentioned that there was also some concerns raised by other respondents suggesting 
that caution should be exercised when it comes to employment of dynamic spectrum 
access. They indicated it will be a premature action for the regulator to even think about 
employing dynamic spectrum access as it is has to address the issue of releasing high 
demand radio spectrum. 
The use of service and technology neutrality has manifested by the refarming of 2G and 
3G radio spectrum to 4G radio spectrum. The operators who were previously licenced for 
voice can today provide data in the same networks. As explained by other respondents 
during interviews that Telkom was initially assigned spectrum in 2.3 GHz radio spectrum 
for backhaul, which they now use for provision of mobile services.  There was also some 
concerns raised regarding the refarming of radio spectrum to give effect to service and 
technology neutrality as most South Africans, especially in rural areas, are still using 2G 
services. Therefore, continuous refarming of radio spectrum for LTE networks in the long 
run might come at the expense of the consumers. 
Service technology neutrality has blurred the line between data and voice, and between 
landline and mobile, which further stimulates market liberalisation and competition. 
Operators are free to provide various services at all levels using radio spectrum and 
technologies. 
This third stride stimulated further progress on both radio spectrum reforms and market 
liberalisation as reflected in figure 6. The economic efficiency of radio spectrum use was 
evident, with more value service offered in the radio spectrum and newer business 
models. Greater technical efficiency brought about by newer technologies and refarming 
of the radio spectrum could be realised. It has further made possible for players to employ 
strategies such as radio spectrum refarming to enable the roll-out of new technologies, 
such as LTE, to meet end-user demands. 
5.4 STRIDE 4: ESSENTIAL FACILITIES TO ENABLE SHARING  
The ECA gave way to regulations on essential facilities and facilities leasing or sharing in 
terms of section 43 (8). An essential facility in terms of the ECA is defined as an electronic 
communication facility that is predominantly provided by a single or limited number of 
licensees and cannot feasibly be substituted or duplicated in order to provide services, 
and examples given are local loop, sub loops and associated electronic facilities for 
accessing subscribers and provisioning services (RSA, 2005). Radio spectrum as a 
scarce resource enables players in the market to have essential facilities such as their 
infrastructure networks. The definition of essential facilities as expressed in the ECA 
should give a way for radio spectrum sharing and leasing. This would further liberate the 
market and allow more players gain access to radio spectrum as an essential facility in 
the process of providing services through having access to infrastructure owned by their 
competitors. 
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The definition in the ECA suggests that radio spectrum is indeed an essential facility. 
However, the regulations for essential facilities have still not been concluded since 2007. 
The draft regulations did not list radio spectrum as an essential facility, even though the 
definition in the ECA suggests that it is. This has left uncertainty in the industry around 
radio spectrum leasing and sharing, and has further limited market liberalisation and 
allowed anti-competitive behaviour by the dominant players.  
The respondents suggested that essential facilities, and facilities leasing and sharing 
concepts give effect to open access as contained in the ECA. Therefore, this gives the 
assertion that open access is a separate and greater stride of radio spectrum reforms. It 
can be shown that open access is an important radio spectrum reform that can ensure 
greater market liberalisation supported by flexibility. The ICT Integrated Policy Review 
report noted that access to critical and essential infrastructure is of vital importance for 
the achievement of South Africa Connect policy objectives of universal and access 
broadband services for all by 2030. It further indicated access to essential infrastructure 
is one of the bottlenecks that exist in the electronic communications sector that affects 
effective competition  (DTPS, 2015). 
To show the importance of access to essential infrastructure, the ICT Integrated Review 
report recommend sharing of active electronic elements of the network or national 
roaming based on market competition analysis. It also supports sharing of Radio Access 
Network (RAN) to ensure effective usage of radio spectrum. These recommendations 
were also supported by some of the respondents during interviews.  
Essential facilities and facilities leasing and sharing applied to radio spectrum bring about 
huge opportunities for effective competition, flexibility and market liberalisation. Newer 
players may be able to make use of radio spectrum without actually having a radio 
spectrum licence. They may be able to use infrastructure of the incumbents to provide 
services and thus compete at a service level. This stride becomes a springboard for 
wireless open access, radio spectrum trading and service based competition. However, 
it must be said that there has not been huge enthusiasm in the market for facilities leasing 
and infrastructure sharing. Even though this has potential to deliver a broad range of 
services through access to radio spectrum, there are no incentives for players to use it.  
Instead, this is used by players to curtail competition by denying their competitors access 
to radio spectrum and thus resulting in ineffective competition: the “tragedy of anti-
commons”. This regulatory intervention represents the saturation point depicted in figure 
6.         
5.5 STRIDE 5: MARKET-BASED APPROACHES RADIO SPECTRUM 
PRICING AIP 
Market-based approaches predominantly take into account the economics of radio 
spectrum, with an attempt to solve the demand and supply problem. The total supply of 
radio spectrum is finite, but the extent to which it can be used depends on innovation. 
Both supply and demand of radio spectrum is affected by innovation. Market based 
approaches incentivise innovation, which in turn affects radio spectrum usage efficiency. 
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It can be shown that demand for radio spectrum increases with falling prices, whereas 
the supply remains invariant (Marks, et al., 2006).  
Market based mechanisms include AIP, radio spectrum auctions and radio spectrum 
trading in secondary markets. The mechanisms typically co-exist with each other. The 
ECA does not directly mandate market based approaches in management of radio 
spectrum as an alternative approach to command-and-control. However, it does refer to 
efficient radio spectrum management and to competitive bidding processes for radio 
spectrum acquisition, especially where demand for available radio spectrum exceeds 
supply (RSA, 2005). Further, the National spectrum policy prefers the employment of 
market based approaches where demand exceeds supply to be considered by the 
regulator to assign radio spectrum (DoC, 2010). Similarly, ICASA regulations and 
published ITAs make reference to market based approaches to ensure efficiency and 
flexibility in radio spectrum management. On the other hand, the NDP states that market 
based approaches such as auctioning or reverse bidding of the radio spectrum as a form 
of licensing as well as radio spectrum trading should be considered by the regulator (NDP, 
2012). 
AIP as a regulatory tool further represents a plateau where the market liberalisation is 
saturated in figure 6. This is a pricing strategy introduced by the regulator in South Africa 
through radio spectrum fee regulations. The application of AIP has been instrumental in 
improving efficient use of radio spectrum in South Africa. Since the implementation of AIP 
regulations, some operators, such as Sentech and Telkom, offered to give back some of 
the radio spectrum they held. This presented new players with the opportunity to obtain 
radio spectrum, although the impact would be negligible in terms of the number of new 
entrants. It further represented a stride for efficient radio spectrum management. The 
respondents to the interviews further indicated that AIP managed to level the playing field 
in terms of ensuring players in the market pay equal radio spectrum fees.     
Auctions were pronounced as the preferred method to award the digital dividend radio 
spectrum. This has been stated in the draft ITAs published by ICASA for releasing the 
high demand radio spectrum. The NDP also states that auctioning or reverse bidding of 
the radio frequency spectrum should be a method to license radio spectrum as well as 
radio spectrum trading. 
However, the regulator has failed to get buy-in for radio spectrum auctions and to date, 
any attempts to introduce radio spectrum auctions have failed. Radio spectrum trading is 
alluded to in the form of radio spectrum leasing, but the full extent of radio spectrum 
trading remains unclear in terms of the ECA. 
There were two opposing views put across during interviews on radio spectrum auctions. 
The one group felt that even though auctions have the potential to introduce flexibility to 
command-and-control, they also present some elements to act as a barrier of entry for 
new entrants, and by doing so, entrench the dominance of the incumbents. The other 
group strongly suggested that auctions should complement command-and- control to 
create a hybrid model for awarding radio spectrum licenses to ensure flexibility. 
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The integrated ICT review report suggests that there is not an obvious benefit for radio 
spectrum trading and auctions. It must be said that while market based approaches might 
have to some extent enabled efficient utilisation of radio spectrum, in the long term it 
entrenches the exclusivity in utilisation of radio spectrum.This inadvertently stifles 
competition and has a negative contribution towards market liberalisation “the tragedy of 
anti-commons”.  
5.6  STRIDE 6: SERVICE BASED COMPETITION VERSUS 
INFRASTRUCTURE BASED COMPETITION 
Infrastructure based competition is characterised by horizontal market structure, with 
market forces determining what will be sustainable for business models and market 
structure. It further provides the market forces the legitimacy to decide on what is effective 
competition for the market (Broadband Prime, 2008). While service based competition 
according to information gathered during interviews is about open access to networks 
through one established infrastructure operator in a form of National broadband network 
that will allow access to its network by its competitors for provision of services. This has 
potential for open access incentives which not only lowers the financial barriers new 
market players, but also increases access to radio spectrum while ensuring non-profitable 
areas are served (Broadband Prime, 2008).  
Both the NDP and National Broadband Policy have stated the importance of South Africa 
to rather focus on service based competition than infrastructure based competition. The 
NDP indicated the importance to review  the market structure and analysis of benefits 
and costs of duplicating or sharing infrastructure , given that the radio  spectrum on which 
mobile broadband depends is limited (NDP, 2012, p. 191).  
While National Broadband Policy states that there should be a feasibility study to establish 
whether there should be multiple national broadband networks or a single network to 
provide broadband services to all by 2030. The national broadband network   envisaged 
is to provide wholesale wireless open access services to other players. This would allow 
other players who do not have access to radio spectrum to provide wireless and mobile 
services. This radio spectrum reform ensures that access to radio spectrum is no longer 
a barrier to entry to the market, hence improving competition and making huge leap 
towards market liberalisation. 
In South Africa services based competition concept as a phenomenon enabled strategies 
such as national roaming to allow Mobile Virtual Networks (MVNOs) to access radio 
spectrum and provide services and incentivises players to be more innovative, thus 
improving competition.  
Respondents during interviews suggested in urban areas there is sufficient competition 
with regard to infrastructure and networks. Therefore what is required is the regulator to 
release radio spectrum to enhance competition through better networks. This will ensure 
that the demands of consumers in metropolitan areas are met and service based 
competition is enabled. While for rural areas there is not sufficient infrastructure hence 
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the need to create more infrastructures to meet National broadband policy imperatives 
for universal access for all.  
This sixth stride made improved progression on market liberalisation and created some 
level of competition for metropolitan areas and minimal infrastructure sharing elements 
presented through roaming, with lack of infrastructure in rural areas. It ideal to move from 
continuous infrastructure competition but service based competition to further bring 
market liberalisation. Similarly, this regulatory intervention represents a plateau in market 
liberalisation as shown in figure 9.   
5.7  STRIDE 7: NON-RIVAL NON-EXCLUSIVE UTILISATION OF RADIO 
SPECTRUM 
The third stride made improved progression on both radio spectrum reforms and market 
liberalisation. The economic efficiency for the usage of radio spectrum was evident, with 
more value-added services offered in the radio spectrum and newer business models as 
depicted in figure 7 below. This regulatory intervention represents market liberalisation 
driven by radio spectrum reforms as shown in figure 6. In this stride the priority is given 
to radio spectrum with market liberalisation marginalised.    
 
 
 
Figure 9: Economical perspective of radio spectrum management 
 
Source: Researche’s own 
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Market-based approaches, like command-and-control, continue to entrench exclusive 
allocation and assignment of radio spectrum and cause the tragedy of anti-commons. 
With this dominant players ensure that other players do not have means to compete, such 
as having no access to radio spectrum.  
On the other hand the stride on service based competition, serving as a springboard for 
wholesale open access, does well in encouraging new entrants and somehow level the 
playing field. However, dominant players tend to rely on the integrated market structure 
for themselves and compete unfairly with new entrants or those who do not have access 
to radio spectrum. 
New technologies including cognitive radio and dynamic radio spectrum access make the 
phenomenon of self-regulation and dynamic coordination a reality. This means that, at 
least in theory and with a little coordination, it is possible for adjacent radio stations to use 
the same radio spectrum without causing harmful interference.  In economics terms this 
is referred to as non-rival. If many players can make use of the radio spectrum in this 
manner, then the radio spectrum can be considered almost non-exclusive. Therefore non-
rival and non-exclusive utilisation of radio spectrum could be considered the ultimate goal 
to deal with both economic and technical issues in radio spectrum management. This will 
result to universal access to broadband services through a liberalised market.  
ICASA’s discussion document on Dynamic radio spectrum access states that the dynamic 
spectrum regime provides the users with incentives to ensure innovation providing 
services.  The National Broadband Policy and National Radio Spectrum Policy support 
radio spectrum sharing between licensees and across services to enable efficient use of 
radio spectrum. The National Broadband Policy also supports the enabling of dynamic 
radio spectrum access.  
The respondents suggested that essential facility leasing and sharing concepts give effect 
to open access and that there is no need for open access policy or regulation. In the end 
this will lead to realising radio spectrum as a public good that can be accessed and used 
by all to deliver services. While the National Broadband Policy states that open access 
will enable sharing of infrastructure platforms by service providers. This will allow 
competition at service and technology level, while facilitating service neutrality to allow 
flexibility in usage of resources (DoC, 2013). Open access will further facilitate the 
flexibility in usage of common principles and standards to enable interoperability and 
universal access to broadband services, while focusing on providing services in 
underserved areas and communities (DoC, 2013).  
The ICT Integrated Policy Review report recommends the open access regime that is 
supported by regulatory framework to satisfy effective access to the infrastructure, 
transparent services and access in a non-discriminatory manner.  
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5.8 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION  
This chapter analysed the data from interviews, providing better understanding of radio 
spectrum reforms and market liberalisation. This was done with data collected and 
reviewed from documents. New themes emerged and were presented in a form of strides 
representing regulatory steps taken informed by data from previous chapter.  
The analysis confirms the strategies alluded to by Wellienus and Neto on radio spectrum 
reforms for developing countries. It further reveals that there is a relationship between 
radio spectrum, even though there can be the adoption of radio spectrum reforms without 
market liberalisation. Recommendations for consideration by policy maker and regulator 
will be made in the next chapter.              
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6  CHAPTER SIX: CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS   
Radio spectrum management in the main is about access to and usage this rare natural 
resource by different radiocommunication services without causing any harmful 
interference thus ensuring quality of service to the end-users. Numbers of regulatory 
reforms have been used by regulators for market liberalisation. In this report, the 
relationship between market liberalisation and radio spectrum reforms has been 
presented. The effect of radio spectrum reforms on innovation, flexibility and efficiency to 
management of radio spectrum management is also demonstrated. 
As stated in chapter 1, prior to 1996, there was radio spectrum reform introduced which 
saw radio spectrum hosted under Telkom a state owned monopoly. During that period 
there was no market liberalisation as Telkom was the only player in the market providing 
services to the end-users. It provided basic telecommunications services, hence radio 
spectrum management was not focused on encouraging players to be innovative when 
providing services. Similarly, radio spectrum was in abundance with limited radio 
communications services requiring radio spectrum. The main objective of radio spectrum 
management was to ensure there is no harmful interference hence command-and-control 
as an approach was effective. However, radio spectrum reforms had fewer contributions 
on market liberalisation. 
6.1 STRIDE 1  
In 1996 the management of radio spectrum was moved to an independent body SATRA 
later ICASA, resulting in some form of market liberalisation. This saw the introduction of 
competition with radio spectrum awarded to two operators and later the third player was 
licensed to provide services. However, this move while introducing a level of competition 
did not bring much change in radio spectrum management as command-and-control was 
still prevalent. Rigidity and inflexibility for radio spectrum management remained. The 
radio spectrum licenses were prescriptive in terms of the type of services and the 
technology to be used to provide services. Even though a slight move towards market 
liberation was realised, radio spectrum remained a limiting factor for increasing 
competition. The introduction of an independent regulator in itself it is tool for reform; 
however in this study we consider the second stride as the initial step towards radio 
spectrum reform. 
6.2 STRIDE 2  
The second stride which was introduced in the ECA with increased access to radio 
spectrum is a step towards radio spectrum reform. Increased access to radio spectrum 
means any service provider was eligible to obtain any type of radio spectrum provided 
that radio spectrum is available. It meant that the options became many, allowing 
meaningful competition and innovation among the players. Regulatory tools such as 
licence-exempt and commons radio spectrum became a catalyst for internet service 
providers and value-added network systems (VANS) to be participants in the market 
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through provisioning of services to the end-users without necessarily own networks but 
using the infrastructure owned by others.   
6.3 STRIDE 3  
The ECA also brought about service and technology neutrality in radio spectrum 
management, as third stride to spectrum reforms. This move allowed broad range of radio 
communications services and it is at this point where innovation by services providers 
was further experienced which is benefiting the end-users. It enabled operators to use re-
farmed radio spectrum for new and advanced technologies as a temporary solution for 
lack of access to radio spectrum due to the delay of release of high demand radio 
spectrum by ICASA. This did not only ensured flexibility and efficiency in radio spectrum 
management; it also aided the market players in meeting the demands and needs of the 
consumers. It further allowed licensees to continue with the provision of basic mobile 
services such as 2G in nonprofitable areas of the country where more advanced services 
such as LTE are not yet a need for consumers.         
6.4 STRIDE 4  
The ECA further brought about essential facilities leasing and sharing. These regulatory 
tools, while improved radio spectrum efficiency, they did not necessarily move market 
liberalisation further. Part of the problem why market liberalisation was not further realised 
is a tragedy of anti-commons. In that radio spectrum as resource has the potential to allow 
multiple rights holders. However the licensing regime adopted in South Africa is still 
promoting exclusivity right to radio spectrum with majority of players are prevented from 
using it, frustrating further market liberalisation.  
6.5 STRIDE 5  
ICASA was successful in implementing a radio spectrum pricing strategy which is AIP. 
This is the first regulatory intervention based on market based approach adopted by the 
regulator. Efficiency on radio spectrum usage was realised with some operators offered 
to return excess radio spectrum to ICASA. It further played a role in levelling the playing 
field because the pricing formula for radio spectrum used by ICASA ensured that all 
players pay for radio spectrum equally.     
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6.6 STRIDE 6  
A huge stride around service based competition as opposed to infrastructure based 
competition will serve as springboard for advanced radio spectrum utilisation models and 
thus lead to further market liberalisation. This is backed by advancement in technology 
with innovation and new business models. It allows wholesale open access. However, if 
this regulatory tool is still based on command-and-control which is static and in the main 
favours dominant players, it will suffer the tragedy of anti-commons problem. Where a 
number of players prevent others from using radio spectrum, frustrating what would be a 
socially desirable outcome for universal access to broadband services.   
6.7 STRIDE 7  
Therefore, a more advanced model recommended should be based on non-rival and non-
exclusive usage of radio spectrum. This will allow market liberalisation, competition, 
flexibility and innovation and in the end they will be free markets. 
Market based approaches are important for radio spectrum management but do not 
remove the rivalry and exclusive nature of spectrum and suffer from the tragedy of anti-
commons. Like command-and-control, they entrenches exclusivity and rivalry. 
Given the challenges of integrated market and anticompetitive behaviour by players, it is 
recommended that any regulatory intervention has to look at open access as a signboard. 
This help with unlocking the issue of accessing radio spectrum for the purpose of ensuring 
universal access to broadband services. The second thing that the regulation is to create 
incentives to ensure facility leasing and sharing is enforceable. Even though market 
based approaches has potential to bring some market liberalisation it also has negative 
effect of encouraging rivalry and exclusivity. 
CONCLUSION   
Future challenges such as universal access to broadband services by all and industrial 
Revolution 4.0 will be shaped by a fresh wave of innovation in areas such as driverless 
cars, smart robotics, materials that are lighter and tougher, and a manufacturing process 
built around 3D printing. This era will see convergence of multiple sectors of technology 
and industry (artificial intelligence, nanotechnology, autonomous vehicles, to name a 
scant few) as evidence that humans are entering a new era of profound, exponentially 
increasing possibility and risk. Similarly ITO where technology will disrupt people’s lives 
through intelligent sensors improving efficiency while collapsing existing architecture into 
one and create systems that are more economic and effective and reduce operational 
costs. This will bring changes the type of workers, skills, and it will also bring additional 
value to end users.  These challenges recognise the need for us to prepare for the 
industrial revolution. Hence the shift on the assignment and allocation of radio spectrum 
not giving one entity radio spectrum, so we are able to respond to these changes and 
radio spectrum is at the centre of this revolution. 
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It is therefore recommended that consideration should be given to radio spectrum reforms 
which will enable non-rival and non-exclusive utilisation of radio spectrum to ensure 
efficiency in radio spectrum usage and management. If the status quo of radio spectrum 
management remains it will further limit efficient use of radio spectrum.  
A regime with elements of self-regulatory models could also be considered as an 
incentive to ensure that players embrace non-rivalry and non-exclusivity. This regime will 
address the challenge of the tragedy of anti-commons in that rightful licensees of radio 
spectrum would not be in a position to prevent other radio spectrum users to use it. It 
further do not encourage tragedy of commons in that shared-resource system where 
individual users acting independently would not prevent use of radio spectrum as a 
shared resource to their own self-interest to a point where the value of radio spectrum is 
depleted. The ultimate goal should be a market where radio spectrum is accessed as 
public good to enable efficiencies through innovation. In the end this has the potential of 
delivering the policy objectives of South Africa Connect of universal and affordable 
broadband services for all. 
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APPENDIX A: RESEARCH QUESTIONNAIRE  
 
Dear Sir/Madam 
My name is Cynthia Lesufi, currently working towards completion of the degree, Master 
Arts in ICT Policy and Regulation, at the University of Witwatersrand (WITS). The 
curriculum consists of coursework and research, which involves compilation of a 
Research Report. The research seeks to explore required spectrum reforms, in the “high 
demand broadband spectrum”, that could enable South Africa to fulfil national objectives 
as expended in the National Development Plan (NDP) and in the National Broadband 
Policy, “South Africa Connect”). Broadly, there is a requirement for high-speed, high 
quality broadband networks for everyone by 2030, facilitated by open access networks 
and highly competitive market structure. Efficient allocation and assignment of “high 
demand broadband spectrum” is seen as one of the main ingredients in creating an 
enabling environment to achieve the objectives. 
South Africa has always had an intention to liberalise the telecommunications market and 
increasing competition. On the other hand, there is the issue of spectrum scarcity which 
is required for market growth. It appears that issues around spectrum assignment and 
allocation may impact market liberalisation and competition. Therefore, these questions 
are aimed at establishing your perception about spectrum assignment and allocation, the 
way it has affected your business, as well as competition and liberalisation of the market 
in general.       
The main objectives of these questions are to:   
 To ascertain if current methods of assigning spectrum managed to bring 
effective competition in the market. 
 Trying to understand the core relation between liberalised of market and 
spectrum reforms  
All your responses will be held in strict confidence; findings will be summarized and no 
statements used in the report will be attributed directly to you. The interview will take 
approximately 60 minutes and with your permission, the proceedings will be recorded. 
Thanking you, 
C Lesufi  
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TOPIC: RADIO SPECTRUM REFORMS AND ASSOCIATED EFFECTS ON MARKET 
LIBERALISATION  
As part of the research methodology the following are questions used for data collection.    
Which current radio spectrum reforms are most likely to achieve market liberalisation for 
universal access to broadband services?    
 Sub-questions  
Q.1. To what extent can addressing radio spectrum management efficiencies in the 
South African context assist achieving universal access to broadband 
services? For instance, South Africa Connect, broadband policy calls for 100% 
broadband access and this policy objective expands what the National 
Development Plan is calling for, which is: 
 Timeous allocation  and assignment of radio spectrum to roll-out 
broadband infrastructure and provide broadband services   
 Proper development and  implementation of monitoring strategies for 
efficient and effective usage of radio spectrum to eliminate radio 
spectrum shortage    
 Adoption of  proper radio spectrum fees strategies (commercial vs. 
government radio spectrum)  
 Spectrum refarming   
Q.2. To what extent can the current radio spectrum regulatory approach of licensing 
radio spectrum adopted by ICASA encourage competition and ensure 
infrastructure sharing? 
 Prohibition of radio spectrum trading in secondary markets  
 Prohibition of radio spectrum sharing  
 Administrative Incentive Pricing model   
 Command-and-control approach  
Q.3. To what extent can adoption of the alternative radio spectrum regulatory 
approach of licensing radio spectrum encourage competition in the following 
areas?  
 Market-based approaches (auctions and radio spectrum trading)  
 Radio spectrum pooling, commons and parks  
 Innovation  
 Probability of substitutability  
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 Redefinition of the market structure  
 Market consolidation  
 Increased accessibility and affordability of broadband services and 
infrastructure   
Q.4. Can an alternative radio spectrum regulatory approach of licensing radio 
spectrum possibly assist to address the cost associated with the usage and 
access of broadband services?  
Q.5. What regulatory interventions can ICASA possibly adopt to limit the possibility 
of consolidation of markets to distort competition and universal access?  
Q.6. To what extent can the employment of dynamic radio spectrum access 
improve efficiency in radio spectrum usage? 
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APPENDIX B: Participation Information Sheet   
Dear Sir/Madam 
My name is Cynthia Lesufi, currently working towards completion of the degree, Master 
Arts in ICT Policy and Regulation, at the University of Witwatersrand (WITS). The 
curriculum consists of coursework and research, which involves compilation of a 
Research Report. I kindly request that, you be a participant in my research.        
The main objectives are to:   
 To ascertain if current methods of assigning spectrum managed to bring 
effective competition in the market. 
 To try and understand the core relation between liberalisation of market and 
spectrum reforms  
Your participation will be through an interview conducted with you. 
As a participant to the interview, you have the right to leave out some questions and you 
can refrain from answering any questions during the interview. If you also feel that some 
of the answers provided should not be mentioned in the research, you have the right to 
indicate or mention that during or after the interview.        
Topic: Alternative spectrum reform approaches to enable National Broadband 
Policy “South Africa Connect”  
SECTION A - DETAILS OF THE PARTICIPANTS  
 
1. Organisation:  _______________________ 
2. Occupation: _______________________ 
3. Date of interview: _______________________ 
4. Length of time at institution/organisation: _______________________ 
5. Email and contact numbers: 
________________________________________________________ 
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